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Abstract 
This thesis puts forward a strong argument for why more up-to-date interactional research is 
needed into disputes and why disciplines, methodological approaches and theories should 
come second to the phenomenon. This thesis investigates how people behave in disputes. 
Disputes are a ubiquitous part of everyday life – we know a great a deal about disputes in 
particular contexts, how people disagree, and how disputes can be resolved. However, little is 
known about the specific interactional features of public disputes. Public disputes are 
disputes which occur in a public place where there are onlookers – for instance, on public 
transport, on the radio, or during protests, for instance. These are activities which regularly 
occur throughout everyday life as our opinions, beliefs, views, identity and/or knowledge etc. 
clash. This research examines actual, naturally-occurring disputes between strangers in 
public. The focus is on the ways that people challenge those contestations, resist those 
challenges, and manage their relationship with their co-disputant.  
  
 The data comprises a corpus of over 100 recordings of disputes between members of 
the public. The data were collected, transcribed, and analysed within an ethnomethodological 
framework using a combination of conversation analysis, membership categorisation 
analysis, and discursive psychology in order to demonstrate how the phenomenon is handled 
sequentially and rhetorically. This combination of approaches centres the phenomena rather 
than focusing on the application of methods. The three analytic chapters are organised around 
different features of disputes and address the overall structural organisation of a dispute. 
 
The first analytic chapter inspects enticing sequences, which is a way that a challenge 
can be produced that reverses the logic of the other’s argument. This chapter (Chapter 3) 
builds on previous research, and lays the groundwork for the other chapters, to show the 
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sequential placement and forms of resistance to challenges. This illustrates resistance as a 
solution to the practical problem of being trapped in a challenge with nowhere to go. The 
second analytic chapter investigates how people do partitioning, that is, how they exploit the 
boundaries of their situated identity, or category (i.e. from radio caller to father). This chapter 
(Chapter 4) shows how people reconfigure their relationship with their co-disputant(s), and 
how certain actions (i.e. requests, directives, instructions) trade on the relevance of this new 
relationship. The final analytic chapter examines how people work to appear ‘reasonable’ in a 
dispute. People seek to win a dispute and one way of accomplishing that is to be the 
‘reasonable’ person relative to the other’s unreasonable behaviour. In this chapter (Chapter 
5), I unpack this to show how, through meta-talk, people present their behaviour as 
reasonable, or the other’s behaviour as unreasonable, to produce a purportedly-rational 
argument. I reveal that whilst participants rarely express reasonableness, they do respond to 
transgressions of conversational norms (i.e. turn-taking, sequence). Consequently, this 
accomplishes a turn-at-talk and a chance to control the direction of the dispute.  
 
 The thesis presents a state-of-the-art examination of disputative interactions and 
contributes significantly to our understanding of the structural organisation of disputes and 
how people behave in public places. Throughout the course of the thesis, I establish 
frameworks for future research that combine ethnomethodological approaches, deals with the 
‘messiness’ and difficulty of public video-recordings, and develops an understanding of what 
a dispute actually is.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Disputes are a feature of our everyday life. They occur and may be characterised in different 
ways, though they largely regard at least two oppositional stances or opinions being taken by 
participants regarding some item, event, or view. What actually constitutes a dispute, conflict, 
argument, debate or discussion will be unpacked over the course of this chapter; crudely, 
however, a dispute in interactional terms is the manifestation of a challenge to some prior 
turn, which escalates. The complexity of understanding the makeup of a dispute occurs across 
a number of disciplines: psychology, linguistics, sociology, philosophy etc. For the purposes 
of this thesis I will largely draw on the work based in those four disciplines. 
 
 In the vernacular sense a dispute is a disagreement, or some competition, which arises 
from differing opinions, interests or principles. These are then generally understood as 
violative of some ‘ordinary’ conduct and represent a breakdown in ‘normal’ conversation. In 
the literature, disputes tend to be characterised as aggressive, destructive, disruptive and 
hostile (Collins, 2008). The studies I have identified herein employ a wide variety of research 
methods, including case studies, ethnographies, quantitative surveys, interviews, focus 
groups, critical discourse analysis and conversation analysis. A number of these studies treat 
disputes as a social problem requiring resolution, and have the objective to further a 
framework that improves upon mediation techniques and approaches; however, there is a 
small body of research that criticises this perspective and treats disputes as a constructive 
process (Church, 2009; Marcus, 1985; Nelson, 2001; Simmel, 1955). I have particularly 
focused on studies which adhere to empirical findings that treat disputes as neither a problem 
nor constructive, but a ritual of our everyday lives that informs us about interactional 
practices, culture and relationships.  
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 I pay particular attention to those studies for two reasons. First, it adheres to the 
interactional research tradition (Goffman, 1983; Sacks, 1984), as my subsequent chapters 
examine the sequential organisation of disputes as they are managed by participants. Second, 
I am interested in how disputes figure as interactional procedures and the resources employed 
by participants in their accomplishment. This perspective does not exclude literature from 
other fields, but rather remains in accordance with ethnomethodological principles 
(Garfinkel, 2002) (Chapter 2). In this sense, disputes are activities rich in features that can 
inform us of normative orientations to social order through violations of that order 
(Garfinkel, 1963). The literature review goes some way to explicate the large and varied body 
of research on disputes. Disputes are a well-established research topic and many of their 
features are understood by analysts and members alike. They are important to research 
because they are a primordial site of social order – that is, the norms of how people behave in 
everyday life ostensibly break down and new ‘norms’ are created. Kotthoff (1993) points out 
that disputes suspend the ‘normal’ routine of interaction and it’s these “violations” of the 
everyday that illuminate members’ own orientations to the routine accomplishment of talk-in-
interaction. Herein, I examine the social order and structural organisation of disputes to 
investigate three phenomena: how participants suppress and resist ongoing challenges, how 
participants reconfigure their relationships in the suppression and bringing off of a challenge, 
and how participants metadiscursively produce themselves as reasonable.  
 
Chapter summaries 
 
 
In Chapter 1, I begin by exploring disputes at the macro-level with a discussion on what 
constitutes a ‘dispute’. I examine the history of research into disputes from a social scientific 
perspective – how they have been traditionally investigated across disciplines. I move to 
more specific interactional research on disputes to make a case for the “moments and their 
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men” (Goffman, 1967, p.3), overviewing some interactional research and providing some 
example contexts where dispute research has typically been conducted. I then propose a 
taxonomy of disputes (specific for the research in this thesis) – this is done in order to clarify 
the differences between terms. I showcase the varied usage of language such as ‘dispute’, 
‘conflict’, ‘argument’, ‘quarrel’ etc. in the literature. I explain that each term has its own 
connotations and propose that (1) agreeing on a single term is pointless, (2) we should not 
“spin our wheels” trying to define a phenomena (see Janicki, 2017), and (3) that it does not 
matter a lot because we should be focusing less on analytic terms and more on language-in-
use. Characterising these activities as disputes is not about the word “dispute”: the word is 
just a convenient shorthand of a recognisable sort of sequence.  
 
Following this, I ask “why do people argue?” to illuminate some of the reasons that 
researchers have ascribed participants for disputing. I then unpack the interactional activity of 
disputing – first, I review literature so that a ‘dispute’ can be identified, and its composition 
examined. I consider the broad structural organisation of a dispute, from how it begins and is 
ratified by members themselves (Coulter, 1990) to how it ceases to be a dispute (Church, 
2009). However, as will become apparent in Chapter 2, these are not primary concerns for 
this research – so I will move on to how a dispute unfolds sequentially for members. In this 
section, I investigate some core sequential features of a dispute: challenges, resistance and 
(dis-)alignment, affiliation, preference, agreement, and their relevance for the findings 
revealed throughout the analysis. Furthermore, I discuss how these features are relevant for 
the moral order of disputes: I review literature which investigates how participants manage 
their identities and relationships through disputes. I then summarise the chapter and explain 
how this literature is applicable for the research presented in this thesis; finally, I ask four 
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questions which will guide the research and which I will return to in the discussion chapter.  
 
 Next, in Chapter 2, prior to the analytic chapters I set the scene for how I actually 
conducted this research. I describe how the data was collected and detail the practicalities for 
collecting data from an internet source. Building on the prior discussion of what constitutes a 
dispute, I explain the types of data which I am examining in this thesis – specifically, the 
three contexts where I am examining these disputes (radio, protest and public) – and how 
data was found and selected from these environments. I then detail transcription, storing the 
data, and importantly, ethical considerations for these recordings – here I will discuss the lack 
of relevant guidance on dealing with these data and propose some ways of ensuring and 
upholding the British Psychological Society (BPS) (2018) ethical guidelines. Following that, 
I describe the analytic particulars of Conversation Analysis, Membership Categorisation 
Analysis and Discursive Psychology, grounding them in their common root: 
ethnomethodology. As well as discussing how these methods are applied in the analysis, I 
explore how these methods can work together and be mutually beneficial – concluding that 
the phenomena is central to the analysis and that we should not get held up by the application 
of the methodology.  
 
 The following three chapters comprise the analysis. These are ordered to mirror the 
literature review and methodological approach, and to represent the move from challenge to 
resistance. Chapter 3 focuses on a particular type of challenge and how it can be resisted: 
enticers. I investigate enticers as a routine way that speakers in disputes manufacture a 
challenge that reverses the logic of the others’ argument. I build on Reynolds’ (2011; 2015) 
and Reber’s (2019) work to show what happens when these challenges are not canonically 
brought off in the face of resistance. I illustrate the sequential placement of resistance to 
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these challenges – specifically, that resistance occurs at the earliest point that the challenge is 
projectable (in accordance with Reynolds’ ‘phases’). I also show some forms that resistance 
may take and how this resistance is dealt with by the challenger. Significantly, I show how 
resistance is a solution to the interactional bind placed on the target of the challenge and how 
speakers (1) ostensibly comply to resist, (2) pursue an enticing challenge, and (3) resist by 
reversing the trajectory of the enticer. 
 
 In Chapter 4, I retain focus on the structural organisation of disputes by investigating 
how alternate categories are deployed to render certain actions as non-sanctionable. I show 
how members exploit the boundedness of identity categories in order to bring off or suppress 
challenges in disputes. I reveal how people (re)configure their relationship as a practical 
accomplishment through being heard (or seen) as an incumbent of a different category 
device. This shows how members themselves display the rights and responsibilities that 
certain devices afford, and more specifically, those actions which trade on the relevance of 
particular categories. I demonstrate how the practice of partitioning unfolds throughout a 
sequence – how these ‘new’ categories are mobilised, the actions that trade on them, and how 
they are ratified by the other participant(s) in and through a dispute.  
 
 In Chapter 5, I conclude the analytic chapters by focusing on how metadiscursive 
moves (talk about the conversation itself) are done in the service of doing being reasonable as 
a practical accomplishment for bringing off challenges. I describe three ways that these 
moves are constructed by speakers and unpick how this feature of a dispute speaks to the 
structural organisation as more important than the content of the dispute for ‘what-we’re-
doing’. I consider how speakers present their own conduct as ordinary and rational relative to 
the other speaker; I also show how speakers present the other participant(s)’ conduct as 
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violative in some way; and finally I show how speakers do being rational and manage the 
subjectivity of the argument in a dispute. I suggest that doing being reasonable is a concern 
for disputers, and more importantly, shows how members treat the structure of the dispute 
(and thus the activity) as a resource which is perhaps more valuable than the content of their 
turns.  
 
 In the final chapter, I will discuss the findings from this thesis, and how my thesis 
contributes to and expands our understanding of disputes from an interactional perspective. I 
describe the key themes that shape and are shaped by the nature of the interactions examined: 
morality and categories, sequence and accounting, and disputes. I suggest that members do 
(dis)order as a structural concern, and reflect on what disputes ontologically are in the emic 
sense as well as how participants themselves systematically produce disputes as an ongoing 
activity. I consider how participants may achieve a ‘win’ by simply achieving a turn and thus 
being able to control the direction of talk, even for just a moment. I discuss limitations of this 
thesis, including the ‘answers’ that this research can provide and the nature of the recordings 
analysed. I make the case that analysts should not avoid this ‘messy’ data, and that it can 
offer fruitful insights into how members do being in public, and do being in a dispute. I then 
propose directions for future research whilst underscoring the relative scarcity of research on 
the phenomenon investigated within this thesis. Finally, I offer possible practical implications 
for professions which encounter disputes and for research on disputes as a whole. I will then 
conclude by drawing together the key themes of this thesis to consider how disputes are part 
of the social fabric of everyday life. 
 
 Overall, this thesis will employ a novel cross-ethnomethodological approach to reveal 
interactional features of public disputes which occur across environments. I provide 
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instructions on how to access this type of data, how to analyse this type of data and why we 
should not restrict ourselves to a particular approach. This thesis contributes to our 
knowledge about disputes – how they are actually constituted and performed in and through 
talk-in-interaction by members themselves. 
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Chapter 1: 
Disputes: Reviewing what we know 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
 
Disputes, arguments and conflict are a part of our everyday life: they occur everywhere, 
between any number of people, and are considered by many as a problem. Disputes are, 
however, also a solution to a problem – when opinions, knowledge, or the subjective reality 
of a person’s world clash with another person’s, then there are three options: ignore this 
clash, discuss this clash, or dispute. These three options span numerous interactional contexts 
from people on a bus to the Court of Justice of the European Union, for instance. There is a 
vast amount of research on disputes that explores motivations, reasoning, and behaviour in 
and during disputes. I will be drawing primarily on ethnomethodological and conversation 
analytic (EMCA) literature which are the studies of members methods and is devoted to  
discovering the witnessable social order and sense-making practices. In figure 1 I have 
outlined some of the key initialisms which will be used and unpacked throughout this thesis.  
 
Figure 1. Initialisms. 
CA Conversation Analysis A method to study talk-in-interaction. 
MCA Membership Categorisation Analysis A method to study who-people-are and 
what-they’re-doing. 
DP Discursive Psychology A method to study psychological 
matters as produced in talk. 
EM Ethnomethodology The study of social order. 
TCU Turn-Construction Unit Units of talk that comprise a turn at 
talk. 
TRP Transition-Relevance Place Points of possible completion of a turn 
at talk following a complete TCU. 
SRP Standard Relational Pair A pair of people that go together e.g. 
mother-baby 
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For ethnomethodological research, the focus is squarely on members’ own methods, relying 
on an empirical look at what people do, and not what people think they do. Consequently, 
some approaches to do EM are CA, MCA and DP which are the examination of members’ 
methods as done in and through talk-in-interaction. I will return to unpack these terms in 
greater detail in Chapter 2 (section 2.2); for now however, they are the principle approaches 
of most of the literature examined herein. This chapter reviews some of this literature to 
provide a background for the analysis in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
 
 In this chapter, I will review literature which underscores why we should focus our 
analytic efforts on disputes. I will problematise some of this literature for its dealing with 
terminology – as confusion arises over what a ‘dispute’ is versus a ‘conflict’ –  and in doing 
this, I propose a taxonomy which is appropriate for this particular type of data (though I 
explain that we should not overly concern ourselves with definitions). I will then, in section 
1.2.2, consider what a dispute actually is, and how, as analysts we can ‘know’ that people are 
doing disputing, and particular contexts and compositions of disputes. Building on this in 
section 1.4, I will examine the structure of disputes – how they begin, how they end, and how 
they unfold. I then specify my focus by reviewing literature that examines the sequential and 
moral organisation of disputes. I describe some key terminology (which will be expanded 
upon in Chapter 2) that is helpful in revealing the structure of a dispute and for the analysis. 
Finally, in section 1.5 I will summarise the chapter to discuss how this extant research will be 
used to inform and be informed by the findings of subsequent chapters, and I will also outline 
four key questions that I will return to throughout this thesis. This review will demonstrate 
the need for more up-to-date interactional research on disputes, and the usefulness of 
interactional research to reveal the taken-for-granted understandings of how disputes unfold. 
 22 
Further, the review will expose the disparate bodies of research on disputes in terms of how 
different disciplines have conceived and examined disputes. 
 
1.1 Disputes as topic of research 
 
 
Disputes as a topic feature in a large extant body of research stretching back to the founding 
of research methods and theoretical frameworks in the social sciences (Durkheim, 1893; 
Hobbes, 1651 [2016]; Weber, 1978). There have been a number of approaches to studying 
disputes: surveys to explore how group performance is impacted by intragroup conflict (Chun 
& Choi, 2014), focus groups to reveal how sexism can be used to resist during couples’ 
conflict (Overall, et al. 2011), conversation analysis to show how disputes manifest, and the 
function of disputes between children (Maynard, 1985a; 1985b), discourse analysis that 
investigates the delicate nature of how disputes are negotiated (Jacobs & Jackson, 1981; 
Tracy & Agne, 2002), etc. The analysis of disputes has also led to the founding of various 
fields, theories and models: argumentation theory (van Eemeren, et al., 2014), negotiation 
theory (Ting-Toomey, 1988), game theory (Rapoport, 1974), model of argument (Toulmin, 
1958), etc. Consequently, there have been a number of works, and many more since those, 
which have sought to explain, examine, and theorise conflict as both a societal and individual 
phenomenon. It is only in relatively recent times that the social sciences have taken the 
‘linguistic turn’ to establish an interactional tradition of research (Goffman, 1983) and 
examine “not, then, men and their moments. Rather moments and their men” (Goffman, 
1967, p.3). It is in this tradition in which I focus on the ritual behaviours of people during 
disputes.  
 
 For interactional research, disputes are a fruitful area of investigation yielding insights 
into frame analysis, crisis negotiation, mediation, courtrooms, therapy, police encounters etc. 
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Agne (2007) exemplifies this with his analysis of how profound disagreement during 
negotiations is an obstacle and how reframing is (in)effective in some ways for overcoming 
this. Moreover, Agne & Tracy (2001) consider how conflict is shaped through talk and how a 
particular shaping blamed the perpetrator and contributed to a dire outcome at the Waco 
Siege. How disputes get shaped is ultimately a members’ concern over what can/should and 
cannot/should not be said, this is understood as the ‘frame’ of talk. Goffman (1974) describes 
these ‘frames’, and more recently Tracy and Hodge (2019) use ‘genre’. These terms 
foreground the discursive work and overall structural organisation through which 
participants’ “reactions to what actually gets said are heavily coloured by these expectations” 
(O’Driscoll, 2019, p.171). These studies show the usefulness of dispute research: tracking 
what the interactional particulars afford, seeing where the outcomes of these situations arise 
and thus how talk may be manipulated to prompt or prevent these outcomes. As such, dispute 
research benefits an array of areas: ways to counter resistance in crisis negotiation (Agne & 
Tracy, 2001; Sikveland, 2019), overcoming barriers to mediation (Stokoe, 2013); retaining 
person-centredness in therapy (Muntigl et al., 2013); ways of averting conflict in the jury 
room (Pomerantz & Sanders, 2013); and ways of ‘othering’ the defendant in courtroom 
settings (D’hondt, 2009) etc. This research interest lies in a desired outcome – how 
(non)employment of interactional feature(s) can craft pathways to those outcomes.  
 
In this section, I will review the taxonomy of disputes and how it relates to ‘conflict-
talk’, ‘arguments’, ‘quarrels’ etc., which will also be unpacked throughout the chapter. I will 
then discuss why disputes are a fruitful topic for ethnomethodological research. Following 
this I will review studies that examine why people dispute and finally, I will summarise by 
drawing on literature that answers the question: what constitutes a dispute? 
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1.1.1 Taxonomy of disputes 
 
 
There are endless ways to describe disputes, with each term seemingly describing a 
specific quality of interaction. In this section, and throughout the chapter, I will differentiate 
between some of those terms to clarify the differences between disputes, conflict, and 
disagreement. This taxonomy is applicable for various interactional contexts where disputes 
can occur; however, my focus is on public disputes and how ‘dispute’ most appropriately 
captures the interactional activity. Throughout this thesis I will be using some form of the 
word ‘dispute’ to describe the interactional activity that the participants are engaged with. 
Various authors (see Ardington, 2003; Evans & Schuller, 2015; Hardaker, 2013; Kádár, 
2014; Kampf, 2015; Waldron, 2012) contribute to defining aspects of disputative talk: 
‘heckling’, ‘insulting’, ‘trolling’, ‘hate speech’ – though they largely also take the stance that 
getting bogged down in the specifics of what is, for instance, ‘hate’ or a ‘troll’, is not useful. 
In addition to contributing to definitions, these papers also describe the different ways that 
researchers treat these terms for their own purposes, which Janicki (2017) suggests is a 
problem in and of itself. For ethnomethodological studies, however, the understanding of a 
dispute ought to remain rooted in the data. 
 
 The most common terms to describe some oppositional interaction are: disputes 
(Goodwin, 1982), conflict-talk (Reynolds, 2011; 2013; 2015), conflict disputes (Agne, 2007), 
and adversative discourse (Church, 2009). These are often conflated, and authors from other 
disciplines have proposed taxonomies (see Fenn, et al., 1997) that go some distance to 
clarify. Holsti (1966) uses disputes as constitutive of a conflict, that is, disputes are the 
tensions between participants and that chains of disputes may cause conflict – and that 
disputes may be resolved but the conflict remains ongoing. Similarly, Meirowitz et al. (2019), 
on militarisation, distinguish ‘disputes’ as the emergent (or ‘first step’) interactions that can 
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be ongoing and may or may not lead to conflict. In this sense, conflict is described as 
subsuming disputes and that a conflict is in some way an escalation of a dispute.  
 
Alternatively, Tracy and Hodge (2019) in reviewing language, communication and 
interaction studies on conflict, explain that ‘conflict’ most regularly refers to interpersonal 
conduct whereas ‘disputes’ are reserved for institutional settings. Their usage of ‘dispute’ is 
on the basis that participants ‘do conflict’ in institutionally specific ways in the service of 
displaying their own moral reasonableness and the other’s moral unreasonableness. Capturing 
these varied usages, Church (2009) notes her usage of ‘adversative discourse’ skirts the 
problem of the differences in terms – in that we should not be overly concerned with the 
descriptors – and that ‘adversative discourse’ describes the interaction in a way that captures 
the oppositionality without casting a specific understanding such as quarrel, argument, 
conflict, etc.  
 
 Quarrels are also a way of describing a dispute, though Antaki (1994) explains that an 
argument is a specific interactional feature as a part of a quarrel; though quarrel appears to 
have fallen out of usage in dispute research. In some sense then, disputes are action-oriented 
and activity based, whereas ‘conflict’ is used as a descriptor of a protracted (or serious) 
disagreement between two parties. This resonates with their uptake, with authors noting that 
disputes may be momentarily resolved, but conflict has to be managed over larger timescales 
(Davies, et al. 2005; Liberman, et al., 1997). In the EMCA sphere, Argaman (2009) states 
that disagreement is key – that disputes regard matters of ownership, physical materials and 
space and regard social control (see also Cobb-Moor, et al. 2008, p.587); furthermore, 
conflict lacks the ‘interpersonal niceties’ and is described as hostile (see also Lorenzo-Dus, 
2008, p.81). There are exceptions to this usage (see Reynolds, 2011; 2013; 2015). 
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Defining terms across the spectrum of conflict research poses a problem for many 
researchers. Janicki (2017) notes that this problem is independent from the discipline – that it 
regards the authors’ philosophical position which translates to a stance toward a particular 
concept/term. As Wittgenstein (1953) notes, the essentialist view to pose questions such as 
‘what is a dispute’ and expect an answer is untenable. Wittgenstein explains “what still 
counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No” (p.33).  This is 
not a problem, and we will likely never know what the theoretical differences are. What 
EMCA approaches can do is to detail the interactional particulars that look like (and are 
treated) as disputative. Moreover, Janicki (2017, p.64) concludes “non-essentialist 
philosophic position […] allows researchers to move forward rather than spin their wheels at 
the very initial stage of trying to define the phenomena”. For the purposes of this analysis, I 
acknowledge there are not clear delineated boundaries between the concepts – however, I 
will exclusively use ‘disputes’ to describe the collaborative activity of disagreeing. I do this 
for two reasons: (1) these disputes are time-constrained, relatively short (see Smith, 2017), 
and do not feature physical violence; and (2) it reserves ‘conflict’ for those moments when 
the dispute escalates to include multiple parties and/or physical aggression. Over the course 
of this chapter, I will return to this discussion to further specify disputes and discuss what 
constitutes them as well as cover the limited empirical research that examines disputes in 
public. 
 
1.1.2 What actually is a dispute? 
 
 
Following the previous section that goes some way to provide a taxonomy of disputes and 
clarifies my usage of the terms – this section examines what constitutes a dispute. In this 
section, I consider both interactional and non-interactional studies to discuss how disputes are 
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identified, what they are, and what work still needs to be done to understand them. I will 
explore the interactional research toward the end of the section to provide an understanding 
of what a dispute is that is empirically grounded in the interactional particulars.  
 
 Disputes capture an array of synonyms that are used to describe specific instances 
where people are being adversarial: Church (2009) uses ‘adversative discourse’ to describe 
mutually articulated disagreement; Antaki (1994) uses ‘argument’ to describe talk which 
supports a position inside of a ‘quarrel’ as synonymous with ‘dispute’ and ‘squabbles’; 
Brenneis (1988) and Kotthoff (1993) both use ‘dispute’ to capture an array of interactional 
practices and a suspension of the ‘normal’ preference order of cooperative interaction; there 
is fighting (Jackson & Jacobs, 2009; Jackson-Jacobs, 2013), which are physical episodes of 
conflict; and other terms such as: discussing, debating, conflict (Grimshaw, 1990; Reynolds, 
2011) that describe a social action. The term ‘dispute’ also gets used in the social sciences to 
deal with macro-level social forces in adversarial situations between groups (Drury, Reicher 
& Stott, 2003). Thus, these terms encompass a wide range of meanings across research, even 
in the social sciences. Indeed, in interaction, a dispute is fundamentally composed of 
opposition to some prior utterance(s) or action(s) of another speaker or group. Moreover, 
disputes are treated as serious (genuine) disagreements (Jackson & Jacobs, 1981; Leung, 
2002; Scott, 2002). In sum, there are varied terms which provide descriptions of a social 
situation where two opinions meet. This is what is understood as constituting a dispute in the 
majority of the literature reviewed. 
 
I have no objective to giving a definition of ‘dispute’ – instead, remaining non-biased 
toward any particular definition and unpacking its applicability to certain interactional 
contexts. We know a great deal about disputes, though there are still features of disputes to 
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illuminate and unpack, and definitions presuppose that we already know everything worth 
knowing (Sacks, 1995). The emphasis in this chapter and throughout this thesis is that 
disputes are illustrative of people (re)configuring their relationships between one another. I 
am not concerned with producing a theoretical framework like those found in argumentation 
theory, reasoning theory or negotiation theory (see Ehlich & Wagner, 1995; van Eemeren, et 
al., 1991; van Eemeren, et al., 2002); nor is this research concerned with the argument, but 
rather, the arguing-with (Antaki, 1994; O’Keefe, 1977). Consequently, this limits what I am 
treating as constitutive of a dispute, with the emphasis on the moment-by-moment opposition 
observable in the talk, versus talk about disputes (Stokoe, 2013; Stokoe & Sikveland, 2016; 
Weatherall, 2015). Thus, there is a gap in the empirically-grounded research warranting an 
exploration of precisely how micro-practices of talk speak to what a dispute is.  
From politeness research, O’Driscoll and Jeffries propose a definition of a dispute: 
“any situation or behaviour involving parties (individuals or groups) who are, or consider 
themselves to be, instrumentally, intellectually and/or emotionally opposed or simply 
antagonistic toward each other” (2019, p.4-5). However, their definition does not accurately 
pin down the particular constitution given the multitude of contexts in which a dispute may 
occur and does not take into account that opposition may not necessarily constitute a dispute. 
Graham (2017), building on Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1992), explains that interaction, 
and manifestations of conflict, are fluid and that the boundaries between the states of 
antagonistic, aggressive and violent are not a priori clear but rather based in the participants’ 
responses; moreover, each community of practice (see Lavé & Wenger, 1991) has its own set 
of expectations and rules that render it difficult for analysts to locate and describe 
manifestations of a conflict (Marra, 2012). Therefore, it is worth looking to interactional 
research to ground an examination of disputes in what actually gets done by people, rather 
than relying on what they (or we) think constitutes a dispute.  
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In ethnomethodological research, there has been much work on dealing with disputes 
where participants are facilitated by a third-party to recount versions of a dispute. For 
instance, Stokoe and Edwards (2007) examined neighbour disputes to systematically show 
how identity categories figure in disputes. Similarly, Ehrlich (2007) focused on legal 
discourse with trials as a form of dispute resolution whereby versions of the dispute are 
presented to some third-party. Ehrlich draws on Atkinson and Drew (1979) to note how these 
versions are supplanted with accounting components that cast the blame on the other party. 
These studies ostensibly regard disputes but are concerned with how alternate opinions or 
‘sides’ are presented; furthermore, disputes as a matter of sides is an institutional concern 
whereby an ‘offence’/dispute has occurred and needs to be dealt with, often by a third-party 
to solicit what happened after the fact. Kidwell (2018; 2009), Kidwell and Kevoe-Feldman 
(2018) and Kidwell and González Martínez (2010) show the presentation of sides and how 
disputes are pre-empted by police officers by mobilising specific interactional resources (pre-
beginnings and unconstrained questions) to craft alignment. Moreover, they observe the 
citizen/suspect response is constrained by those resources insofar as how the citizen/suspect 
offer accounts (to restore normalcy), do story-telling (to circumvent opportunities for 
resistance), apologise, or display their own understanding. These disputes do not represent 
participants on an equal footing, however. Police officers are able to define the 
citizen/suspect’s actions to decide on the consequences of those actions and this is managed 
by seeking alignment at the earliest possible points to avoid any disputes – as such, 
interactional research shows that it is in the uptake where a dispute is ratified by the 
citizen/suspect and the officer.   
 
What makes a dispute a dispute is not an abstract definition then – the evidence is 
found in the interactional particulars. There is regularity across studies with how disputes are 
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constituted by members through talk. The sequence of a dispute follows an initial 
oppositional turn after an ‘antecedent event’ (Church, 2009; Maynard, 1985a); from there the 
dispute develops with counter-assertions, with the turns seen to be affected by the prior 
utterance(s) through the use of either ‘simple’ strategies (rejections, denials or contradictions 
(Phinney, 1986)), or elaborated responses (reasoning, explanations, justifications, queries 
(Antaki, 1994; Phinney, 1986)). Moreover, Goodwin & Goodwin (1987) noted (in children’s 
disputes) that escalation occurs when a responsive turn mirrors the prior challenging turn (in 
syntactic structure) and embeds that prior challenging turn inside of the responding turn. 
Furthermore, they go on to point out that they view disputes as the development of 
interrelated utterances, with the participants manipulating the syntactic structures of prior 
moves.  
 
The constitution of disputes, then, is found in their uptake. Disputes can only occur 
with counter-opposition to some already oppositional turn. There are a number of strategies 
which then get deployed in how speakers treat the previous actions, and those strategies are 
not randomly deployed but are produced “as to be understood in particular ways; they 
interpret their own and other person’s conduct as indexing, indicating and revealing some 
particular meaning” (Pomerantz & Mandelbaum, 2005, p.151). Disputes are dynamic and 
sustained through participants building on the prior turn rather than isolating those turns 
(Church, 2009; Coulter, 1990; Hutchby, 1996a). Therefore, the doing and understanding of a 
dispute is retrospective – those oppositional responses cast the first turn (in which they are 
responsive) as an arguable (Hutchby, 1996a; Maynard, 1985a). Where a response does not 
resist, disalign or otherwise treat the prior turn as disagreeing, then that typically results in a 
termination of the dispute (Church, 2009). For the purposes of collecting data, and thus 
deciding on what counts – I adapt Church’s (2009) and Reynolds’ (2013) definition: that any 
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adversarial discourse, where an opinion is contested, where two or more stances are 
produced, where there is provocation, or where an offence has occurred and is being dealt 
with through talk, characterises a dispute. In the following section, I will explore why people 
dispute to highlight that asking that question is counterproductive: we can ascribe certain 
motivations, but these would be based in what people think they do and not what they do. I 
will conclude by making a case for interactionally-grounded research into disputes.  
 
1.2 Why do people argue?  
 
Disputes occur everywhere, every day between people and over any topic, though Antaki 
(1994, p.159) notes that those topics, while individual, are “limited by the stock of things that 
society at any one moment determines to be controversial”; furthermore engaging in a dispute 
is not done without reason (Grimshaw, 1990). What is of grave concern to some participants 
in one moment in one environment is malleable, and not particularly useful in examining the 
structural organisation of disputes. Disputes are organised, and participants’ conduct in 
disputes is produced in orderly, systematic ways (Coulter, 1990; Maynard, 1985a; Reynolds, 
2015).  
 
 People argue about categories and particulars – what constitutes something and the 
implications that one may draw from them. Talk in disputes is governed by some ritualised 
behaviours or rules (Collins, 2008; Coulter, 1990; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1990), and those 
rules inform us not only about how society operates and is reproduced by people, but also 
those peoples’ psychology insofar as what is reasonable to say about that disputed topic 
(Billig, 1991). Disputes provide us with insights into the social representations of society 
regarding the things that people are invested in. Those representations are constructed and 
negotiated in disputes, and concurrently reflect and produce cultural experiences – disputes 
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function as a social structure that helps reproduce authority, relationships, and other patterns 
which transcend the dispute itself (Church, 2009; Maynard, 1985a).  
 
In various contexts, a dispute may be an activity that produces a ‘win’ or is a point-
scoring exercise. For instance, the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) 
during parliamentary sessions are adversarial with personal attacks and aggravation that is 
not only sanctioned, but rewarded (see Allen et al., 2014; Bull & Wells, 2012; Bull & 
Strawson, 2019), as such disputes in the sense of opposition are expected. Goffman (1967) 
notes this as aggravation, which occurs whereby the antagonist seeks to score points at the 
other’s expense. Similarly, disputes in police interrogations are one method through which 
suspects can achieve a ‘win’ (David, Rawls & Trainum, 2017); as such, disputes may be a 
productive method to achieve some desired outcome depending upon the context. Treating 
disputes as point-scoring for some ultimate outcome is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
language games, wherein it is through the use of language that meaning is achieved – it is 
how ‘things’ are used, where they are used, and when they are used that provides a sense of 
their meaning. Rawls (2008) develops this to explain that meaning is dependent on 
constitutive rules and that all participants understand they are engaged in the same practice. 
The dispute game may be played – whereby every turn constitutes a move in the game: in the 
examples from the literature just described, the dispute is not a fair game, as the interaction is 
fixed in favour of the questioner; however, in public disputes they are usually fair (but 
competitive) games (Caillois, 2001) to the extent that there are no institutional norms about 
one person having more clout than the other.  The dispute game is played as two teams, with 
each trying to score a point and win the game; and the game does not only regulate the 
playing, but creates the very possibility of playing (Wittgenstein, 1953). In this sense, the 
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‘win’ is constituted by the game – in certain disputes a win will allow the continuation of 
play, whereas in other disputes points may be scored without any practical consequences.  
 
 For members, disputes are productive, rule-governed, constructive and ultimately, a 
shared activity (Brenneis, 1998; David, Rawls & Trainum, 2017). They afford interactional 
opportunities for cooperation and an increased understanding of oneself, others and their 
local culture (Eisenberg, 1987). This refinement is detailed by Hay and Ross (1982) and 
Putallaz and Sheppard (1995) who explain that disputes are necessary in peer relationships to 
stimulate an improvement of our social skills and social acceptance; and they do not tend to 
cause permanent relationship problems or discord but rather, are quickly forgotten. That 
notwithstanding, these studies focus on peer relationships where those participants will 
seemingly see one another again; comparatively, in my data that social contract does not 
exist, because the disputants are either strangers to one another or have an institutional 
relationship where they are unlikely to interact again – this context then offers a window into 
how people establish relationships that are only constituted by a dispute. In this sense, there 
are two strands on understanding disputes: (1) members’ own conduct through their ability to 
manage those disputes and how they produce and negotiate locally determined roles and 
responsibilities (Chen & French, 2008; Stalpers, 1995); and (2) disputes as co-operative and 
beneficial to relationships through indexing competence and social knowledge as well as 
being demonstrative of how participants reproduce their own social world, moral order, and 
culture.   
 
 People argue for a range of reasons in which they are invested, and though to 
maintain empirical rigour we cannot psychologise and ascribe motivations for engaging in a 
dispute, we can examine those outcomes which suggest some benefit for participating. 
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Disputes are not an aberration of talk, but as studies show, they are delicately and carefully 
managed, which suggests they are a useful environment for conducting certain business (even 
if that business is espousing one’s own world view). As Goffman puts it 
“from the bridge that people build to one another, allowing them to meet for a 
moment of talk in a communion of reciprocally sustained involvement. It is this spark, 
not the more obvious kinds of love, that lights up the world.” (1967, p.116-7).  
This section has described some research which ascribes reasons for disputing, and other 
research which describes the outcome of disputes as the motivation for disputes. These are 
not outrightly problematic, but nevertheless do not consider that disputes are a members’ 
activity and that the why people argue, unless availed in the talk, is of secondary relevance to 
the how people argue. Disputing is often less about winning and more about an environment 
where oppositional positions are being espoused. The following section explores this, 
specifically by focusing on extant interactional research that can provide answers to these 
questions.  
 
1.2.1 What can interactional research tell us about why people argue? 
 
 
This section builds on the prior one to discuss two core components of all disputes: openings 
and outcomes. In the following two subsections I will review interactional literature that has 
specifically shown the procedures that occur at the beginnings and ends of disputes. This is 
done to answer the above question: why people dispute. Interactional research has revealed 
how disputes can arise in talk (and thus how we know it is a dispute and not just ordinary 
talk) and how disputes arrive at an outcome. Consequently, examining the structure of talk 
can go some way to answering just why disputes occur – either as beginning by some 
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infraction or having an outcome that is not necessarily a ‘win’.  
 
1.2.1.1 Dispute openings 
 
Disputes can be initiated in almost endless ways; in this section I will focus on the general 
structural organisation of how a dispute begins. This is done to highlight interactional 
research as a way of showing how disputes emerge and are ratified as disputes by 
participant(s). There are various acts which a participant may use to express some initial 
opposition to an earlier point in the sequence. Eisenberg and Garvey, in their study on 
children, explained that a dispute is “a sequence which begins with opposition” (1981, 
p.150). The opposition must be overt, or at least attended to as overt enough to warrant a 
dispute (Church, 2009). It is in the uptake that a dispute is either (a) ratified, and it 
begins/continues, or (b) is conciliated to initiate a cessation of the dispute (Ross & Conant, 
1995). What counts as opposition is endless (Maynard, 1985a) as opposition can occur in 
response to any previous action (and so any previous talk may be interpreted as the initiation 
of a dispute). 
Nominating a start of a dispute has implications for the following analysis of that 
dispute. There are two understandings for the start outlined by Church (2009): (a) the first act 
of opposition, or (b) the action that provokes that act of opposition. The latter is commonly 
referred to as the ‘antecedent event’ (Church, 2009) or ‘arguable’ (Maynard, 1985a). Some 
studies (see Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981; Laursen & Hartup, 1989; Phinney, 1986; Shantz, 
1987) include interactions that are constituted by only the two turns: the antecedent event and 
initial opposition. However, identifying that initial move is further complicated given that a 
single move of opposition does not constitute an episode of dispute, and thus the initial 
opposition is only rendered a part of the dispute retrospectively (e.g. ‘accidental’ bumps; see 
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Katz, 1988). Maynard (1985a, p.5) explains: “initial opposition does not constitute an 
argument […] its status as part of the argument is dependent on whether it is treated as a 
legitimate repair initiation or whether it is let to pass or whether it is itself counteracted”. A 
speaker’s single turn which opposes the other’s position, prior turn, or conduct requires some 
acceptance by that other speaker through opposing that opposition. 
The instigation of a dispute is difficult to determine through identifying those initial 
moves, nor is it particularly useful – it involves analysts classifying turns as part, or not part, 
of the dispute, which is a members’ concern. It is a members’ concern insofar as classifying 
those turns as oppositional or as the dispute source casts the speaker as the disputer or 
disputee. In this sense, features such as ‘blaming’ (Wodak, 2006) seed a dispute as it 
positions the other speaker as perpetrator (Goffman, 1967; Márquez-Reiter & Haugh, 2019). 
That notwithstanding, the determining of peoples’ roles in the disputes (e.g. the disputer and 
disputee) is often an analytical assumption with implications for subsequent analysis. As 
such, rather than focusing on the first two moves of antecedent event and opposition where 
these roles may be configured, some authors examine a three-part sequence of how disputes 
are initiated (through opposition), ratified (with further opposition) and accepted as a dispute 
by the initiator (through more opposition). Indeed, the dispute activity may then be 
understood as ratified by all participants, and not just a single episode of opposition which 
could have been remedied if the initiator did not accept the respondents ratification of the 
dispute, e.g. initiate a repair sequence to quell the incipient opposition.  
 In his book, Antaki (1994) draws on van Eemeren and Grootendort’s speech act 
model whilst applying Coulter’s (1990) quarrel analysis to focus on a three-part sequence to 
identify a dispute-initiation: (1) speaker A takes a turn, (2) speaker B attends to the 
disputable meaning of that utterance, and (3) speaker A confirms that disputable meaning. 
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The dispute then gets ratified by the minimum number of participants required for a dispute 
to occur. If there is a breakdown in this sequence, or a disruption, then the dispute remains 
potentially available as an activity, but requires recognition and authorisation through a re-
doing or restarting of this three-part sequence. Coulter (1990) and Cromdal (2004) explain 
that any speaker may attempt one of those moves in and through the talk, and it is in their co-
participant’s uptake as to whether their move is ratified. All of these studies, despite 
differences, focus on how disputes arise out of oppositional turns and thus they treat the 
dispute as a ‘response-centred event’ (Hutchby, 1996b). These findings show the why people 
argue is not about psychological motivations, but about when opposition to some 
event/issue/opinion is done, that opposition is treated as opposition and then confirmed by the 
initial opposer that the original opposition was indeed opposition.   
 The beginning of a dispute as centred around the participants’ disagreeing response 
may be examined through the interactional preference structure, in the sense that responses to 
the first turn propose a preferred or dispreferred course of action (Bilmes, 1988; Pomerantz, 
1984). Preference for agreement is not that speakers should always agree but it is about the 
accomplishment of social action and that agreeing tends to be unmarked whereas dispreferred 
disagreeing responses tend to be marked in some way. Those disagreeing second turns then 
typically require additional interactional work (pauses, indirectness, justifications, hesitations 
etc.) in order to formulate those expressions of disagreement. Moreover, where there is 
disalignment and different expectations for appropriate behaviour, then conflict may arise 
given the deviation from some local norms; however, this can serve to facilitate a 
renegotiation of what constitutes appropriate behaviour (Graham, 2007). That 
notwithstanding, Goodwin (1990) found that contrary to disagreement being dispreferred 
with those typical markers of dispreference, disagreement was produced with explicit 
expressions of polarity and/or a repeating of the turn being opposed in order to bring attention 
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to and challenge it. This finding is supported by Kuo’s (1992) work, which observed that 
markers of opposition, rather than markers of dispreference, occupy turn-initial positions in 
disputes amongst friends. Kuo’s work suggests that these direct strategies to disagree index 
the relationship between friends. Furthermore, disagreement affords specific turn markers 
and rhetorical strategies (Georgakopopulou, 2001) that mark the opening move of a 
disagreement. These markers then, may be used at the initiation of a dispute and also to 
maintain or escalate that dispute.  
 The relationship between the initial turns of the initial sequence of the dispute appears 
to be the primary indicator of why the dispute has occurred whilst also informing the 
speakers of how the dispute will be organised. Leung (2002) noted that in any dispute, the 
beginning can follow any trajectory. Research confirms this, including seemingly innocent 
questions that attain mutual agreement with a ‘norm’, and subsequently that agreement is 
challenged on the basis of the target not adhering to that ‘norm’ (Gruber, 2001; Reynolds, 
2015);  the ‘you say X but what about Y’ device used on radio call-shows where a host 
responds to the caller’s opinion by highlighting a specific item in the caller’s opinion as 
challengeable without directly challenging the entire opinion (Hutchby, 1996b); threats in 
children’s disputes that are used as vehicles to espouse and introduce issues instead of 
ostensibly defeating the opposition (Niemi, 2014); he-said-she-said accusations in children’s 
talk, which are produced as ways of complaining about someone without openly insulting 
them and which designedly do not project a clear outcome (Goodwin, 1980; 1990); format 
tying through strategic use of the surface features of talk (i.e. meta-talk) that can (re)construct 
their position or relationship as in opposition (Goodwin, 2006; Goodwin, 1990; Goodwin & 
Goodwin, 1987); blaming whereby attorneys can reallocate blame to the opposing side and 
thus render blame as a blameworthy action (Ingrids, 2014); denials which avoid culpability of 
a prior complaint and sustain the sense of one party being a complainer and the other being a 
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complainee (Dersley & Wootton, 2000); the interpretation of events whereby some event or 
issue is treated as a subjective experience and is open to the descriptive practices of the 
disputers (Cobb & Rifkin, 1991; Stokoe & Hepburn, 2005). These varied studies showcase a 
wide range of devices, practices and actions which get brought off in the initiation of a 
dispute. The disputes are organised with respect to those practices, devices and actions as 
sustained ‘chains of action’ (Church, 2009; Coulter, 1990); in non-disputative talk, the 
sequence is prospectively formed by the mutual relationship of the prospective first action 
and the retrospective second (Schegloff, 2007a). However, in disputes participants work to 
resist those projected actions, otherwise the dispute would end (Church, 2009). Going along 
with the projected action, and thus allowing the other interlocutor to complete their project or 
action is a concession of sorts – it returns to the ‘normative’ frame of talk, the orderliness of 
turn-taking and the collaborative working toward completion of a project or action; therefore, 
resistance blocks those projected actions, stalls progressivity and importantly, does not 
concede.  
 Disputes occur over at least three turns and in those three turns the dispute is 
organised with respect to the sequence proposed with the initiating device/practice/action – 
the activity takes hold where the original action (antecedent event) is defended and not 
treated as a prompt for repair (Maynard, 1985a). This relies on a capturing of the interactional 
sequence wherein a dispute is brought off; unfortunately, it is not always that case that the 
dispute opening is captured, and there is limited research which examines how the dispute is 
retrospectively reconstituted by the members. This means that as analysts, we do not have 
access to the antecedent event, the opposition, or its ratification, but only the members’ own 
understandings of that three-part structure as displayed in the ensuing talk.  
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 In sum, it has been found that particular three-part turns constitute a dispute (Antaki, 
1994; Coulter, 1990; Dunn & Mumm, 1987), and that we cannot concretely say a dispute has 
been initiated after two turns, as it may be understood as a repair operation or let pass 
(Maynard, 1985a). Consequently, it is the speaker who has caused the antecedent event that 
may ratify and thus authorise the dispute to progress. The antecedent event may be any topic, 
view, issue etc. that is opposable by the other speaker and follows a trajectory which is 
dictated by the practice/device/action which has initiated the dispute. There is a space in the 
existing literature for research which examines those disputing-initiating moves in a post-
initial position – more specifically, identifying the moves which progress, initiate or resist 
dispute trajectories. In the next section, I consider the outcomes of disputes in terms of why 
people dispute and question whether it is possible to win a dispute. 
 
1.2.1.2 Dispute outcomes  
 
Thus far I have reviewed the (primarily ethnomethodological) research on dispute openings. 
In this section I will review literature which concerns the cessation of disputes. There are a 
number of methods members can use to end a dispute. Members’ methods do not regularly 
end the dispute in agreement (Church, 2009). Some of the methods used are: walking out and 
leaving the interactional space where the unilateral departure terminates an ongoing 
complaint sequence, but not necessarily the dispute (Derlsey & Wootton, 2001); compromise 
or withdrawal in family interactions where the adult is far more likely to compromise in order 
to introduce a new topic, and withdrawing is the most socially disruptive as it halts any 
transition to that new topic (Vuchinich, 1990); de-escalation through mediation where 
institutional conventions of mediation are exhibited to prevent, resolve and manage disputes 
which could arise during mediation (Greatbatch & Dingwall, 1997).  
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 The most abrupt resolution to a dispute is to physically leave the interaction. Dersley 
and Wootton (2001) observed that these walkouts are predicated by some harmful escalation 
of the dispute; however, though they halt the dispute in that moment, the resolution is 
temporary as “the nature of the division will need to be addressed” (p.613). In this respect 
‘resolution’ does not cover this outcome – instead, it’s a manifestation of an interactional 
impasse. The participants reach a point where escalation of the confrontation has occurred 
and the sequential trajectory may propose future conflict, thus restricting the space of some 
collaborative resolving of the dispute; it is at these points where the authors identified 
walkouts as happening. This relies on participants being in spaces which afford walkouts, 
however.  
 The walking out of a dispute speaks to the problems with resolving a dispute. Once 
begun, a dispute is an activity that is collaboratively produced by the speakers and as such 
‘doing disputing’ renders disincentives for termination of the dispute (Reynolds, 2011). 
Those disincentives are the initiating dispute moves outlined in the earlier section (1.2.1.1), 
insofar as the escalation of the dispute (and thus initiation of new trajectories) thwarts de-
escalation or cessation. Leung (2002) explains that disputes arise through the taking of 
different positions, therefore the primary resolution is through some move toward a similar 
position. A change of state by a participant, or even an acknowledgment of the other 
speaker’s position, may lead to resolution – often marked with tokens that indicate a change 
of perspective (e.g. ‘oh’ (Heritage, 1984a; 2016), ‘I mean’ (Goodwin, 1990), ‘Ach’ (Golato, 
2010), ‘aha’ (Weidner, 2016)). The move toward a similar position is, however, accountable 
for participants in disputes, as otherwise it could be construed as disingenuous in some way, 
and is certainly marked – and so interactional work ought to be done by the participant to 
move out of the frame of the dispute.  
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 There is very little research in the ethnomethodological literature that details the 
sequential organisation of dispute resolutions in public disputes. These are often 
characterisations of actions – Vuchinich (1990) identified some of the characteristics of turns 
which are present toward the end of a dispute: submission to the other speaker’s position, 
third-party intervention, joint compromise, stand-off between speakers, and withdrawal. 
Vuchinich noted that the structures of talk display some dominant/submissive relationship 
between the speakers or some consensus on the compromise they have arrived at. Moreover, 
there are not clear departures from the dispute, but a move from the ongoing dispute to a new 
topic or activity and so members pay little attention to closing sequences in disputes. This is 
corroborated by Ditchburn’s (1988) study on young children’s play who that found topic 
change constitutes a de-escalation (if collaborative) as the speakers ratify the shift and thus 
the abandonment of the dispute. Additionally, Greatbatch and Dingwall (1997) on mediation 
services also found that shift topics as proposed by a mediatory can deescalate a dispute, 
though the practices they identified (also including: soliciting clarification and sanctioning 
the other’s conduct) are generic practices in interaction. These findings suggest that 
participants do not generally move toward initiating a de-escalation and resolving a dispute 
through agreement, but that they attempt a dispute cessation without submission or making 
concessions. This interactional research goes some way to identify certain outcomes of 
disputes but it is not extensive.   
 Church (2009) explains that early work on disputes overestimated the extent to which 
resolving a dispute actually occurred. She points out that this was a consequence of the non-
empirical data used by researchers. More recent studies (such as Church, 2009) show that 
resolutions to disputes are not accomplished, and that an agreement is not always reached. 
The termination of a dispute appears to occur through a breakdown in turn taking where 
speakers do not take their turn at talk, which permits participants the space to withdraw 
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without losing face (see Donohue & Kolt, 1992; Vuchinich, 1990). Jackson-Jacobs (2013) 
observed a similar phenomenon whereby remedial matters in a dispute are brought about by a 
breakdown. He notes that the breakdown does not resolve independently existing disputes, 
but that the breakdown is a members’ method to manufacture a resolution.   
There are a number of studies which explicitly study resolving disputes; however, 
these studies regard mediation. Mediation in one sense, and as described above, may involve 
the intervention by a third-party whereby they take a neutral position to propose a trajectory 
that leads to a resolution. In public disputes this may occur, though it tends to have minimal 
impact on the resolution of the disputes if the third-party is not ratified as impartial. The other 
sense of mediation for resolution involves professional mediation services, which are 
facilitated institutional interactions managed by a neutral facilitator with the aim for non-
adversarial resolution (see Firth, 1995; Garcia, 1991; Glenn & Kuttner, 2013; Maynard, 
2010). As Glenn and Susskind (2010) and Stokoe and Sikveland (2016) explain, most of this 
previous research has been based on self-report data, surveys and interviews. Despite the 
differences in data collection, in these institutional interactions the participants are already 
orienting to some resolution, and the disputes are characterised as drawn out over a long 
period of time with multiple episodes constituting the dispute (Garcia, 1991). This renders the 
resolution as an intended outcome unlike public disputes where the outcome is often the 
opposite – no resolution.  
This section has reviewed literature that answers why people argue. First, I explored 
literature which revealed motivations and reasons for people arguing, for instance, how some 
environments ‘reward’ people for disputing, and how disputes can support the development 
of social relationships and skills. I then examined what interactional studies have to say about 
why people argue – specifically, focusing on the openings and outcomes of disputes. I 
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detailed literature that demonstrates how interactional research can precisely show what 
actually occurs in disputes i.e. how they arise, to demonstrate that why is not the question that 
should be asked. Rather, we should leave the motivation and reason ascription to the 
disputers themselves and ask how they go about availing those motivations and reasons in 
and through the dispute. Specifically, I outlined the three-part structure of dispute initiation 
whereby speakers oppose and ratify the opposition to collaborate in doing disputing and 
discussed the limited literature on those ‘reopening moves’, i.e. how new trajectories or 
challenges are brought off in the dispute. Finally, I described possible outcomes of disputes. 
Those outcomes are ways that disputes can end but do not speak to the difficulty of having a 
resolution for a dispute. Indeed, people do not ostensibly win or lose in disputes as evidenced 
by the existence of mediation services, which points to the difficulty of resolving disputes. 
The purpose of a dispute then, as empirically-grounded research shows, is that it affords a 
particular frame and structure through which people are able to suspend certain 
conversational ‘norms’ of mundane talk to espouse opinions, challenge, and resist. In the 
following section I will detail those specific practices. 
 
1.3 Interactional approaches to disputes 
 
 
Thus far I have drawn on a number of interactional studies which have examined disputes; in 
this section I will expand on these studies to specifically exhibit the insights generated by 
paying close attention to talk-in-interaction in disputes. M.H. Goodwin’s early work (1980; 
1982; 1983; 1987; 1990) on children’s disputes set much of the groundwork for future studies 
that examined interaction in disputes. She challenged the assumptions that working-class 
children’s talk was too deficient for systematic analysis and that disputes are forms of 
deficiencies (Allen & Guy, 1974 cf. Goodwin, 1990). Goodwin investigated how children do 
disputing, specifically how opposition is built through ways such as: pointing to 
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inconsistencies in prior talk to remove the grounds for disagreement; recycling their position 
to sustain a dispute; format tying where speakers tie their argumentative move to an earlier 
point in the sequence by modifying a repeat of  an earlier turn to display their adversarial 
stance. Goodwin’s investigation clearly underscored why interactional approaches are useful 
and valid and why focusing on areas of social life that are otherwise considered ‘messy’, 
‘deficient’ or ‘troublesome’ can provide fruitful insights into the social order of everyday life.  
 
 In more recent times, and building on the pioneering work of Goodwin, Reynolds’ 
work (2011; 2015; Reynolds & Fitzgerald, 2015) focuses on an under-researched area of 
interaction – disputes in public. These are disputes which occur in public spaces (e.g. radio, 
on the street, on public transport etc.), they usually involve two participants unknown to each 
other, and are available to onlookers/overhearers. He synthesised different 
ethnomethodological approaches, i.e. different methods in the study of interaction, to 
examine how speakers work to construct social norms and subsequently bring off challenges 
based on those norms. In doing this he showed how people produced themselves as ‘agents of 
social order’ to cast their opponent as normatively challengeable despite their largely 
symmetrical power relation. Reynolds argues that in disputes, this practice of manufacturing 
social norms does not result in a ‘win’ nor even force a concession, but it does ‘reset’ the 
talk, with the challenger controlling the direction of the subsequent talk. Reynolds showed 
the shift between disputative talk to non-disputative talk whilst remaining in the frame of the 
dispute; consequently, that parties construct and do norms-in-action and by doing so can 
position their opponent as failing to adhere to certain norms. His investigation pioneers a 
novel interactional approach by combining ethnomethodological approaches and examines a 
unique context: public disputes. His work, building on the similarly novel work of Goodwin, 
produces a clear framework for combining interactional approaches, for the close 
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examination of ostensibly disordered talk, and for further research that reveals how 
participants challenge and treat the ‘norms’ of social life.  
 
To build on Goodwin and Reynolds’ work, I will first detail some features that are 
central to understanding social interaction. This section does three things in that regard: first, 
I explain how talk is sequentially organised. Specifically, I explore the practices that 
constitute challenges in a dispute as well resistance, and how these practices sequentially 
unfold and are interrelated. In doing so I will also examine disagreement, disalingment and 
disaffiliation with regard to how participants unproblematically do all three without 
disrupting the disputing activity. Second, I will review literature which focuses on moral 
order in disputes – how people configure who they are and their relationships with one 
another, and how they mobilise categories, during disputes. This is done in order to build on 
the prior two sections which focused on how disputes begin and end, to show how disputes 
unfold on a turn-by-turn basis.  
 
1.3.1 Sequential organisation of disputes 
 
 
In previous sections, I outlined the general structural organisation of disputes – specifically 
on the sequential ratification of a dispute. In this section, I will detail three specific sequential 
phenomena which are discussed throughout this thesis. First, I explain a ‘challenge’, what a 
challenge is, what its function is in a dispute, and how they are manifest in and through the 
talk. I will then outline a potential (and common) response to these challenges: resistance. In 
this section I provide an overview of what constitutes resistance, its sequential placement, 
and its pertinence for disputes. I will finish by examining (dis)agreement, (dis)alignment and 
(dis)affiliation and how these are expressed in and through sequences and their 
interrelatedness. 
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 The importance of studying sequence organisation was established by the ground-
breaking work of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) and has since been the underlying 
basis for much, if not all, future Conversation Analytic work. Sequence is important as it 
does not restrict analysis to a single turn at talk but to multiple turns so that we can examine 
the action as it unfolds and is treated by the other participant(s).  
 
1.3.1.1 Challenges 
 
Challenges constitute a large part of what occurs during a dispute. In a vernacular sense, a 
challenge is a difficult task and to challenge is to provide opposition against some 
turn/item/practice/action. In disputes they occur as initiating actions that position the 
challenger as taking some adversarial stance toward the other speaker’s prior turn(s). There is 
little EMCA research on the interactional phenomenon that occupies the space of a challenge. 
Sacks explores ‘challenges’ in the context of games (1995, p.360), in that any turn has a 
variety of interpretations and that a ‘challenge’ is one of those possible interpretations and 
their primary operation is to select next speaker (p.667). Moreover, he explains that 
challenges are rendered in their uptake and it’s through some denial, rejection or more 
general resistance of that challenge that we can understand the turn as a challenge; therefore, 
a ‘challenge’ is grounded in how participants treat it as a challenge and not, for instance, as a 
warning. This has limitations for how we understand a challenge – as speakers can challenge 
without that challenge being treated as such, the following section goes some way to pin 
down what a challenge is, and how, as analysts we can treat turns as challenging.   
 Any interactional phenomenon may largely constitute a challenge, insofar as 
oppositional talk retains all of the sequential properties of mundane talk. Challenges should 
not be understood as a single phenomenon which does opposition, but rather a taxonomy of 
actions/devices/practices that afford the speaker the opportunity to straightforwardly counter 
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some prior turn. Reynolds (2011; 2013; 2015) has largely conceptualised challenges as 
‘phases’ to illustrate how a specific type of challenge – an enticer – gets brought off. He 
explains that parties to the dispute are rendered as ‘challenger’ and ‘target’, and that these are 
the component parts of any dispute (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987). The initiating side of the 
sequence, trajectory or device can be understood – in that moment – as the challenger, with 
the responder understood as the target. These roles may (and probably will) be reconstituted 
by the members themselves throughout the talk as they seek to challenge the opinions, views, 
beliefs etc. of the other speaker.  
An area of EMCA literature where challenges are discussed is in terms of epistemics. 
Parties in talk continuously display their epistemic ‘status’ in relation to one another (who 
knows what, who has the rights to know what, and the degree to which participants are 
well/ill-informed or to what degree they are committed to their talk). Participants’ statuses 
are manifested through their word choice, turn design and action formation, which constitutes 
the participants’ epistemic stance (Heritage, 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2013). Parties in mundane 
conversation maintain congruency between the apparent epistemic stance in a turn and their 
displayed epistemic status in relation to the topic and the other party’s epistemic status 
(Heritage, 2013). This notwithstanding, disalignment between parties can and does occur. 
Thus, challenges occur through participants negotiating whose view is more legitimate, or 
who has mastery over the accessible matters and within whose epistemic domain those 
matters fall (Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Heritage, 2012a). In disputes, as in all talk, 
epistemic status and stance “supply the basic axes around which variations in practices, 
actions and outcomes will be organized” (Raymond, 2018, p.66). 
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 Challenges then, avail an adversarial stance, initiate trajectories, and create 
contingencies for the next speaker with respect to how they will respond. Koshik explains 
that “[wh-questions] can be used as challenges because they convey a strong epistemic stance 
of the questioner, specifically a negative assertion” (2003, p.52). Challenges do not have to 
convey disagreement or disaffiliation with the other speaker, but they are sequentially 
implicative (Schegloff, 1987) and may comprise a non-aligning response to the prior turn 
whilst also initiating a new/different trajectory. Consequently, turns are designed as harder to 
challenge than others, often because their lack of specificity and ambiguous natures renders 
them easily defensible against such a challenge (Kitzinger, 2000). Therefore, challenges can 
be understood as emerging as responsive to some prior turn that avails an oppositional stance 
toward that prior turn whilst also initiating a new/different trajectory. However, this 
oppositional stance and new/different trajectory can only be ratified by their uptake.  
 Challenges are a fuzzy category in EMCA – it does not have the quality of a technical 
term, but it is something that is observable in disputes and thus something that can be pinned 
down. The research outlined above goes some way to identify what a challenge could 
possibly look like, and how a challenge can possibly function, but precisely how challenges 
can be deployed to initiate a new trajectory of talk and thus possibly win a turn-at-talk 
requires more research. 
 
1.3.1.2 Resistance  
 
Resistance as something accomplished in and through talk-in-interaction has been examined 
across a number of interactional contexts. These contexts influence what the resistance will 
look like, as each context constrains and affords resources for the participants. For instance,  
patient’s can resist by introducing obstacles to compliance as a resource to actively 
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participate in the ongoing activity (Barton, et al., 2016); in emergency calls, callers can 
politely issue resistance so not be designedly obstructive yet block a trajectory of action 
(issuing CPR)  (Berger, et al., 2016); in family mealtimes where the issuing of a threat sets up 
response options to either comply with the threat (e.g. finishing a meal to be able to go to the 
ballet) or resist (e.g. spitting out food as a response to the threat of no pudding if the meal is 
not finished) (Hepburn & Potter, 2011); in sales calls where salespeople work to minimise the 
grounds for resistance to occur by pre-empting those reasons for resistance (e.g. mentioning 
the difficulty of arranging a meeting and providing a solution in the same turn) (Humă, 
Stokoe & Sikveland, 2019); in counselling where patients resist talking about personal 
experience by producing themselves as the ‘owner’ of those experiences (i.e. claiming 
primary rights to talk about that experience) (Muntigl et al., 2013) etc. Resistance, across 
these studies, is generally understood as a practice enacted in and through talk that does not 
comply with, or evades, the prior turn in some way. This design may be straightforwardly 
aligning, or seemingly affiliative (Stivers, 2010), yet it infers some trouble with some prior 
turn (Drew, 2018). One of Sacks’ (1995, p.xvii) first inclinations toward the analysability of 
talk was through hearing resistance – how the procedural rules of talk are flouted in 
unproblematic ways for members. Resistance is squarely considered as a difficulty of some 
sort where speakers are not going along with what is being attempted. Consequently, this 
marks resistance as a fruitful avenue of research for disputes as it is not only a phenomenon 
itself, but also exhibits a members’ ratification of disputes, i.e. not accepting or going along 
with the challenger’s opposition. 
 Resistance has rarely been addressed empirically – the focus for EMCA has been on 
the precise operations of talk in interaction (e.g. sequence, repair, action) rather than those 
‘products’ which are accomplished through the use of those operations. Resistance can be 
done in and through talk; it can be a members’ project, or a members’ practice, and is 
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accomplished through various actions depending upon what is being resisted, and this may 
include: Clark and Pinch (2001) who argue that inaction or minimal contributions in sales-
calls are obstacles for the salesperson despite earlier literature considering them as evidence 
of ‘thinking’; incipient compliance to a directive which provides a space for resistance to 
occur as it projects compliance as about to occur yet defies the speaker’s entitlement to issue 
a directive (e.g. a child being asked to ‘eat nicely’ responding by looking as if they are going 
to eat yet perform other actions (having a drink) to push their compliance deeper into the 
sequence) (Kent, 2012), etc. Evaldsson (2017) treats resistance as a participant’s agenda that 
is built through denials, justifications, counteraccusations and substitutions (and presumably 
other interactional features). Widdicombe (2017) on the other hand, examines question-
answer sequences and explains that questions may be designed to alleviate the answerer’s 
potential resistance to the sensitive issues involved with self-identification. Indeed, for 
members, resistance is attended to as a resource or obstacle – it may be operationalised in a 
number of ways to suppress an action or activity, and it may also be pre-empted through turn-
design in order to manage delicate business.  
 Resistance is powerful – it can be brought off through various actions and can be done 
at any moment in and through the talk. In disputes, resistance is treated as a preferred 
response. As discussed in an earlier section, disputes are collaboratively constructed, and this 
is done through oppositional turns; and so resistance is a relevant product for every turn 
produced by the speakers. It is thus difficult to pin down precisely what constitutes 
resistance, though very generally resistance is the not-going-along-with, or outright rejection, 
of a course of action, and as such has to be managed by the challenger. Resistance gets 
managed through turn design (Drew, 1987) wherein challenges are done in ways to obstruct 
potential resistance. Sikveland, Kevoe-Feldman, and Stokoe (2019) demonstrated this by 
showing how police negotiators levy challenges at people in crisis to subvert their resistance 
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and achieve a turning point (i.e change the suicidal person’s stance toward the negotiation). 
Reynolds’ (2015) enticers are an example of this – they seek to suspend a presupposition and 
trap the target into a line of argument before producing a challenge that is difficult to dismiss 
given the target’s earlier response. Similarly, Drew and Holt (1988) and Kitzinger (2000) 
showed how the design of idioms renders them difficult to resist, as they are produced in 
ways which are unspecific and ambiguous and thus easily defensible against any possible 
resistive interpretation of them by another speaker. It’s in these ways that the design of 
resistance informs us about how participants themselves are managing the ‘problem’ of 
resistance and the degree to which a resistive turn has disrupted the progressivity of the other 
speaker’s agenda (Muntigl et al., 2013; Stivers & Robinson, 2006). 
Hester and Hester (2010) underscore that resistance is accomplished through actions 
(rebuttals, accounts, mimicry etc.) that oppose an earlier turn: they show how resistance may 
be used to do non-compliance with an implied category (thereby not accepting that category) 
and serve as a springboard to gain the upper hand. Similarly, Kent (2012) also showed how 
resistance is used to refuse ceding control of their actions to a directive speaker and to ‘buy 
time’ which incrementally denies, or just delays, compliance. These findings explicate 
resistance as culminating in disobedient or defiant outcomes. Consequently, theoretical 
conceptualisations of ‘resistance’ have been unpicked as interactional phenomena, which 
have led to a re-examination Milgram’s ‘obedience’ experiments (Gibson, in press; 
Hollander, 2015; Reicher & Haslam, 2011). This critical work has shown the usefulness of 
taking an interactional approach to data – in the original Milgram experiment, subjects 
administered electric shocks to participants, finding that people are more than likely to 
comply (Milgram, 1974). However, the re-examination from an interactional perspective 
highlighted that resistance occurs when requests for the subject to administer a further 
electric shock is framed as an order (see Reicher & Haslam, 2011). Hollander (2015) argues 
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that the directives issued make compliance or non-compliance a relevant response, and so 
subjects mobilise a range of practices that can be considered as defiant or obedient. Hollander 
showed how the responses go along with the activity by pushing forward the talk, and yet 
build resistance implicitly or explicitly throughout their turns to postpone administering the 
shocks. This careful examination of the talk showed how, though compliance occurs at the 
level of the activity, at most opportunities the subjects will attempt defiance and halt the 
continuation (if only temporarily) of that activity.  
In his work, Hollander (2015, p.429) stresses that these cases “are only possible 
instances that may or may not be amenable to grounded analysis as resistive”, though 
resistance is a possible and can be treated that way by the participants independent from the 
response (Schegloff, 2006). Hollander goes on to outline six forms of resistance whereby the 
participants postpone continuation or project discontinuation with the ongoing activity (in 
this case, the obedience experiments): (1) silence and hesitation, (2) imprecating, (3) 
laughing, (4) addressing the learner, (5), prompting the experimenter, and (6) attempting to 
stop the experiment with accounts. Gibson (in press) builds on this to discuss how 
participants resist through crafting shared membership with the experiment on some basis 
other than experimenter-participant-subject, thereby reconfiguring their relationship in order 
to account for disobedience. Sacks (1995) analyses this kind of relational reconfiguration as 
the practice of partitioning; I will discuss this in the analysis. These operations are interpreted 
as possible points of resistance; however, they are understandable as resistance by way of the 
experimenter (the respondent) designing their responsive turns in ways which manage the 
interactional consequences of a disruption to the activity’s progressivity.  
Thus far I have broadly reviewed literature which has examined resistance as the 
product of various interactional phenomenon; however, for disputes, understanding 
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‘resistance’ as a unique practice is difficult, given that almost every turn is resistive in some 
way. Consequently, those studies reviewed unpack resistance in the course of an interactional 
project (e.g. getting children to eat more vegetables); there is limited research that captures 
how resistance is brought off when the participants are actively engaged in disagreeing with 
one another. Dooley et al. (2019) go some way to identify different forms of resistance: 
active or passive. They define passive resistance as delayed, withheld or minimal responses, 
whereas active resistance takes the form of explicit statements of non-agreement. Moreover, 
they note “the social delicacy in disagreement means active resistance […] occurs more 
infrequently” (p.213). Though their study examined people with dementia resisting treatment, 
this model goes some way to explicate different forms of resistance and what they 
accomplish. Passive resistance (as less explicit forms of disagreement) as being more 
common in their findings and in the previously mentioned studies, may be built into 
speakers’ turns during a dispute; however, active resistance – where participants effectively 
work to disagree – is what constitutes a dispute.  
 To sum up, interactional research into resistance provides us an empirically grounded 
examination of how members accomplish resistance. Resistance is disobedience (Gibson, in 
press), yet disputes are a specific activity where disobedience is presupposed and so 
participants work to be seen as actively disagreeing so that they do not concede their own 
position. While EMCA has only recently begun investigating how members manipulate 
various operations to suppress, or do non-compliance, those studies already provide details of 
how resistance unfolds sequentially. That notwithstanding, a great deal of the research thus 
far has focused on institutional interactions i.e. interactions where there is some apparent 
‘goal’ or activity to be completed. Consequently, there is very little interactional research 
which focuses on resistance in disputes and even less which details the forms of resistance 
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and their sequential placement.   
 
1.3.1.3 (Dis)- agreement/alignment/preference/affiliation 
 
Disputes are characterised by disagreement; disagreement occurs when a speaker’s views 
differ from those expressed by other speakers (Sifanou, 2012). Ishihara (2016) defines three 
types of disagreement: mitigated, unmitigated and aggravated. The first two broadly map to 
Pomerantz’ (1984) weak and strong disagreements (produced with or without delay, hedges, 
pauses etc.). Ishihara’s third category are those disagreements which are upgraded and 
capture the explicitness of the disagreement. Understanding disagreement as a form of 
disputes has been purported (see Grimshaw, 1990; Kakavá, 1993; Waldron & Applegate, 
1994) with disagreement considered as incompatible views.  
“The very existence of conflict and schism in social life depends on the possibility of 
there being alternative and competing accounts of the same social event” (Drew, 
1998, p.322). 
 
On the contrary, some authors (e.g. Goodwin, 1982; Schmitt & Márquez-Reiter, 2019) view 
disagreement as a part of dispute though not necessarily constitutive of a dispute. Schmitt and 
Márquez-Reiter (2019) note that disagreements are regularly found in a dispute’s initial 
moves as disagreement reveals and allows underlying conflict to emerge. In any case, 
disagreement is central to how disputes unfold. 
Disagreement is a presupposed feature of a dispute as all parties will engage in some 
oppositional behaviour that necessitates disagreement. Disagreements are tied into preference 
structure (Pomerantz, 1984) as being dispreferred responses. Disprefered responses are not 
keyed into what people (dis)prefer for the next turn but rather, what action is being done and 
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the delivery of that action i.e. hedged or following a pause. Sacks (1987) explains this as 
preference for contiguity – that if an agreeing answer occurs then it occurs contiguously and 
quickly, whereas a disprefered response may be delayed and “pushed rather deep in to the 
turn” (p.58). This is a structural consideration, preference structure regards how turns are 
marked rather than the individual’s wishes and that any turn following a delay may be heard 
as a rejection, declination or some disagreement (Heritage, 1984a). Moreover, preference is 
action-oriented – that is, for every action that a person does there is always an alternative 
which has different implications for the sequence trajectory and participants’ relationship. In 
disputes, however, preference structure is somewhat ‘reversed’. Pomerantz (1984) discusses 
this in terms of the local context in which the response emerges, as such, in disputes those 
markers of a disprefered response (delays, pushing the response deep into the turn) do not 
regularly occur. For disputes, preference relies on the action being done – specifically, to 
reveal why this particular way of espousing a view, demanding, instructing etc. is being done 
over possible alternatives. 
“there is no shortage of dispreferred responses in talk-in-interaction. Every social 
setting is a world full of diverse interests and turf and stances, all being managed 
(among other ways) in talk-in-interaction, and these are not suppressed or dominated 
by the organisation of preference/dispreference” (Schegloff, 2006, p.72). 
In the local context of disputes, parties are engaged in oppositional talk and every turn 
constitutes a ‘win’ through achieving speakership to further do opposition. This facilitates an 
alternate preference structure where turns which disagree are produced as a preferred 
response. Consequently, disputes are highly constrained, collaborative environments with 
constrained and collaborative management of allowable disagreement reversed with respect 
to mundane everyday talk.  
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Incipient conflict may be marked through disalignment (Glenn, 2019). For instance, 
Heritage and Sefi (1992) explain that someone giving advice represents a claim that they are 
more knowledgeable and thus problematises the recipient’s competence by displaying their 
own knowledge, and rights to espouse that knowledge. Furthermore, Shaw and Hepburn 
(2013) detail how people show unwillingness or hesitation to occupy the role of advice 
recipient. It is in this sense that the disalignment occurs through the advice-giver orienting to 
some fault or deficiency with the recipient. Disalignment between turns does not necessarily 
constitute a dispute but the disaligning does afford moments of disruption or resistance which 
can mark incipient conflict between speakers. Similarly, disalignment between turns is unlike 
disalignment between speakers (Schegloff, 2007).  
 
  Relational disalignment can occur whilst the speakers are structurally aligned – this is 
known as (dis)affiliation. This is present when a speaker displays some experiential, emotive 
or some otherwise affective stance toward a topic or action and in doing so affords the other 
speaker(s) opportunities to (dis)affiliate with that stance. A speaker may affiliate with a 
stance if that speaker’s turn supports the espoused stance and/or agrees with the preferred 
response; Stivers et al. (2011, p.21) describe affiliation as turns which “match the prior 
speaker’s evaluative stance […] and/or cooperate with the preference of the prior action”. On 
the contrary, a speaker may convey disaffiliation with their co-interlocutor if the response 
spoils solidarity between them (see Heritage, 1984a). In this sense, collaborative complaining 
sequences (where speakers complain about some third-party) are achieved through affiliative 
turns which progress the sequence as collaborative. Howbeit, disaffiliation may occur if the 
reception of the complaint is resistant to the prior turn or is delivered with prosodic 
downgrading (see Couper-Kuhlen, 2012; Drew & Walker, 2009), though disaffiliation is 
rendered in its uptake, as no response is inherently (dis)affiliative (Lee & Tanaka, 2016; 
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Stivers, 2008). Stivers (2008) shows the inextricable boundedness of (dis)affiliation and 
(dis)alignment with a discussion of how participants do storytelling. Stivers explains that in 
storytelling, turns can be structurally fitted with the in-progress activity but disaffiliate with 
regards to the unfittedness of one’s stance with the other speaker(s)’.  
Disputes take for granted disagreement as a core feature with which they are 
organised, and (dis)preference, (dis)alignment and (dis)affiliation provide analytic tools to 
illuminate the structural and relational work which is done in and through talk-in-interaction. 
In this regard, I follow Butler et al. (2011) and Stivers et al. (2011) who illustrate the 
interrelatedness of alignment and its ‘structural character’, and affiliation and its ‘evaluative 
character’, to demonstrate how relational issues are managed in and through the organisation 
of the interaction and how they intersect. Consequently, though the participants may be 
disaffiliated through their antipodal positions, they are, in fact, aligned. As discussed in the 
previous sections, participants collaboratively produce ‘disputes’ as a joint activity and as 
such are structurally aligned even if they are not relationally aligned. In the following 
section, I unpack the consequence of affiliation and alignment by exploring the moral 
properties of talk.  
 
1.3.2 Moral order 
 
Affiliation and alignment regard peoples’ stances and positions toward views, opinions, 
beliefs, events, items etc. in talk. It is through these interactional details of how people 
manage whether they are affiliated or aligned with their co-interlocutor that we can begin to 
see how people treat the world around them – and thus what they treat as good/bad or 
right/wrong. Morality is an intrinsic property of disputes (and all interaction). It has a large 
extant body of literature across the social sciences. Morality is an abstract notion between 
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right and wrong, or good and bad. Bergmann (1998) discusses this in terms of how the 
possibility of choice presupposes an attribution of responsibility – so morality is not an 
abstract notion, but rather it is grounded in orderliness and normativity. Indeed, morality is 
done in and through social interaction and is salient for disputes as speakers may generate 
opposition on the basis of the possibility of choice, whereby a speaker may ascribe blame 
because of the other speaker’s chosen path.    
 
Morality and the moral order underpin intersubjectivity and they are core to the 
conducting of any interaction (Goffman, 1967).  Indeed, the moral order describes the orderly 
conduct in any given interaction – it describes the way in which members’ rights and 
obligations are laminated in and through the talk. The orderliness of the moral order relies on 
members’ use and is anchored to the local environment. Transgressions of these rights and 
obligations may lead to a disagreement (Kent, 2012), trouble (Jefferson, 2015), and/or a face-
threat (Goffman, 1981). Disputes then, are inexorably tied to morality. Though Grimshaw 
(1990) notes that disputes ‘leave’ the orderly, it is rather a reconstitution of orderliness – 
what is ordered for this environment whereby the members enter a new game. Garfinkel 
(1967) sought to examine this with his ‘breaches’ where routinised activities were violated in 
some way, which may lead to a dispute because of the transgression. This disrupted peoples’ 
common-sense understandings of how interaction ought to happen thus highlighting that 
conduct as irregular, and ‘wrong/bad’ according to those common-sense understandings. 
However, unlike recent linguistic pragmatic work (see Kádár et al., 2019; Horgan, 2019), 
understanding disputes as inherently transgressive of how we act is problematic for 
ethnomethodology – disputes are (as will be shown throughout the analysis) highly ordered 
and are conducted with respect to what is ordinary for this context, and a dispute’s 
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‘ordinariness’ may be transgressed. As such, the interlocutors fashion a moral order as they 
negotiate what is ordinary, and what counts as transgressive for their environment.  
 
Morality is negotiable, and thus what counts as right/wrong, or bad/good and how 
people ought to act is shaped by interlocutors in their specific environments. Kádár et al. 
(2019, p.24) explain that “genuine conflict and aggression […] may ultimately never become 
fully ordinary”, which may be true insofar as disputes are seen as violating the mundanity of 
everyday life – but people regularly and unproblematically engage in rule-governed disputes, 
so disputes are ordinary in an interactional sense for those involved. Moreover, participants 
in the dispute may metadiscursively invoke an alternate moral order of non-disputative talk 
(what Kádár et al. (2019) term ‘ordinary’) as a resource for bringing off challenges; therefore, 
members themselves exhibit the ordinariness of the dispute through sanctioning non-
disputative behaviour.  
 
1.3.2.1 Attending to transgressive talk 
 
Public disputes are understood as departures from everyday, mundane and public talk, i.e. 
they are transgressions of how people ought to act in public. This section will focus on a 
single way that speakers treat a normal structure of talk: how speakers talk about talk and 
deal with transgressions against that ‘normal’. Throughout the previous sections I have 
detailed certain features which have been described in the literature; in this section I will 
explore a resource which can be drawn on at any moment in the talk to accomplish a 
challenge or resistance. That resource is meta-talk, or meta-discourse: meta-discourse refers 
to participants’ conduct above and outside of the current interaction. It is the language that 
speakers use to describe what speakers are doing in their talk (Craig, 2008). Craig (1999) 
defines two types of meta-discourse: meta-talk which constitutes research and theory about 
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talk, and the practical meta-talk of everyday life. The first is an analyst’s concern and the 
second is what occurs during disputes. This is a member’s resource – where there is a 
mispronouncing, a noticeable absence of talk, or some otherwise noticeable item of talk that 
is marked, then this can be furnished in the talk as meta-talk. For instance: 
 Speaker 1: WHAT ARE YOU DOING? 
 Speaker 2: Why are you shouting at me? 
 Speaker 1: Oh sorry I didn’t mean to 
 Speaker 2: it’s okay 
In the above example, speaker 2 holds speaker 1 accountable for the delivery of their talk and 
in doing so disrupts the adjacency pair of question/answer (though it could be heard as a 
request to stop whatever it is that speaker 2 is doing). Drawing on meta-talk is a unique and 
readily available resource for participants (Lucy, 1993): it provides opportunities to challenge 
or resist in delicate ways which do not need to consider the other’s stance, but rather their 
conduct. Meta-talk is a readily available resource that pushes the talk forward in a way that 
(1) does not reach a point of closure (on the other’s terms), and (2) restricts the grounds to 
argue back. The restricting is accomplished as meta-talk does not directly address a particular 
person, but speaks to the good of society (at least within the dispute frame).  
 
 There is a relative scarcity of research on meta-talk. Tracy (2011; 2016) discusses 
how judges use meta-talk whilst attending to their ‘neutral’ position, though Tracy does note 
that meta-talk is not needed when making an argument but rather for referring to those 
arguments that are being made. In psychotherapy, meta-talk is regarded as good thing for 
participants as it permits a reflection on prior talk to move up ‘perceptual hierarchies’ 
(Cannon et al., 2019). Burdett et al., (2019) underscore this finding to explain that meta-talk 
reflects an orientation on how their own experience, as conveyed in and through talk, may be 
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received in different ways depending upon the perspective of the receiver. As such, they 
explain that meta-talk gets deployed to deal with and anticipate a possible reception of the 
participants’ prior talk. Though this research does not focus on disputative talk, their findings 
offer a framework for understanding how meta-talk functions in a particular environment.    
 
 Interaction is suffused with meta-talk, which Yankah (1995) examines through how 
speakers in formal interaction (i.e. orators) can have their role spun around through doing 
meta-talk; moreover, this ‘spinning around’ regards how meta-talk continually references the 
‘norms’ of communication with the situated discourse within which it occurs. This is similar 
to Romaniuk (2015) who examines ‘meta-sexist’ talk in political discussions: she explains 
that ‘meta-sexist’ talk gets minimised, trivialised and ultimately used to undermine the 
legitimacy of the accuser’s position. She shows the risk and the cost of doing meta-talk which 
directly accuses and refers back to some prior turn. Meta-talk then, is a readily accessible and 
easily usable resource for members but it has its risks – holding someone accountable for 
their prior talk is a sanctionable move. Meta-talk is thus inexorably tied to the moral order. 
The aforementioned research indicates that meta-talk is usable to treat prior turns as in some 
way problematic or disruptive and thus characterise the other speaker’s behaviour as 
unreasonable or immoral in some way. Meta-talk is an omnipresent resource for all 
participants in talk and reveals their own reasoning and attendance to sense-making practices, 
i.e. what a ‘normal’ structure of talk ought to look like. Consequently, meta-talk in disputes is 
a fruitful avenue for research, as disputes regard some violation to the ‘normal’ structure of 
everyday talk and thus evidence ought to be found, in how and when members do meta-talk, 
that the members themselves are attending to that violation of the normal as accountable 
behaviour.  
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1.3.2.1 Culture and relationships 
 
 
In this section I will review literature that examines how people, in disputes, reproduce 
culture and how speakers configure their relationship with their co-disputant in talk. One way 
to get at these features of talk is through Membership Categorisation Analysis. I will largely 
focus on membership categorisation analytic literature herein, though I will also outline 
Membership Categorisation Analysis as an analytic approach in the Methodology (Chapter 
2). In disputes, speakers recurrently work out ‘who-they-are and what-they’re-doing’ 
(Fitzgerald, 2012), and as such exhibit their methods for sense-making. To this end, an 
overlooked consideration of disputes are the situated aspects of identity work (Watson, 1997) 
and the practical actions that a speaker’s identity affords. Work on disputes which focuses on 
who-the-speaker-is is varied, but is largely limited in scope to institutional interactions. 
Stokoe (2003; 2009) for example details the mediation services’ dealing with neighbour 
disputes: Stokoe shows how speakers’ categories i.e. who they are, are used to accomplish 
actions in the service of complaining and how this categorisation work maintains normative 
gendered practices. Additionally, Stokoe (2010) builds on these findings to examine the 
denial of accusations in police interrogations, highlighting how discourses of male violence 
get maintained through everyday talk. These studies showcase the usefulness of examining 
who speakers are and how they work that out in order to tease out how those categories are 
purposefully deployed by people to accomplish some action. Examining categories and their 
deployment can reveal to us the discriminatory, inculpatory, and/or moral practices of 
everyday life.   
 
There are two broad ways with which research has focused on speakers’ identity, 
relationships and the production of culture to illuminate disputes in some way. First, there are 
some which examine how discourses of conflict get propagated through category work – 
 64 
most notably, Eglin and Hester (2003) in their analysis of the Montreal Massacre. They show 
that the victim/perpetrator categories are situated as locally ordered practical actions. 
Similarly, Leudar and Nekvapil (1998) and Leudar et al. (2004) show that categories are 
deployed in ways which are related to the actions being brought off, and it is through these 
actions that speakers can work to delimit their moral, social and religious characteristics. 
Furthermore, they explain that parties to a dispute are not incumbents of independent 
categories but rather, are incumbents of a “double contrastive identity” (2004, p.262) 
whereby they all belong to the us and the them are united as opposition inside of the dispute 
frame – be it a religious war (2004), a battle of civility (1998), or claims to nationhood 
(Housley & Fitzgerald, 2001). These studies demonstrate how discourses of conflict – 
massacres, religious war, civil unrest or devolution of power – get produced on the micro-
interactional level as category disputes.  
 
 The second way that authors focus on identity, relationships and culture is through 
examining the moral order. Who speakers are and how they exhibit that is morally 
implicative – this is clearly illustrated when one category takes precedence over another such 
as a ‘mother’ assuming the categorial identity of ‘police commissioner’ (and its associated 
rights, responsibilities and concerns) to work as the reason for fulfilling or failing the 
category-bound obligations of ‘mother’. Therefore, categories are highly consequential in 
disputes (see Jayyusi, 1984) and related to problems of: what to do in a particular situation, 
assessing what the other speaker did, ascertaining what the other speaker will do, or adducing 
why the speaker did that. In Jayyusi’s words: “[categories] are tied into normative action 
contexts – and the questions above are all questions about actions” (p.137). Consequently, 
categories avail members’ understandings of their own, and the other speaker(s), values, as 
well as the relative moral implicativeness of certain acts in certain environments. Radburn 
 65 
and Hosley (2011) demonstrate this to reveal how conflict can occur in poker. They present 
an analysis which shows how speakers claim the rights to occupy certain categories, with 
members of ‘poker playing’ negotiating and legitimising themselves as professionals and not 
mavericks, or gamblers. 
 
 Categories in disputes have broadly been examined as contributing to a larger 
discourse of conflict or as morally implicative in the local environment. Examining 
categories may also reveal how disjunctures between them can cause, or even remedy, a 
dispute, as (Eglin (1979), in his analysis of a newspaper article and press release, showed 
through the ways that members’ create disjunctures that rationalisation can occur by making 
‘reality’ appear differently. Moreover, Reynolds’ (2015) research largely focused on how 
groups are organised in disputes, particularly the categorisation work that those members 
accomplish. It is impossible to complain about someone without invoking who that person is. 
Categories then are an interesting and highly consequential area of research in disputes, as it 
is not about what identities the people possess, but how they deploy who-they-are (to each 
other) and thus what challenges can be produced or how resistance can be shaped in the talk. 
This shows how fruitful disputes are as an area of membership categorisation research – there 
are multiple avenues that reveal the sense-making practices of people during disputes.  
 
1.4 Discussion  
 
This review represents an initial organisation of some key areas of research that directly 
speak to what a dispute is and how people do disputing. The literature has gone some way to 
pin down exactly what a dispute is and some of the features common to disputes (depending 
on the environment within which they occur). Throughout this chapter I highlighted how 
 66 
interactional research provides a unique approach for understanding disputes and revealing 
the specific practices that occur in disputes. In this chapter I reviewed literature relevant to 
the analysis of this thesis – specifically, examining the interactional details of disputes. I 
began by providing an overview of disputes as a topic of research and how they have been 
examined across various disciplines. I then provided a taxonomy of a dispute, where I drew 
on existing literature to differentiate between specific definitions before concluding that, 
although I can provide a differentiation between terms and justify my own use of ‘disputes’, 
that ultimately it serves little benefit to the actual analysis. In doing this, I drew on 
Wittgenstein to explain that the boundaries of these terms are fuzzy and that often the terms 
are only used to describe a specific practice within a dispute. I concluded with a justification 
of my use of ‘disputes’ as constitutive of the activity whereby members have taken 
oppositional stances (in some regard) yet retaining ‘conflict’ as an escalation, or as a drawn-
out (collection), of disputes.  
 Next, I explored why people argue. Here, I began by exploring literature that ascribed 
reasons and motivations for why people ague. I then reviewed ethnomethodological literature 
to discuss how disputes may be framed as a social problem and requiring of a resolution (thus 
hinting at the idea that disputes are dysfunctional); however, I countered this by discussing 
the product of a dispute. I illustrated the openings of disputes and some outcomes of disputes 
– this respecified the question of why people argue through showing what actually causes 
disputes in the first instance, and the difficulty with reaching an outcome. I demonstrated 
how a dispute begins: as three moves from an ‘antecedent event’, and what those outcomes 
could be: walkouts, stand-offs, mediation etc. I concluded by explaining that disputes are not 
an aberration of talk, but rather a particular context that affords oppositional stances to be 
brought to the fore. 
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  The final section regarded certain practices features of disputes – here, I reviewed 
literature which deals with interactional features and outlined instances where more research 
is needed, specifically around challenges, resistance, and meta-talk in disputes. For 
challenges and resistance, I discussed the fuzziness of the terms – that they do not have the 
quality of a technical terms yet are observable in disputes. Indeed, research is needed to pin 
down what challenges and resistance may look like, where they occur during a dispute and 
more importantly, how people deal with the interactional contingencies of challenges and 
resistance. The body of research reviewed throughout this chapter highlights what we already 
know about disputes and its implications for what could be avenues for future exploration. 
Though the literature examined focused solely on disputes, or conflict in some manner, there 
have been very few conversation analytic studies which examine structural features of talk 
across different disputative contexts. There has been little research (see Reynolds, 2015; 
Reber, 2019) on how participants resist a challenge. For example, how can participants safely 
suppress a possible enticing challenge? And what does this resistance look like? The 
examination of how Reynolds’ enticers are resisted shows how members, at the earliest 
possible point of projection, take a turn which designedly disrupts the trajectory or tacitly 
pushes back against the base of the enticer. Additionally, what occurs in response to this 
resistance? The bringing off or suppression of challenges is also underexplored – specifically, 
understanding what a challenge actually is and how this influences and is influenced by who 
the people are (to each other) as demonstrated in the talk.  
 One thing is for certain – the extant interactional literature typically focuses on single 
environments of disputes (classroom, mediation, workplace etc.), but none looks across 
environments to uncover the common features of talk which can be found in those different 
environments. So, examining features of disputes across contexts not only informs us of 
members’ routine practices for doing disputing, but also how these practices converge or 
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diverge from non-disputative talk. This thesis undertakes an empirical analysis of public 
disputes. This offers insights into what constitutes a public dispute by looking across 
different interactional contexts, and also how a public dispute sequentially unfolds by 
applying interactional methods. By employing three interactional methods (Conversation 
Analysis, Membership Categorisation Analysis, and Discursive Psychology), this thesis 
offers an original contribution to the sequential, moral, and psychological understanding of 
people arguing. The synthesis of these approaches serves to uncover how people behave 
within public disputes. This adds to existing psychological, sociology, and linguistic research 
on disputes by demonstrating how people themselves understand public disputes – without 
relying on any previous argumentation theories to account for certain behaviours. Whilst 
ethnomethodological approaches are inductive, the research within this thesis is largely 
guided by some core enquiries:  
(1) What resources are strangers afforded in a dispute? (Chapter 3).  
(2) What are members’ practices for doing resistance in disputes? (Chapter 5).  
(3) What are the categorial implications of disputing? (Chapter 4 and 5).  
(4) How is the relationship between participants (re)configured during a dispute? 
(Chapter 4).  
The following chapter will focus on the methodological approach, including: how data was 
collected, how it was organised and chosen, and the ethical considerations. I also outline my 
analytic approach used to address the above-mentioned questions and detail how this 
approach is appropriate given the background laid out throughout this chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 69 
Chapter 2: 
Methodology 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I (1) provided an overview of existing research on disputes and what 
constitutes a dispute, (2) gave an overview of the structural organisation of a dispute, and (3) 
detailed the sequential and moral organisation that features in disputes. This situated disputes 
and generally ‘conflict talk’ in the wider ‘macro’ social scientific literature and moved 
toward the ‘micro’ interactional features as the point of inquiry for this thesis. This chapter 
builds on the prior one by detailing whereabouts and how the dispute data was collected and 
handled. I will also explain the analytic methods that inform and produce the findings in this 
thesis.  
 
This research is empirically grounded, and the research procedures reflect the 
importance of starting with the data. Section 2.2 describes the approach taken to assembling a 
collection of disputes, the availability of this data, and the choices made. Section 2.2.2 will 
unpack the three types of public dispute data used. Section 2.2.3 details the data selection 
process and how the data were transcribed, and it also discusses the ethical considerations of 
this research during data collection and storing – specifically, the use of online, publicly-
available videos as a resource for researchers. In Section 2.3, I provide a description of the 
analytic procedure and framework. I will consider the relationship between Conversation 
Analysis (CA), Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) and Discursive Psychology 
(DP) as Ethnomethodological approaches to be drawn on as tools in the tool-box that are 
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mutually beneficial in making claims about members’ methods. Finally, in Section 2.4 I will 
summarise the chapter.  
 
2.1 Data collection 
 
This first section describes the steps taken to assemble the data collection that empirically 
grounds the thesis. First, I briefly justify interactional data sources before introducing the data 
source – online recordings – and the sub-collections formed from this data source. Then, I 
discuss the procedures for choosing and capturing the data.  
 
2.1.1 YouTube as a data source 
 
Ethnomethodological approaches involve the study of members’ methods, and as such the 
individual methodologies, such as CA, tend to be applied to recordings of naturally-occurring 
interactions in everyday conduct. CA’s focus is on how interactions unfold for the members 
on a sequential turn-by-turn basis, rather than using retrospective methods to capture what 
members think happened, such as through interviews. This thesis examines pre-existing 
recordings which is data that has been recorded without research purposes in mind, thus the 
recordings are natural – insofar as they pass the dead social scientist test (Potter, 2002), and 
they allow for repeated listening, which provides for detailed transcriptions (see Section 
2.2.3.1) and close micro-level analysis (see Section 2.3) of the why that particular thing 
happens in that particular place.  
 
Data for this research consists of both audio and video-recordings of people going 
about their everyday lives conducting everyday business. These recordings are of some 
violation of the everyday ‘unproblematic’ conduct of people – disputes. It’s in the violation 
 71 
of some social norm (see breaching (Garfinkel, 1967)) that these interactional events become 
noteworthy for the overhearing audience (Heritage, 1985) and thus those in the overhearing 
audience (also known as bystanders) become the video-recorders. Just like the early tape 
recorders permitted Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson a close look at telephone recordings, new 
and ubiquitous technology (specifically smart phones) has allowed interactions across a 
variety of contexts to be recorded, permitting researchers’ insights into people’s  everyday 
(and until now uncovered) lives. This notwithstanding, not every facet of everyday life is 
recorded but rather, people capture those interactions which are noteworthy – such as home 
movies (Strangelove, 2010; Robles, 2012), police encounters (Goldsmith, 2010; Smith, 2011) 
or pranks (Weatherall et al., 2016).  
 
Ethnomethodological studies have benefitted from these technological developments, 
not only involving new ways to precisely capture interactions which would be otherwise 
unavailable, but also the recording procedure and distribution as forms of data in their own 
right (see Broth, 2006; Heath, 1992; Laurier & Brown, 2011; Pihlaja, 2014). Platforms that 
offer amateur videos to be uploaded offer a rich source of data. YouTube in particular is one 
of the largest of these platforms providing an abundance of naturally-occurring material that 
researchers can analyse. Despite this abundance of data, there has not been an abundance of 
studies using EMCA approaches to this data (Laurier, 2015; Silverman 2007), with EMCA 
being slower to take advantage of this as a source of data. EMCA studies that do use 
YouTube as a data source usually do so for its archival purposes, drawing on previously 
broadcasted material (Butler & Fitzgerald, 2011; Llewellyn & Butler, 2011) rather than as a 
source of amateur, ostensibly unedited recordings. The ‘amateur’ content is created outside of 
professional routines and practices and thus retains the temporal and sequential properties of 
the original event (Laurier, 2015). Amateur content is still edited: the purpose of the original 
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event shapes its recording (when the recording begins and ends), and what the camera 
operator captures (where the camera is pointing).  
 
The seemingly ubiquitous nature of video recording is often focused on specific 
interactional events, which can be understood as events the camera operator finds 
noteworthy; the equipment used by recorders often varies with most using mobile phones, 
some using action cameras, and more rarely (for in vivo recordings), video cameras. These 
videos regularly occur in public places and are uploaded with little concern for the 
participants in the video, who often remain identifiable to viewers. The identifying of 
participants is often done by members in the video comments and more generally on social 
media where the participants in the video may be subject to abuse and harassment. I will 
detail my response to this in section 2.2. (ethics).   
 
2.1.1.1 Practicalities  
 
 
The data was primarily collected from websites where recordings are hosted; this was 
primarily YouTube, but also some radio-specific websites (such as LBC radio). I started with 
a number of search terms that generally described some conflict; these terms were drawn 
from the literature discussed in Chapter 1 and also taken from the Oxford Dictionary of 
English. The initial search terms used were established by those sources, but the full list of 
terms was intuitive, as I discerned what members themselves titled their videos: “dispute(s)”, 
“argu*”, “conflict”, “altercation”, “squabble”, “row”, “barney”, “fight”, “fracas”, “feud”, 
“freakout”, “spat”, “quarrel”, “tiff” and “scrap”. From the videos identified with those terms, 
I followed videos recommended by the YouTube algorithm. From this, I discovered the 
member’s term “public freakout” and compilation videos – these are collations of video 
recordings of disputes collected by and for YouTube users. The large amount of data 
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available on YouTube presented the problem of when to stop – so, rather than creating an 
enormous corpus of my own and dealing with the problems that it would present, I curated 
videos on YouTube into personal ‘playlists’, which are collections of videos available to the 
user on YouTube (see figure below). The videos were added to the playlist if they (a) 
contained a dispute between two or more participants, (b) audio/video was clear enough to 
make sense of what was happening, and (c) appeared to be and were oriented to as naturally 
occurring so were recorded by bystanders or one of the involved participants. Videos were 
discarded if they were deemed in some way artificial, i.e. as ‘reality television’ or as ‘how to 
argue’ guidance videos.  
 
 
Figure 2. A playlist on YouTube.  
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This rendered YouTube as the primary data storage site, thus saving time from downloading 
every video featuring a dispute and taking up saved storage space on my hard drive. 
However, given that videos may be removed from the site for various reasons1, those videos 
which I deemed as clear examples of the identified phenomenon or those which were of 
interest were downloaded immediately. Where the recordings could be downloaded via those 
websites, I did so – on YouTube, I used a VLC video downloader (see Appendix C). 
YouTube permits access to content (videos) for personal and non-commercial usage in 
accordance with local laws and regulations; as such, my usage is “non-commercial research” 
and adheres to the “Fair dealing with a work for the purposes of research for a non-
commercial purpose does not infringe any copyright in the work” (Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act, 1988, p.47). In the next section I expand upon my data sub-collections. 
 
2.1.2 Types of data 
 
 
In searching for data, I began only collecting ‘disputes’; however, through my collection, 
three data themes were selected which allowed me to breakdown and manage my collection. I 
initially created a coding system which identified the context, the subject of the dispute, and a 
crudely defined numerical representation of aggression; however, this proved ineffectual for 
understanding my collection. As such, I created three sub-collections which partitioned the 
recordings on the basis of their environments: radio, public and protest. These are analyst’s 
distinctions and are not necessarily important for members (unless attended to), but they are 
useful distinctions to help inform the collection of disputes.  
 
 
1 See YouTube’s terms of service for more information on video removal 
[https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms] 
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In total, I have 282 recordings of ‘public disputes’ of approximately 100 hours. The 
‘recordings’ are the full-length versions of the data extracts, and ‘clips’ are the short, 
extracted instances of the phenomenon from those recordings (of which there may be 
multiple). As described above (2.1.1.1), the actual downloaded data is 20 hours of recorded 
material. Figure 3 details the entire collection stored on YouTube, downloaded, and broken 
down by type. 
 
Type # Hours # Recordings 
Full Downloaded Full Downloaded 
Radio 22  4  92 18 
Protest 10  1  18 5 
Public 68  15  172 42 
Figure 3. Collection details.  
The 20 hours downloaded were chosen as possible instances of the analytic foci. I will detail 
the basis on which these recordings were downloaded in section 2.1.3. In this section, I will 
detail each environment and how these environments shape the disputes. I will then finish 
with a discussion about the context and composition of these environments, specifically, 
highlighting ways that link these as environments for a dispute.  
 
2.1.2.1 Radio  
 
The first sub-collection from my data set were collected from radio interactions. These are 
disputes that occur during radio phone-ins and radio interviews. There have been a number of 
EMCA studies which have focused on radio interaction (see Clayman, 2004; Dori-Hacohen, 
2014; Fitzgerald & Housley, 2002; Goffman, 1981; Hutchby, 1992; Kilby & Horowitz, 2013; 
Whitehead, 2015 etc.), each focusing on some sequential and structural organisation of talk 
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on the radio. The recordings collected were produced post-2010 and predominantly between 
2012-2016; they occur across a variety of countries (though mostly UK), in a range of time 
slots from public and independent radio stations. Unlike the previously listed studies (besides 
Whitehead, 2015), the analysis does not regard features of radio-talk, but rather the 
institutional setting as a fruitful site for disputes to occur, for two reasons. First, in the 
recordings collected, the participants (in whatever configuration) are prompted by the host to 
discuss potentially controversial topics in order to solicit views to be challenged; furthermore, 
the hosts in these recordings rarely maintain their ‘neutral’ stance (Clayman, 1992). Second, 
the radio interactions mirror other types of disputes collected, by the virtue that they are 
produced to provide a space for discussion between the host/guest/caller, and they are also 
available to an overhearing audience, which is thus a resource for the participants to draw 
upon (Ames, 2013; Heritage, 1985; Hutchby, 2006). The radio recordings differ to the other 
recordings due to their institutional character, and though the interaction is designed to stoke 
controversiality – the focus is on the dispute that occurs around these controversial topics. 
 
The radio interactions share the interactional phenomena identified across the other 
environments; however, these phenomena are sensitive to their local environment and thus 
shape and are shaped by their context. I will explain my use of protest data in the following 
section.  
 
2.1.2.2 Protest 
 
 
The second sub-collection identified comprises ‘protestor interactions’. These are interactions 
that occur during protests between two or more opposing sides of multiple people who gather 
in public spaces (e.g. protestors clashing with counter-protestors). Like the radio interactions, 
the configuration of participants can vary from ‘protestor-protestor’, ‘spokesperson-
 77 
protestor’, ‘protestor-police officer’, and ‘protestor-bystander’. These memberships are 
organised horizontally rather than in a hierarchical structure (as to who is leading the protest). 
These roles are dynamically constituted by the members in and through interaction. There are 
very few EMCA studies that examine interaction during protests (but see Keel, 2017; 
Mcllvenny, 2017; Reynolds, 2015), though there is some upcoming work (see Bodden, 
2019). This is a hugely fruitful area of research for EMCA given the recent availability of 
recordings from inside protests.   
 
The protests recorded occur post-2011 and largely coalesce around particular events: 
Occupy (2011)2; the US presidential race (2016)3; Brexit (2016)4; and Charlottesville 
(2017)5. The recordings of the protests are somewhat unlike the other sub-collections in that 
this collection is assembled from serendipitous recordings of the protest (often for evidential 
sake), purposefully filmed by the spokespeople (or their entourage) for uploading to their 
social media, and include recordings of noteworthy interactions; or, constitute an assemblage 
of all of these (as there may be multiple recordings of the same event). The protest 
interactions then are characterised as multi-party interactions and are organised by the 
participants in and through the interaction regarding who has primary speakership. 
Additionally, unlike the other contexts, the counter-protest environment specifically affords 
two oppositional sides to meet and dispute, thus disputing is expectable for protestors and 
does not violate the local expectations of that environment. Next, I will detail the sub-
collection of public data.  
 
2 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupy_movement 
3 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_States_presidential_election 
4 See 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referen
dum 
 
5 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unite_the_Right_rally 
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2.1.2.3 Public 
 
 
The third sub-collection from my data set is that of ‘public disputes’; these are characterised 
as arguments that occur in public environments, primarily on public transport and on the 
street. The former is what largely constitutes the available recordings on YouTube, which 
may be accounted for as public transport is a confined space where the participants, including 
the recorder(s), are not necessarily able to leave until their stop, or until they are removed 
from the transport; thus, the disputes are more likely to be extended rather than a brief 
exchange of words (which may occur in more open spaces).  
 
There are a number of EMCA studies that examine public interactions and spaces; 
however, the majority of those studies investigate situated practices in, and the gestalt of, 
public spaces (see Carlin, 2003; D’hondt, 2009; Haddington et al., 2012; Heath, Hindmarsh 
& Luff, 1999; Laurier, Whyte & Buckner, 2001; Licoppe & Figeac, 2018; Smith, 2017a; 
Watson, 2005). Very few studies examine disputes in these public spaces (but see Mcllvenny, 
1996; Reynolds, 2015; Smith, 2017b).  
 
In this sub-collection, the data is largely drawn from UK contexts with other English-
speaking countries (USA, Australia and Canada) also included. The recordings were 
uploaded between 2011-2016. Due to these recordings capturing ‘momentary breaches’ in 
everyday public life, the dispute has normally begun prior to the recording starting (unlike 
radio interactions where the recording is happening irrespective of the dispute). As such, the 
cause of the dispute is often constructed by the participants in and through the talk, so my 
descriptions of those events that occasion the dispute are grounded in members’ own 
descriptions. The disputes are regularly constructed as regarding two things: X-ist or X-ism 
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in talk or some violating behaviour for the environment, or an assemblage of these. 
Throughout the course of the dispute, the ‘topic’ often changes and is reconstituted by 
members, so it is difficult to pin down exactly what a dispute regards, with the analysis 
largely dealing with participants’ recharacterising the dispute.  
 
The recordings themselves are events that the participants – either those in the dispute 
or bystander(s) – find noteworthy to record. These recordings often privilege a particular 
perspective of the dispute (usually a bystander’s perspective), and this is a perspective that 
the participants in the dispute may not have access to, thus allowing us (the post-event 
audience) access to conduct not necessarily available to the participants. The claims being 
made through the analysis, then, are grounded in how the identified phenomenon is taken up 
by the respondent rather than as isolated turns at talk/conduct. Moreover, these recordings 
and the recordings from the protest sub-collection are not covert, and do get attended to by 
the participants; however, this is not problematic as the camera operators are members 
involved in the interaction and the act of recording is a resource for participants in the 
dispute. The sub-collection of disputes in public forms the majority of the cases shown 
throughout the analysis; this is in part due to the affordances of public spaces in that they do 
not strictly facilitate disputes (and this is attended to by participants), unlike radio shows and 
protestor interactions, which do afford spaces for adversarialness. Therefore, participants in 
public disputes carefully manage this contingency, rendering their talk as accountable for 
disputing in ways that talk in the other sub-collections do not.  
 
2.1.2.3 Context and Composition 
 
This section has shown three environments that disputes can occur in and has highlighted the 
differences between those environments. Though different, they all involve disputes in 
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public. Previous interactional literature (as described in Chapter 1), has examined disputes in 
specific contexts between different people: e.g. Classrooms (Cobb-Moore et al., 2008; Danby 
& Baker, 2001); children (Goodwin, 1982; Theobald, 2013), families (Goodwin, 2006; Noy, 
2012; Vuchinich, 1990), courtrooms (D’Hondt, 2009; Ingrids, 2014), neighbours (Stokoe, 
2003; Stokoe & Edwards, 2007), radio (Hutchby, 1996a; 1996b) as well as how narratives are 
produced in and through disputes (Eglin & Hester, 2003; McKenzie, 2001). These contexts 
shape and are shaped by the disputes – each context and the participants themselves have 
certain affordances that mean the disputes are composed by the members in different ways. 
The aforementioned environments (radio, protest and public) are all tied by their context as 
public disputes and their composition as inherently multi-party.  
 
Multi-party disputes are a unique kind of activity governed by rules which are not 
dissimilar from those already outlined. This section goes some way to highlight the particular 
affordances of multi-party disputes and sketches how opposition between multiple 
interlocutors is formed. Thus far the research examined in the literature review (Chapter 1) 
has largely focused on private disputes – disputes in non-public places – between friends, 
children or peers. This is in stark contrast to public disputes, which may be between any 
configuration of people (e.g. between strangers and/or between organised groups (Fine, 
2010)). Comparatively, there is less research on these spaces. Reynolds (2011) reviews this 
literature and outlines the exceptions to this: media disputes (Hutchby, 1996a; 1996b) and 
politics (Antaki & Leudar, 2001; Billig, 1989; Harris, 2001; Rapley, 1998; Reber, 2019; 
Robles, 2011). These studies coalesce around opposing sides representing societal interests 
and are organised around ‘winning’ (Hutchby, 2011; Leung, 2005; Sivenkova, 2008). This 
research largely considers how opposition in the media and politics is ‘talked into being’ 
(Heritage, 1987), and how those institutional roles and their associated obligations and 
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responsibilities are constituted. This is similar to Billig’s (1989; 1991) observations about 
how speakers strategically espouse their position or oppose the other position, and in doing so 
how this speaks to the speakers’ own psychology.  
 
 Goodwin and Goodwin (1990) criticise ‘multi-party’ as a descriptor of interactions 
that feature more than two speakers. They argue that it does not sufficiently distinguish 
between two-party and three+ party interactions. Though this term is used elsewhere (e.g. 
Maynard, 1986b; Butler & Wilkinson, 2013; Mondada, 2013b, etc.), their argument considers 
that differentiating between two and three party interaction treats multi-party as special in 
some way and as operating under different principles, which is not necessarily the case. This 
thesis then, considers ‘multi-party’ as three or more participants regardless of speakership – 
this is slightly problematic insofar as the ‘overhearing audience’ is often a non-active 
participant (as in the case of radio interactions), but is a resource for the currently speaking 
participants to drawn on or recruit. Sifanou (2019) describes this ‘localness’ as the gestalt 
contexture relevant to the behaviour of all members. Moreover, this is also theorised by 
Goffman (1981) who distinguishes between ratified participants and overhearers, explaining 
that regardless of the participants’ precise roles – their physical position and their relation to 
what is being said – that people ritually design their turns for both those ratified and those 
who are overhearing.  
 One aspect of multi-party disputes is the constitution of the us versus them (Simmel, 
1955) which is particularly pertinent in counter-protestor interactions where the sides, by 
virtue of their existence are constructed as oppositional. Though there has been little CA 
research in this regard (Gruber, 2001; Reynolds, 2011; 2015). A consequence of multi-party 
disputes is the sustaining of multiple sides; Goodwin and Goodwin (1987) and Kashangaru 
(2009) argue that a dispute may only ever sustain two sides and that where a third-party 
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offers an alternate stance that does not align with either side, then it is possible to treat it as a 
new set of sides to the dispute, therefore creating a schism (Egbert, 1997; Kashangaru, 2009). 
Moreover, where a third-party enters the dispute, they enter either with respect to the us-them 
configuration to align with one side, or work to sustain some form of neutrality (Clayman 
2002; Garcia, 1991).  
 Disputes which involve a third-party entering the fracas highlight the opportunity for 
collusion and collaboration between participants. With the two distinct positions attributable 
to two sides, a third speaker may align themselves with one of those sides (Church, 2009), 
though that alignment may or may not be accepted by the original disputer even though those 
aligning moves are designed as offers of collaboration (Maynard, 1986a); however, Maynard 
notes that acceptance is not usually explicit, but is displayed through non-rejection. Offers 
may receive rejection if they are not sufficiently tied to the original opposing turn/view, so an 
offer of collaboration has to manage these contingencies through retrospectively constructing 
what a display of alignment to their side looks like. Moreover, receiving unsolicited support 
from a third-party is known as ‘piggybacking’ (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1990), which is the 
achievement of the actions by a third-party who has demonstrated their willingness to behave 
at the suggestion of the opposition’s side.  
 Danby and Baker (1998) examined multi-party disputes and observed that they 
normally begin as two-party disputes, with other speakers quickly taking a side. However, 
Maynard (1986a) argues that a dispute does not consist of, or belong to, two sides, and that 
one can oppose another person’s position, stance or claim by straightforwardly aligning with 
a counter position, stance or claim. Consequently, a multi-party dispute occurs first as a two-
party dispute with other speakers aligning to one side or the other, though the alignment 
needs to be ratified with the others on that side. A third-party may also produce a schism to 
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craft an alternate dispute rather than produce an aligning turn. In this sense, third parties need 
not collaborate in a dispute but introduce a new trajectory, stance or position which is 
afforded by the platform of the dispute.  
 For multi-party disputes, there is a large body of literature which covers intragroup 
conflict where the internal structures or rules break down and the group’s harmony or 
productivity is threatened (Chun & Choi, 2014; Kerswill & Mahama, 2019; Schmidt & 
Branscombe, 2001). This thesis does cover this type of dispute, and whether intragroup 
disputes yield any differing findings from the interactional phenomenon identified in disputes 
is not clear. Additionally, much of the literature on multi-party disputes focuses on 
negotiation theory to facilitate some joint decision making (e.g. Aakhus & Vasilyeva, 2007; 
Ehlich & Wagner, 1995; Garcia, 1991; van Eemeren, et al., 1991; van Eemeren, et al., 2002). 
For all of the environments examined throughout this thesis they are (potentially) multi-party, 
that is, the environments afford the possibility for these to become multi-party and in some 
sense they are already multi-party given that the video-recorder is a (passive) participant who 
makes choices over what and who to record. Indeed, interlocutors act according to the 
physical and relational configuration of other people in those spaces – and will work to 
reconfigure those configurations for the benefit of their own agenda.  
 
2.1.3 Data selection 
 
 
To select data for the analysis, I first identified some candidate phenomenon – moments of 
talk that I found interesting, noteworthy, or appeared to be accomplishing something in line 
with the core questions posed in the literature review. The candidate phenomena were 
selected on the basis that they regarded the sequential, or moral orders of disputes. 
Specifically, Chapter 3 considers how interlocutors influence the sequential organisation of 
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talk; Chapter 4 considers how relationships are changed in disputes; and Chapter 5 
crystallises the thesis by examining how people talk about the norms and expectations of how 
people act in disputes. The initial (candidate) cases were transcribed and presented at Data 
Sessions and at research conferences to refine the analysis and capture the analytic foci for 
the chapters. Once some candidate phenomenon (and thus a focus for the analytic chapters 
had been identified) I downloaded 20-hours of data from the larger 100-hour corpus which 
appeared to contain the phenomenon, or a variant of those phenomena. These 20-hours were 
orthographically transcribed which enabled a closer look at the recordings, and allowed for 
initial observations to be made without the need to produce full Jeffersonian (2004) 
transcripts for the whole collection. Following this step of identifying the clearest cases 
which demonstrated the phenomenon identified, I then produced full Jeffersonian transcripts 
of each instance of the phenomena.  
 
This was an iterative process occurring through the analytic process. Those selected 
phenomena were then presented at data sessions and in conference presentations; these are 
core tools in the Conversation Analytic toolbox which adds to its methodological rigour, 
incorporating socialisation into the EMCA community and validation of findings (Stevanovic 
& Weiste, 2017). Once a phenomenon had been selected as a basis for an analytic chapter, I 
then proceeded to build a collection of candidate instances through detailed Jeffersonian (and 
Mondadian-lite (Mondada, 2018) see Appendix B) transcripts, which will be covered in the 
following section. Those collections afforded me the scope to select the clearest examples 
that best demonstrate that interactional feature or practice in action for the chapters (see 
Appendix D for a full list of all data used in this thesis). 
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2.1.3.1 Transcription 
 
 
After selecting a phenomenon for analysis, I refined those initial transcripts using the CA 
transcription system developed by Gail Jefferson (2004). To do this, I used Adobe Audition6 
and Audacity7 for data playback and Microsoft Word8 for typing. I used both playback 
programs for different purposes, though they include similar features useful for detailed 
transcripts: adjustment of playback speed, measurement of gaps and pauses, adjustments that 
can improve audio quality and anonymising features. I used Adobe Audition for video 
transcription which allowed for the video to be played during transcription, which Audacity 
does not permit.  
 
 I used the Jeffersonian transcription system (see Appendix A), which is the system 
developed by Jefferson (2004) and regarded as standard practice in Conversation Analysis. 
Moreover, I referred to Hepburn and Bolden’s (2017) transcription book, as this expanded the 
original collection of symbols to include other vocal elements. I also, for data presented in the 
thesis, employed a Mondadian-lite transcription (Mondada, 2018; 2019) in order to capture 
embodied conduct that would not otherwise by captured by a Jeffersonian system. This 
largely includes moments where there is an initiation of embodied conduct marked by a “*”, 
a continuation of that action “--->”, and cessation of that action with a “*”. However, I did 
not employ the full Mondadian system, as embodied conduct is not strictly the focus on the 
phenomena analysed and so the notation was only used where necessary to represent the 
embodied conduct when relevant for the analysis.  
 
6 Adobe Audtion is available here: [https://www.adobe.com/uk/products/audition.html].  
7 Audacity is available here: [http://audacityteam.org/download/]. 
8 Microsoft Word is available here: [https://products.office.com/word/]. 
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 The symbols available from the Jeffersonian transcription system afford the 
transcriber a method of producing a detailed representation of the data for the purpose of 
examining sequences of talk. The use of transcripts is to display the characteristics of talk-in-
interaction for fine-grained analysis, therefore the primary elements captured in a Jefferson 
transcript are: temporality and sequentiality of talk (turn taking, pauses, overlapping talk 
etc.), the delivery of talk (pitch, volume, intonation, quality etc.), and other elements 
produced by the speakers (laughter, crying, sighing, breathing etc.). Transcriptions remain as 
standard practice in Conversation Analysis to represent the data, but transcribers should not 
rely on one static system for their production and should incorporate additions and extensions 
to Jefferson’s system with the purpose of making as much of the interaction as possible 
available for inspection. Transcripts are a malleable resource for building claims and 
identifying phenomena, and though they are not ‘data’, they constitute a crucial step in the 
analytic procedure for both analysis and dissemination (Hepburn & Bolden, 2017). The 
phenomena identified and examined in the thesis were selected through this transcription 
process. First, orthographic transcripts were produced, which allowed for a sprightly look 
over the whole collection to then mark items of interest. Second, the refining of those 
transcripts occurred, where I identified some interesting feature(s); and finally, further 
refinement was added to provide as detailed as possible representation of the data for 
inspection and presentation. 
 
2.1.3.2 Ethical considerations 
 
 
My data involves members of the public arguing and acting in a manner that they themselves 
would probably regard as violating social norms; and their reasons for disputing are 
ostensibly problematic. The violation of sequential and moral norms throughout the 
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recordings means this data is often difficult to work with, as the audio quality can be poor 
and the content may be offensive. The content of the disputes can be extreme and prejudiced 
and the recording may have unintended consequences for the disputer’s life. As such, this is 
an ethically thorny area with current ethics guidelines not yet capturing the intricacies and 
possible ramifications of this data on those involved and those witnessing a large amount of 
this data. Both Loughborough University (n.d.) and the (BPS) (2018) have a number of 
guidelines to adhere to whilst conducting research; their four principles to uphold are: (1) 
respect, (2) competence, (3) responsibility, and (4) integrity. The BPS has an internet-
mediated research ethics guideline (2017) but this does not accurately reflect all data, with 
considerations still grounded in traditional research procedures. For instance, valid consent is 
not needed when those observed “would expect to be observed by strangers” (2018, p.25); 
similarly, for privacy and anonymity, researchers “will respect the privacy of individuals, and 
will ensure that individuals are not personally identifiable” (2018, p.9). There are also 
specific guidelines regarding work with vulnerable populations: children, persons lacking 
capacity and those in a dependent/unequal relationship. Given the relatively recent 
emergence of videos being produced in this manner (for YouTube and public consumption), 
there are relatively few specific ethical guidelines. In this next section I will outline the 
procedures of following the available guidelines, and how the research was conducted in 
accordance with Loughborough University’s and the BPS’s ethical guidelines.  
 
2.1.3.2.1 Consent 
 
 
I was unable to obtain informed consent from any of the participants featured in my data sets, 
due to the nature of the videos. The disputers featured in the videos are rarely those involved 
in making the recordings, and the camera operators themselves may not be one who uploaded 
the video to YouTube. Whilst neither Loughborough University nor the BPS’s guidelines 
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require informed consent from pre-existing data – that is, data available in the public domain 
– the participants themselves may have been surreptitiously recorded or had recordings in 
which they featured posted without permission. Furthermore, they may be espousing 
controversial views: “particular account should be taken of […] the possibility of intruding 
upon the privacy of individuals who, event while in a normally public space, may believe 
they are unobserved” (BPS, 2018, p.25). I dealt with this in three ways: first, if the data 
involved someone who is purposefully publicising themselves (a radio presenter, celebrity, 
host etc.), then they would not be anonymised. Second, if the recording involved children, 
then it was not added to the collection. Thirdly, if it was unclear that the participants (1) were 
aware of the recording, or (2) indicated any unwillingness (e.g. saying things like “stop 
recording”, “turn it off” etc. or purposefully moving outside of shot), or (3) explicitly 
identified themselves, or any other participant, then the recordings were not collected. 
 
 These three guidelines go beyond what Loughborough and the BPS require, and given 
that the recordings often receive more viewers than readers of my thesis, it might seem 
redundant. However, some of these videos lead to people being ‘exposed’ on social media for 
their supposed views, with other users weaponizing those recordings as ‘evidence’; 
oftentimes the mass exposure is achieved before a correction / alternate understanding is 
produced (see Ronson, 2015). With this in mind, relying on the data as ‘public’ is not 
unproblematic: I am reproducing the speakers in text, which is a political act (Hoey & 
Raymond, 2018), and doing so treats these recordings as static artefacts (as is often done on 
social media). The increased recognition of YouTube videos as a source may lead to an 
uncritical acceptance of the videos as data. It is thus important to reflect on this as an 
emerging data source which is rich and ripe for innovative insights. However, we should pay 
particular attention to issues around how it informs our findings, how we protect those 
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involved in the videos, and how we deal with the single and privileged perspective that the 
recordings afford.  
 
2.1.3.2.2 Storing data 
 
 
The full collection was stored in private playlists on YouTube (see figure 2). This means that 
only I, as a registered user on YouTube, could access these playlists. The cases chosen for 
analysis were stored in an Office 365 Group (see Appendix C). Office 365 Groups are shared 
folders which can be used to securely access data. The data is securely stored on 
Loughborough University servers with encryption; Office 365 Groups allow password 
protected access to that data for selected members of that group (me and my two 
supervisors). Storing data in this way ensures no data ever need to be transferred between 
devices, reducing the risk of interference; nor did the data have to be stored on any physical 
devices (which may be prone to loss or damage). All data regarding the thesis, including 
recordings, transcripts and writing was stored in this way.  
 
 In the next section, I describe the ways I analysed the data corpus. First, I discuss the 
methodological approach that informed the thesis: ethnomethodology. I then discuss the 
specific methods employed: Conversation Analysis, Membership Categorisation Analysis 
and Discursive Psychology and how and why they are assembled.  
 
2.2 Data Analysis 
 
The analytic procedures employed in this thesis are Conversation Analysis, Membership 
Categorisation Analysis and Discursive Psychology. Each of these methods investigates 
social interaction. They each share a common origin: ethnomethodology. Each analytic 
chapter presents a core phenomenon. These phenomenon were selected as they demonstrated 
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some core sequential or moral feature of a dispute (see section 2.1.3). The analysis is 
presented as three stand-alone chapters which each focus on a phenomenon that occurs in 
public disputes. Though these chapters are self-contained, they each offer original 
contributions to the sequential and moral features of public disputes. Crucially, together they 
offer insights into the overall structural organisation of disputes. The analysis is more than 
the sum of its parts. Each analytic chapter uses 10-11 extracts, across 2-3 subsections which 
clearly demonstrate that phenomenon. These extracts are analysed using the methods outlined 
below to examine the ways that the phenomenon occurs i.e. it’s sequential and categorial 
features, and how the interactional phenomenon unfolds in a way which is sensitive to its 
local environment (e.g. protestors on the street vs. people on the bus). Throughout this 
section I will first provide an overview of ethnomethodology in order to make sense of the 
three methods’ compatibility and boundaries. I will then detail Conversation Analysis, 
Membership Categorisation Analysis and Discursive Psychology.  
 
2.2.1 Ethnomethodology 
 
 
This section details ethnomethodology (EM), which is a branch of sociology that emerged in 
the 1960s with a focus on the common-sense, normative assumptions and shared 
understandings people have, and how members actually transact, free from macro-
sociological theories. I will discuss Garfinkel’s work to establish EM, particularly how his 
work was influenced by Wittgenstein and arose at the intersection of Schutzs’ actor-centred 
approach (phenomenology) and Goffman’s actor+context-centred approach (the participation 
framework). This will be a brief overview and for a fuller discussion see: Heritage (1984); 
Maynard (1991); Maynard and Clayman (1991); Hammersley (2019). My discussion of 
Garfinkel’s EM is done to explore and understand how EM understands members’ 
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understandings and some of the criticisms levied at EM. 
 
Ethnomethodology, or the ‘radical’ form of sociology (Berard, 2003; Firth, 2009), is a 
form of inquiry into the normative, taken-for-granted, common sense assumptions and 
practices through which members of a society operate. The term ‘ethnomethodology’ was 
coined by Harold Garfinkel as a way to analyse the social organisation of the world from 
members’ own perspective rather than “‘objectively’ or ‘scientifically’ deduced categories, 
constructs or schemes” (Firth, 2009, p.68). It is a way to get at “a member’s knowledge of 
[their] ordinary affairs, of his own organized enterprises, where that knowledge is treated by 
us as part of the same setting that it also makes observable” (Garfinkel, 1974, p.17). 
Garfinkel (and later Sacks’ (1970)) work was heavily influenced by Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
concept of language games wherein Wittgenstein advocates that language is a rule-governed 
endeavour with specific activities having their own specific forms of rule-governed language 
with concepts that are meaningful regardless of having a clear definition. Garfinkel and Sacks 
thus borrowed indexicality9 from linguistics to argue that even if speakers share a meaning of 
a concept within a conversation, alternate meanings may emerge, and so the meanings 
speakers use between one another are not always the same and depend on the context of their 
use. This is not a hindrance, but rather a resource for members in doing shared understanding.  
 
Garfinkel’s development of ethnomethodology arose in response to Parson’s (1937) 
‘voluntaristic theory of action’, which asserts that social order is constructed and maintained 
as a consequence of an individual’s internalisation of their culture’s shared social norms. 
Garfinkel (1967) criticised this as it treats individuals as ‘dopes’ acting passively. The theory 
 
9 Indexicality is defined as being linguistic forms which change their reference from context 
to context, most indexical forms are developed from Kaplan’s (1989) Demonstratives.  
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was ignorant to members’ own actions, and thus EM provided a significant development in 
attending to the way those actions are seen but go unnoticed. Garfinkel’s response to Parson 
was influenced by Alfred Schutz (Maynard & Clayman, 1991). Schutz’s (1962) work on 
lifeworlds (lebenswelt) described the invariant structures of the lifeworld— the taken-for-
granted common-sense reality enjoyed (or not) by people. Though Garfinkel and Schutz had 
similar considerations of common-sense knowledge, their solutions differed, with Garfinkel 
arguing for empirical investigation over Schutzs’ actor-centred-approach. This broad scope of 
Schutz mirrored Goffman’s, who was also exploring the social and subjective aspects of 
experiences (1983). However, Goffman’s (1983) ‘interaction order’ examined the rules of the 
game and how meaning is established by using and violating those rules, taking an actor + 
context-centred approach (see Maynard (1991) and Rawls (1987) for a detailed discussion). 
 
Schutz’s work focused on the motives of actors being approximately understandable, 
in principle, by other actors, which is dissimilar from EM’s Garfinkelian approach in that 
there are no actors, but only the actions which produce those actors. Schutz explored ‘the 
system’ as having an interpretive reality, understanding that as individuals we confront the 
world and it is unproblematic for others to assume that they also understand the world 
through a similar lens. Thus, Schutz unearthed how action is derived from the actor during 
their everyday life without transposing the subjective actors’ position into his own. This 
therefore means that the routine accomplishment of everyday life is a taken-for-granted, 
primarily objective phenomenon with each of us owning our individual subjective 
perspectives. 
 
These common-sense understandings or ‘reciprocity of perspectives’ (Schutz, 1962) 
are that even when the viewpoint differs, it remains socially organised. For instance, an 
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aeroplane pilot is expected to be more knowledgeable about flying than I am. Thus, it is 
important within ethnomethodology to treat everyday life as being practically accomplished 
by its actors and it is not in the ether but rather, it is accomplished as an ongoing process in 
and through the interaction (Denzin, 1993). Every time we engage in an interaction, we are 
also engaged in the reciprocal consequences and procedural consequentiality (Schegloff, 
1992a) which are solicited from the other co-present actors. 
 
In EM terms, understandings are accomplished procedurally and contextually and not 
on the basis of pre-established shared meanings; thus, what is said is invariably assessed in a 
particular, local context by a particular person in a particular moment. These understandings 
are understandable as the self-accounting properties of practical actions (McHoul, 1998). 
This is in contrast with mainstream sociology of the time, which treated sociologists’ 
knowledge as superior, with a focus on macro theories (structural-functionalism and conflict 
theory) to examine the structures of society. Garfinkel was interested in the microsituations 
that produced those structures, stating that “‘members’ accounts are constituent features of 
the settings they make observable” (1967, p.8). This is a primary reason for CA’s emergence 
from EM, as it permitted a way to study human action10; like EM, CA thinks of context as 
something endogenously generated within talk. Schegloff, a founder CA, considers context in 
two distinct ways (1992b): context can be outside of the interaction as social categories, 
relationships and settings, but it can also be inside of the interaction by way of being co-
constructed by participants in and through talk. 
 
In more recent times EM has diversified to include more ethnographic procedures 
(Dingwall, 1981; Maynard, 2003; Pollner & Emerson, 2001) and further integrate 
 
10 Although only the action manifested in and through talk. 
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Goffmanian concepts (Smith, 2017). EM is a continually developing field of inquiry; it is 
built upon radical foundations as it challenges presuppositions about human conduct. There is 
an assortment of EM methodologies to inform our understanding of the ways through which 
members understand, are governed by and use their repertoire of actions. EM did not set out 
to understand how members within institutions interact, instead remaining ‘institutionally 
indifferent’ (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970); over time studies emerged which produced 
institutionally-sensitive work through which we can observe how members produce their own 
sense-making devices (Cicourel, 1968). The remit and diversity of EM has continually 
expanded since its inception, and it has developed new strands to explore new phenomenon 
in new types of data which have validated EM studies. In 1990 Boden stated that EM is here 
to stay, with other authors commenting that EM has a rich and diverse future at the centre of 
sociology (Hilbert, 2001; Maynard and Clayman, 1991; Housley, pers. comm.), though 
decades on from those comments it remains fairly liminal within sociology.  
 
This section explained and explored EM as an approach to uncover taken-for-granted 
common-sense understandings that pervade everyday life. I discussed its development by 
Garfinkel and his influencers. I also situated EM in the broader sociological concerns of 
1960s/70s and its development in more recent times. The following section builds on these 
historical underpinnings to discuss how Conversation Analysis was founded in order to do 
EM.  
 
2.2.2 Conversation analysis 
 
 
Conversation analysis (CA) emerged around the ‘linguistic turn’ and is an approach through 
which we may understand human interaction and everyday talk. CA was founded as a way of 
doing EM. Sacks’ favouring of naturalistic data is inherently EM, that is, it focuses on data 
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which is ‘out there’ in the world and exists independently of research. The original scope of 
EM is that it does not seek to reproduce existing sociological accounts of phenomenon ‘top-
down’, but rather accounts for the members’ own accounts and interpretations ‘bottom-up’ 
(Maynard & Clayman, 2003). The two key figures, Garfinkel and Sacks (1970), set out the 
method of investigation whereby we examine how things are done rather than applying our 
own analytic assumptions, or else we face the ‘penalties for presumptions’ (Heritage, 1984a). 
 
CA then, seeks to answer the question “Why that now?” (Schegloff, 1973, p.301) to 
provide answers for the reasons why particular aspects of conversation, and subsequently 
behaviours, are not in the ephemeral intentions and/or motivations of individuals (Iedema, 
2003), but are located within the structural logic of the practices themselves. Human 
interaction has been researched in different ways across multiple fields from linguistics, 
sociology, psychology and education studies amongst others (since language is key to how 
humans (and other creatures) act and communicate). CA developed out of Sacks’ focus on 
the organisation of text and talk (that focus developed out of Garfinkel and Goffman’s work 
(see Silverman, 2004)), rejecting the macro-sociological trends of the time. In favouring this 
interactional approach, Sacks’ notion for sociology is that it should be as naturalistic and 
observational as possible. Goffman provided a basis for CA through his pioneering work on 
the ‘interaction ritual’ (1967 [1955]) wherein he was concerned with conventions, 
mechanisms and ritualised sequences of talk. Sacks’ interest in the ‘machinery’ of talk and 
the practices of talk, rather than the subjective meanings of talk (Housley, et al. 2017), lead to 
revealing how behaviours are routine and reoccur. Sacks argued against artificial examples, 
favouring naturally occurring recorded conversations as data (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984) 
(though Goffman was (at that time) unconvinced that level of detail was necessary (1983)). In 
1974, to critique the Chomskian approach that talk is “too disordered for linguistic study,” 
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(Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p.5), Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson published their ‘Simplest 
Systematics’, which served to demonstrate that all units of talk are neither arbitrary or 
meaningless and that there is “order at all points” (Sacks, 1984, p.22). This pioneering work 
showed that the CA enterprise had direct relevance to most, if not all, of the social sciences 
by showing how social order is accomplished through turn-taking.  
 
2.2.2.1 Examining talk-in-interaction  
 
Conversation Analysis focuses on the sequential organisation of talk. In this section I will 
detail what exactly that means, and some of the points of departure for analysis, namely: turn-
taking, turn-design, and social action. First, the core topic for sequence organisation is turn 
taking: turns at talk are comprised of turn construction units (TCUs), and it is through turns 
that action is designed and accomplished (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). In mundane 
talk, turn-taking is largely organised as ‘one speaker at a time’ in order to get things done 
without interruption; however, in disputes, getting things done is problematic. Having a turn 
at talk to espouse a view, opinion or otherwise pursue an agenda permits a momentary ‘win’ 
(see Chapter 3). Consequently, the ‘ordinary’ order of ‘one speaker at a time’ is uncommon 
with the (dis)order of the turn-taking system obscuring talk (see Whalen & Zimmerman 
(1998) on hysterical callers). Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) propose a turn-taking 
system with two components: a turn-constructional component and a turn-allocation 
component which are organised with respect to a basic set of rules.  
 
(1) For any turn, at the initial transition-relevance place of an initial turn-
constructional unit: 
a. If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to involve the use of a ‘current 
speaker selects next’ technique, then the party so selected has the right and 
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is obliged to take the next turn to speak; no others have such rights or 
obligations, and transfer occurs at that place. 
b. If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a ‘current 
speaker selects next’ technique, then self-selection for next speakership 
may, but need not, be instituted; first starter acquires rights to a turn, and 
transfer occurs at that place.  
c. If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to not involve the use of a ‘current 
speaker selects next’ technique, then the current speaker may, but need not 
continue, unless another self-selects. 
(2) If, at the initial transition-relevance place of an initial turn-constructional unit, 
neither 1a. nor 1b. has operated, and, following the provision of 1c., current 
speaker has continued, then the rule-set a-c reapplies at the next transition 
relevance place, and recursively at each transition relevance place, unit transfer is 
effected. 
(Taken from Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974, p.704)). 
 
In this sense, turn-taking is not predetermined by participants and as such it affords 
opportunities for parties in a dispute to design turns in ways which place disagreement as 
sequentially next to thus manufacture opposition (Leung, 2002). Turns do not haphazardly 
occur, but every turn references and builds upon the prior. The continual opportunities to 
refer to and build upon the prior turn permit the maintenance of intersubjectivity through the 
linking of turns (Heritage, 1984a). These rules are applicable for almost all naturally 
occurring interactions; however, disputes are purposefully disordered and one way that the 
disorder may be produce is through flouting these rules. Hutchby (1992) and Kuo (1994) both 
explain that overlapping talk is a means to be confrontational, and Scott (2002) notes that the 
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high occurrence of overlap in disputes demonstrates the fierceness to take the floor and 
dominate the conversation.  
 
Secondly, turn design: speakers design their turns in a multiplicity of ways 
(grammatical form, word choice etc.) to do some kind of action. Turns are designed to be the 
upshot for what has been done in the prior turn and create contingencies for the following 
turn, so in this sense, how speakers design their turns shapes the interaction. In Chapter 4, I 
will discuss how speakers design their turns to be heard as having certain identities in order 
to create contingencies for the other speaker to comply with their turn. In the basic sense, 
turns are designed as adjacency pairs. These are sequentially ordered turns that consist of at 
least two turns where the second turn is responsive in a way that is expected by the first. This 
expectation is known as ‘conditional relevance’ (Schegloff, 1972) whereby the first turn in a 
pair constrains the type of turn that is acceptable as a response. Some examples of an 
adjacency pair are: greeting/greeting, question/answer, accusation/denial, offer/acceptance. 
These pairs display the respondent’s understanding of the prior turn, and a failure to 
acknowledge the first turn is accountable for the notable absence (Schegloff, 1968). This is 
not a general rule however, and the exceptions indicate some other type of sequential work.  
 
Adjacency pairs are a fundamental part of turn-taking and occur throughout all 
conversation. These pairs account for the maintenance, the escalation or the resolution of 
disputes. Without the intricate sequential work whereby turns have a locally determined 
meaning and speakers have an obligation to attend to the prior turn (and be held accountable 
for their prior contribution) then disputes would not be able to occur. This is noted and 
examined by Church (2009) and Jacobs and Jackson (1982), who emphasize the collaborative 
nature of disputes available to analysts through this rule-governed sequence. These 
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fundamental features of all talk permit analysts a closer look at the specific sequential work 
which occurs in different environments and in doing so allows for the examination of social 
order and its manipulation. In the following sections I will examine some consequences of 
this type of social order — challenges and resistance — before returning to the nuts and bolts 
of sequence organisation with a discussion regarding the structural and evaluative character 
of turns at talk.  
 
The third basic concept uncovered through turn design is that of social action. Social 
action is the accomplishment and understanding of actions in and through talk (e.g. requests, 
offers, invitations, tellings etc.); how these actions are constructed is contingent upon its 
sequential position and how speakers orient to those actions. Action, in CA terms is derived 
from the phenomenological tradition of actions being recognisable by co-participants 
(Schegloff, 2007a) and builds on speech act theory (Austin, 1962; Grice, 1975; Searle 1969; 
1975), which is also concerned with action. Speech act theory explains how analysts do not 
begin with categories of named actions, but rather the analysis is grounded in demonstrating 
that it is a particular action to which the co-participants are responding. Finally, what draws 
these all together is sequence organisation, which is the “vehicle for getting some activity 
accomplished” (Schegloff, 1997, p.2). Sequence organisation is primarily understandable 
through adjacency pairs, which (as explained above) are turns at talk that go together: the 
first pair part which may be a request, or question, or instruction and the second pair part 
which is in response to the first pair part (e.g. granting, answer, compliance) (Schegloff, 
2007a). These basic concepts underpin all of CA research, and this thesis. Through these 
ways of understanding how people use language we can examine their relationships and how 
people do social order.  
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CA, then, is concerned with the detailed observations and analysis of talk-in-
interaction (Schegloff, 1992a) through which social realities are constituted (Sacks, Schegloff 
& Jefferson, 1974). Drawing these areas together is intersubjectivity which is the joint, or 
shared knowledge between people that is achieved in and through action and sequence 
organisation (Sidnell, 2010). Schegloff (1992) explains that intersubjectivity is the common 
culture which the individual’s grasp of reality is mediated in and through. Schutz (1962) 
purported that for social actors to make sense of the world, despite their experiential 
differences, they adopt a reciprocity of perspectives which CA elaborates and what 
constitutes the “architecture of intersubjectivity” (Heritage, 1984b, p.254). Disputes largely 
concern knowledge and opinion – how speakers, through talk, claim to have more rights or 
responsibility over particular events, issues or topics. Experiential differences are points of 
contention and are negotiable in disputes; in effect, the clashing of individual realities 
constitutes a social reality where speakers dispute rather than debate.  
  
The components described above do not represent all possible ways of doing CA, but 
they are the basis for CA as a method for analysing interaction. For my analysis, I employ 
CA to reveal the sequential and turn design properties of disputes. As outlined in the 
literature review (Chapter 1), the two common structural features of all disputes have been 
largely examined – how disputes begin (with the three-part structure (Coulter, 1990), and 
how they end (see Church, 2009). However, using CA, I investigate how the structure of the 
dispute speaks more to participants doing disputing rather than the content of the talk itself. 
CA provides the necessary tools to demonstrate those (common) structural properties of talk 
as disputative and not debating, discussing or some other activity. Consequently, I use CA to 
empirically unpick how speakers repair ‘disordered’ talk for adversarial ends (Chapter 5), 
how speakers design their turns to manage interactional contingencies of achieving 
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compliance (Chapter 4), and the points at which speakers place resistive turns in response to 
a challenge (Chapter 3).  
 
This section has given an overview of CA and how it is used within research. It ought 
to be emphasised that CA has been used across a range of contexts and disciplines, becoming 
increasingly expansive; but CA’s interest is always on what emerges from within the data. 
The following section examines Membership Categorisation Analysis.  
 
2.2.3 Membership Categorisation Analysis 
 
 
Membership categorisation analysis (MCA) was founded by Sacks through his invention of 
‘membership categories’ and ‘membership category devices’, these were most famously 
introduced in his lecture ‘the baby cried, the mommy picked him up’ (1966) and 
subsequently widely published in his chapter ‘the search for help’11 (1967). This area grew 
out of EM as a way to understand how members understand one another and how we 
understand how members belong together. MCA’s enterprise was largely eclipsed by CA in 
the analysis of relationships and the moral order through categories – Hester and Eglin 
(1997), building on Sacks’ work, critiqued the analytic separation of the tasks the 
phenomenon is embedded with, which thus became a starting point for subsequent MCA 
work. Further developments have positioned MCA as an important analytic tool for how we 
understand people’s discourse and reveal the who-they-are-and-what-they-are-doing (Butler 
& Fitzgerald, 2010). Sacks (1972) was concerned with conversational practices and a 
praxeological approach to doing identity, asking how (1974), through the methodological 
apparatus, participants in interaction can explicate the common understanding of recognising 
 
11 Though ‘the search for help’ was based on his earlier dissertation work and is distinct from 
the ‘the baby cried’ (stories by children) paper. 
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one another as members of particular groups. The analysis of the membership categorisation 
devices and of the common-sense knowledge is organised by reference to its categories and 
is, in its fashion, an analysis of culture. 
“As members of this society, you can routinely write descriptions of all sorts of 
events. You might, then, write yourself a bunch, where you also have a film or a tape, 
then sit down and try to see how is it that you build those, i.e., try to reproduce your 
descriptions. If you do that, you ought to get an apparatus which would be, in part, an 
analysis of some culture.” 
(Sacks, 1995, p.469, emphasis added).  
 
The recognition of each identity is hearable as a member of a collection of categories: 
‘mother’ is in the collection ‘family’ and ‘teacher’ is in the collection ‘occupation’ 
(Silverman, 1998). These collections are what Sacks (1972, p.332) calls membership 
categorisation devices (MCDs). The application of MCDs is governed by the members’ 
rules, which Sacks observed. First, his rule of economy states that a single category from an 
MCD is referentially adequate. In this sense, hearers/readers will see the unmentioned 
relationship that those categories belong to (e.g. employer/employee, father/daughter 
(Silverman, 2001)). Second, his rule of consistency states that if a category from an MCD is 
used to categorise a member of a population, then all other members of that population may 
be categorised with categories from that device (e.g. seeing employer/employee as being each 
other’s employer/employee in the same workplace). Further to his consistency rule, Sacks 
suggests a ‘hearing’ maxim: when two or more categories are used to categorise two or more 
members, and those categories are hearable as categories from the same collection, then ‘hear 
them that way’. In Sacks’ (1966) lecture he notes that we hear ‘the mommy’ as the ‘mommy 
of the baby’ as it constitutes a ‘team’, which he suggests is a property of duplicative 
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organisation wherein a set of categories defines a unit and places members into this unit 
(1972; Silverman, 1998). This helps us understand that ‘baby’ and ‘mommy’ are likely to be 
a part of the same ‘unit’. Silverman (1998) expands this definition insisting that it is not just 
likely, but rather it is a requirement, to hear the ‘baby’ and ‘mommy’ as belonging to the 
same unit, otherwise to other members it would appear “odd” (1998, p.81). 
 
Given that the ‘mommy’ is the mommy of the ‘baby’, these go together (in 
duplicative units), which Sacks (1972) calls standardized relational pairs (SRPs), which are 
collections of related categories that “constitutes a locus for a set of rights and obligations 
concerning the activity” (1972, p.37). Sacks terms this as Collection R. These SRPs make 
relevant, and observable, an absence of the second part of a pair; the observability of an 
‘absence’ illustrates what Sacks’ describes as the programmatic relevance of some categories 
– in that the hearer can see or make issue with non-incumbency (Jayyusi, 1984) (e.g. children 
becoming ‘game players’ makes it programmatically relevant for there to be other ‘game 
players’ to initiate play (see Butler & Weatherall, 2006)). Just as Collection R consists of 
devices which have obligations to offer help of a particular kind, there are devices of 
specialists which have obligations to help those (clients) with troubles. These devices of 
specialists constitute Collection K, which implies the activities of professionals and their 
clients, for instance in a medical institution the healthcare professional has the obligation, 
predicates and interactional resources available to assist patients. Certain activities are 
understandable as being achievable only, and expectably, by members of a particular 
category; these are known as category-bound activities. An example of such a bound activity 
is ‘crying’ which is bound to ‘baby’; following the viewer’s maxim, if you see an activity 
being done by a member of a category to which that activity is bound, then ‘see it that way’ 
(Sacks, 1995). Jayyusi (1984) explains category-boundedness through which the invoking of 
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an alternate categorization of ‘patient’ as ‘sickly’ the ‘doctor’ as ‘employee’ means that they 
are no longer co-selected and therefore do not exhibit sufficient orientation to the category-
boundedness of the activities with which they are engaged; however in being ‘patient’ and 
‘doctor’ there is an implicative fit which is that the intelligibility of the categories is co-
dependent on one another. 
 
The primary purpose of Sacks’ MCA is to detail the cultural machinery through 
which members produce descriptions and make category selections (though most analysis is 
interested in how people make descriptions and categorisations and largely neglects the 
‘cultural machinery’). These categories are endless in number and are often invoked to 
accomplish a certain activity as categories come with certain rights, obligations and 
predicates making them ‘inference rich’ (Sacks, 1992, p.40). Inference-rich means that 
category devices contain knowledge which members of a particular culture have about that 
culture, for instance a woman may also be categorised as a ‘mother’, ‘sister’ or ‘daughter’ 
with each category carrying different predicates, rights and obligations which an incumbent 
of one of those categories would be expected to possess (Stokoe & Attenborough, 2015). 
Inference rich categories can be incorrectly invoked when members are hear/see-able as an 
alternate category; this mis-categorisation (and subsequent public indignation) informs us 
about a particular culture. 
 
2.2.3.1 Context 
 
 
Context is the environment, circumstances, and backdrop for interactions – context is the 
cultural particulars which interlocutors may access during interaction. This section will 
explore context, how it is used by members, and how analysts may fashion a defensible 
account for the conduct of participants from context. To ethnomethodologists, actions are 
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reflexively related to context. Actions aid in the construction of an elaboration of the context 
to which they belong (Firth, 2009; Heritage, 1984b). Rather than subsuming common sense 
knowledge, ethnomethodologists assert that this common-sense knowledge can be studied in 
its own right. Although categories are embedded in and through context and determined by 
the participants in the interaction, Billig (1987) explains that categorisation is an integral part 
of the world as categorisation is based upon the simplification of the world and thus a way of 
ordering information. Consequently, the ordering of information into categories can be 
prejudicial, as the categories may be operated as ways to differentiate a type of information 
against another type of information. It is serendipitous that, as conversation analysts, we are 
interested in the social organisation of talk and thus everyday life, and we can examine the 
categorisation work which lends itself to the organisation of the social world (Hamilton, 
1979). This returns to the ‘culture-in-action’ explained by Hester and Eglin (1997) as it is not 
the culture which we as analysts are able to explore, but rather the descriptions and 
categorisations which engineer the type of culture which the participants are involved with 
(e.g. Remainers-Brexiteers as ‘us-them’ to tie the behaviour of the ‘them’ as morally 
problematic).  
 
This approach understands the in-action aspects of categories as being not simply 
mental schema which are producible only through language as a ‘vehicle for thoughts’, but as 
categories that reflect culture and are integral to doing interaction. That is, categories are 
fashioned through the social actions people perform (e.g. requesting, complaining etc.), and 
not pre-existing boxes that we place people within. The EM switch which Garfinkel and 
Sacks (1970) outlined concerns the method of investigation whereby we examine how things 
are done rather than applying our own analytic assumptions. Descriptions and the invocation 
of category memberships may be done as unproblematic, such as the action “I’ll get my 
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husband to do X” (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 2017), where ‘husband’ is a gender-defined term 
but here the basis of entitlement does not overtly require the gender component; gendered 
linguistic terms can be employed as a resource within the action. In Kitzinger and 
Wilkinson’s example, the action displays an entitlement to do a request with low contingency 
by invoking the category membership ‘husband’ (i.e. they have a suitable relationship to 
fulfil that request).  
 
There is a danger for analysts in focusing on how descriptions are routinely achieved 
and how normative assumptions are built into how these descriptions are done. Schegloff 
discusses this in that there is “a key difference […] between […] the linguistic form and the 
action it is used to do – on any given occasion” (2007, p.456); this is echoed by Kitzinger 
(2017) who asserts that participants in an interaction are not always ‘doing gender’ and that 
analysts should not rely on the fact of a term being linguistically gendered as evidence for it 
‘doing gender’. It is still important, however, that we consider linguistically gendered terms 
as not necessarily doing gender but that “[members] recurrently gender contexts in a variety 
of ways, and since gender indicators also mark many aspects of context, we rarely notice how 
we use these features to gender our social world” (Hopper, 2003, p.208). Consequently, 
gender (and other) categories do not exist as pre-existing identities but may be invoked or 
disattended to – they are not always attended to but are there for talking (Edwards, 1991) and 
are locally producible to do social actions.  
 
This means that in the analysis of categories one cannot take the description as 
unproblematic: almost any locally adequate explanation of a category’s action entails (in an 
indexical fashion) extended cultural material, not all of which analysts can unpack 
empirically. The high entitlement of the “get my husband to do it” involves more than the 
 107 
formulation of the description: the status of ‘husbands’ in a spouse pair, the assumptions 
about who tells who to do what in certain relationships (with gender as having possible 
relevance), etc. These are things we can speculate about but not necessarily demonstrate 
empirically. Edwards (1991, p.516) explains that as analysts we can recognise the “‘obvious’ 
referentiality of categories” and that the deployment of categorisations in talk is analysable 
by its situatedness (indexicality) and its orientation (rhetoric). For instance, “get my husband 
to do X” is clearly addressed to another party but we cannot fully understand it without its 
sequential context. We cannot view language as a vehicle for thought but rather the actual 
activity of talking is and ought to be the primary focus of understanding categorisation 
(Fitzgerald & Rintel, 2015). Consequently, in public disputes where participants work to 
manage their relationship(s) with their co-interlocutor, and (re)produce culture – it is through 
the analysis of categories, and the actions that occasion them which bring to the surface 
issues of relationships and culture.  
 
The situatedness for categories in doing ‘culture-in-action’ is explicated to be the way 
with which members collaboratively render visible the orderliness, stability and rule-adhering 
quality of their conduct in doing being members of a category (Pollner, 1979); furthermore 
the situatedness of categories in action is done so that members are visibly doing 
categorisation by way of doing the types of activities and interacting in the type of way which 
members of those particular categories would interact (for instance, see Pollner (1979) on a 
lay-person not knowing how to act in court). Doing ‘membership’ through sequences of talk 
can highlight certain asymmetrical distributions of knowledge that reflexively categorises the 
participants in the interaction. For example, a manager doing directing and a footballer 
complying with the directing gives ‘authority to’ that manager. Sacks (1967) and Watson 
(1986) detail this in their analyses of ‘crisis’ calls wherein callers, in speaking to an 
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‘authority’, give the resources for the ‘authority’ to claim this type of membership and in 
doing so position themselves as belonging to the membership of ‘caller’, or ‘advice-seeker’. 
 
In sum, talk designedly does categorisation. Categories are taken-for-granted and thus 
‘invisibly’ talked into being, and it is an analyst’s (and sometimes a member’s) job to 
empirically reveal how these tacit categories are made relevant. As Stokoe (2012a cf. 
Edwards, pers. comm.) explains: the job of the analyst is not to specify those categorisation 
practices more than the members themselves (which can be purposefully designed as 
ambiguous for members), but rather the analyst’s job is to show how those relevant activities 
and predicates get bound to categories and thus what this tells us about the social and moral 
order of everyday life.  
 
Two of my objectives (see Chapter 1) are to investigate the categorial implications of 
disputing and to examine how the relationship between participants is (re)configured during 
disputes. MCA is an analytic approach which can answer these. Public disputes regard 
adversarial positions and first encounters – the participants have to actively configure the 
‘who they are to each other’ to challenge the other’s opinions and/or character. The 
implications of categories on disputes will be shown in Chapter 4 where the analysis reveals 
how actions are tied to categories in order to accomplish (non)compliance. This speaks to the 
moral order and the situatedness of categories through how members display a hierarchical 
distribution of rights and responsibilities. Similarly, in Chapter 5 using MCA, I unpack the 
interactional moves that members make in order to ascribe the attribute of ‘reasonableness’ to 
themselves. In this analysis, MCA provides the tools to empirically demonstrate how 
attributes and predicates get bound to certain categories. Ultimately, I am using MCA to 
reveal the cultural machinery that is present in disputes – the presuppositions members make, 
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the bounding of attributes and predicates to one another, and how members make sense of 
their ‘us’ and ‘them’ relationship in a dispute.  
 
This section has provided an overview of MCA through examining the tools and 
terminology which are operationalised to support our understanding of how members orient 
to and perform their culture-in-action. I explained MCA’s historical roots and its emergence 
as a way of doing EM to investigate the ‘cultural machinery’ of everyday life, and how 
through MCA, we can see the common-sense, taken-for-granted nature of everyday life 
through members’ own category usage. Moreover, I explored some examples to unpack the 
problems with the conflation of index and rhetoric – how the basis of the entitled request “I’ll 
get my husband to do X” may not hang on gender even if gender has been made relevant to 
explain that it is where the action is that renders the category visible to members and analysts 
(this will be discussed further in the following section). In the following section I will discuss 
MCA’s relationship with CA. I will then discuss Discursive Psychology before summarising.  
 
2.2.3.2 CA and MCA 
 
 
The relationship between CA and MCA has had what Butler (2008, quoting Watson (1997)) 
notes as a gestalt switch — meaning that attention to one often excludes the other. However, 
MCA is more closely aligned with its EM roots than CA is, which is exemplified with its 
concern with the practical reasoning, and moral or normative ordering of talk-in-interaction 
(Butler, 2008; Housley & Fitzgerald, 2002; Jayyusi, 1984). The issue between the two is 
highlighted through the incumbency of multiple categories and the selection between a 
multitude of correct categories, understanding the action occurring can only be done through 
the speaker making relevant a category. This is understood as detailing the members’ own 
orientations as opposed to the analyst’s pre-thoughts or assumptions. 
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 The invocation of categories in conversation is often conflated with ‘doing description’ 
of persons or ‘doing person reference’ (Enfield & Stivers, 2007; Schegloff, 2007b;). This 
critiques MCA work on the basis that MCA investigates members as just doing describing, or 
just doing person reference; however, MCA has a greater range of functions than simply 
examining doing reference or doing describing. Categorisations are the ways in which talk is 
constructed; the complex consequentiality of conversation and how this permits 
categorisation (Mondada, 2003; Pollner & Zimmerman, 1970; Watson, 2015;). Participants’ 
own usage of categories is more than doing description or recipient design: MCA details 
members’ own in situ and in vivo accomplishments of their rights, obligations and predicates 
(Smith, 2017) and how the organisation of these categories moment-by-moment provides a 
foundation of the ‘common scene’ (Hester & Francis, 2003). Jayyusi (1984) explains that 
these ‘common scenes’ are category rich and have a complex moral context: the 
categorisation devices used comprise the scenes, are tied to, and are relevant for the actions 
of those members. MCA as a means of analysis thus provides us with the tools to understand 
the consequential machineries within interaction used by members and how these 
machineries inform the culture-in-action.  
 
 The methodological approach follows the Sacksian tradition of starting with 
‘unmotivated looking’ at data to uncover phenomena. Despite the common foundations 
between MCA and CA, they have had ‘divergent trajectories’ (Stokoe, 2012a, p.278) with 
some (e.g., Schegloff, 2007b) criticizing MCA for not engaging with the sequential 
organisation of talk and others (Watson, 1997) criticising CA for setting categorisation 
relevancies at zero. The analytic focus of CA is principally to explore data corpora to 
examine the structural patterns of talk-in-interaction, whereas MCA produces studies of 
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particular interactional settings with a focus on the culture-in-action accomplished in and 
through categories, identity and morality (Eglin & Hester, 1999; Housley & Fitzgerald, 2007; 
Jayyusi, 1984; Plunkett, 2009; Summerfield & McHoul, 2005). Housley (pers. comm.) argues 
that taking a particular EM approach to data is not sufficient: we should instead be informed 
by and unify the different ethno approaches to be more holistic in our approach to move 
beyond the “narcissism of small differences” and the ‘armed camps’ (Silverman, 1998), as 
we have more common ground than differences. Similarly, Fitzgerald (2017) notes that in 
many instances, the application of the methodology is taking over the focus on the 
phenomenon and thus the methodology is both the beginning and the end – this means that 
we, as analysts, should keep a focus on the phenomenon rather than our approach. The 
phenomenon should be centre to the analysis – it ought to be unpacked to demonstrate how it 
is used, what it does, and how it is handled sequentially and rhetorically (Antaki et al., 2003). 
 
2.2.4 Discursive Psychology 
 
 
Discursive Psychology (DP) developed through the 1970s, emerging from the ‘crisis’ in 
social psychology as a way to challenge positivism (Gergen, 1973; Tajfel, 1981). Although 
this emergence was independent of, but influenced in part by EM work, it was borne out of a 
similar influence in Wittgenstein (Condor, 2003). It was within this environment that 
Jonathan Potter, Derek Edwards and Margaret Wetherell reoriented the focus of psychology 
from cognition to language (Wetherell & Potter, 1987). DP’s focus is on the psychological 
phenomena which gets produced and recognised in and through talk (Potter & Hepburn, 
2007); as such its view is that psychological matters are inherently social, and interactional. 
DP came about as a means of challenging cognitive psychology’s dealing with mental states 
as reflected in people’s actions and behaviour, that may have been only dealt with by 
investigating cognitive processes (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007). In this section I will outline 
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DP, its emergence, and its relationship with CA and MCA. I will then discuss the centring of 
a phenomenon to the analysis and the mutual benefit of using the three approaches.  
 
DP is based on Garfinkel’s (1967) work to respecify research from theory to the lived, 
moment-by-moment practices in interaction as a rationale to criticise psychology (Edwards, 
2005). Indeed, DP is a means to challenge the notion that human conduct is only understood 
through the cognitive processes (Edwards, 2006; Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007). Unlike CA, 
however, DP is also grounded in controversies in the sociology of scientific knowledge from 
the 1980s (see Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). These controversies stem from how scientific 
knowledge was treated as assumed and grounded in the natural context of the phenomenon. 
Thus, the DP programme sought to recast the methods of study in psychology (see Billig, 
1987). Edwards and Potter (1992) pioneered the DP programme which drew on those 
influences and crystallised various approaches (critical discourse analysis, rhetorical analysis 
and CA). These approaches are diverse and study social psychological phenomenon, such as: 
attitudes, emotion, categorisation, stereotypes, etc. (Tileagă & Stokoe, 2015). Humă (2019, 
p.69) identifies the four key tenants of DP: “(1) a focus on social action, (2) the situated 
production of discourse, (3) discourse as a construction and accomplishment, and (4) the 
constructing function of discourse”. 
 
DP treats talk as a resource through which people display their attitudes, emotions, 
and knowledge, and take stances and positions with respect to objects and one another 
(Edwards & Potter, 1993). DP considers that ‘discourse’ is constructed through people’s 
linguistic and cultural resources, and (it emphasises) that discourse (as constructed by people 
themselves) is the resource through which people’s social and moral reality is constructed, 
altered and/or undermined. Like other EM approaches, DP emphasises the strict 
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methodological rigour of investigation, particularly on the situated-ness (Potter & Hepburn, 
2007) of interaction – sequentially, institutionally and rhetorically. This gets unpacked by 
Potter (2003) who details these three contexts: sequentially, where talk is contingent on the 
prior turn and creates contingencies for the following turn; institutionally, where discourse is 
shaped by the context within which it occurs; and rhetorically, where discourse can promote 
particular versions whilst undermining others.   
 
This thesis employs DP as a method of analysis by drawing on CA’s toolkit, as well 
as DP studies which examine talk-in-interaction. DP, like MCA and CA, has a number of 
EM-informed underpinnings. Understanding traditional psychological topics such as 
memory, attitudes or other mental content can be done through the investigation of talk, and 
the actions to which people attend, it is thus action-oriented (Potter and Hepburn, 2007). DP 
is also used to show how talk-in-interaction shapes reality and not as a representation of some 
other event: it is thus constructed and constructive (Potter and Hepburn, 2007). DP serves to 
criticise existing psychological conceptualisations of topics whilst also respecifying those 
topics (e.g. memory, attitudes and emotion), specifically how those mental phenomena are 
accomplished in and through talk (see Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards, 
1994). In each of the analytic chapters, I discuss how attitudes are accomplished as people 
take positions against one another – similarly, how emotion (or apparent lack thereof) is a 
sanctionable resource for people (see Potter & Hepburn, 2003). This thesis also unpacks how 
people handle psychological themes in and through talk (emotion, prejudice, accounting), and 
how these are produced by way of people’s descriptions and categories (Edwards, 1991; 
Edwards, 2005). For instance, I show how Edwards and Potter’s (2017) subject/object-side 
assessments get combined (in Chapter 5) in order to render a matter about the world as 
factual whilst also ascribing their stance toward that ostensibly factual matter.  
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DP’s relationship with CA is, like MCA’s, intertwined but with points of divergence. 
Antaki (2008) sets out the differences. CA (and often DP) is concerned with the practical 
accomplishment of interaction in real time but DP is more concerned with displays of, and 
the deployment of, psychological states, descriptions of the world, and promoting interests. 
DP readily draws on CA (Antaki, 2004), because CA offers the most developed approach 
from which DP can be used to make claims (Potter and Hepburn, 2007); however, the key 
differences are that the constructionist theme that runs through DP is less central to CA, and 
DP’s interest lies in the category and descriptions of people, things or events with DP 
emphasising the ‘constructed and constructive’ perspective (Kent and Potter, 2014). In this 
sense, the divergence lies in DP’s attention to how members’ produce, manage and resist 
particular social realties in and through discourse.  
 
This section gave an overview of Discursive Psychology and its relationship to the 
other methods employed from the EM canon. I described how DP came about in response to 
controversies around the sociology of scientific knowledge and as a reworking of traditional 
psychological methods. I underscored the four tenants of DP’s focus: social action, the 
situatedness of discourse, discourse as constructed and accomplished, and the function of 
discourse. I will explain how these methods are combined before summarising the 
methodological framework of this thesis.  
 
2.2.5 Combining methods 
 
 
CA has long been combined with other methodological approaches outside of the EM 
wheelhouse, e.g. corpus linguistics (Riou et al., 2017), cognitive grammar (Etelamaki & 
Visapaa, 2014), and historical linguistics (Keevallik & Habicht, 2017). However, both MCA 
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and DP are inside of the EM wheelhouse and thus overlap in their treatment of language and 
interaction as central to their analysis. The sequential concerns and toolkit provided by 
Conversation Analysis sits nicely with the categorial focus of both Membership 
Categorisation Analysis and Discursive Psychology (see Baker, 1984; Edwards, 1991; Hester 
& Eglin, 1997; Housley et al., 2017; King & Locke, 2015; Speer, 2002). Similarly, DP and 
MCA pay attention to how descriptions are produced (Edwards & Potter, 2005; Edwards & 
Potter, 2017) – specifically how, certain mental and relationship phenomena are constructed 
(Edwards, 1997; Potter, 2006). Throughout this thesis the analysis of the sequential 
organisation of disputative talk will be examined in terms of the categorial, descriptive and 
relational dimensions. I will consider how the members display categories and descriptions as 
situated and sequentially organised. CA provides the robust methodological rigour from 
which a systematic examination of categories, relationships and descriptions can occur.  
  
Therefore, central to the analysis is a concern with how members produce 
understandings of their social realties as morally, socially and sequentially organised in and 
through talk-in-interaction. This will extend the remit of CA, MCA and DP in developing an 
integrated approach whereby the phenomenon is always central to the analysis. In the 
analysis presented herein, the phenomenon grounds the approach – I will unpack each 
phenomenon to showcase its usage, what it does and how members handle it sequentially and 
rhetorically by using the most appropriate approach where necessary to examine each of 
those aspects. It is through combining these approaches that they offer a rich tapestry of 
resources to draw on to produce a methodologically rigorous and EM empirically grounded 
analysis of disputes.  
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2.3 Discussion 
 
 
In this chapter I have described how I selected and collected this data. I explained the 
responsibilities of data collection from online sources and the procedures of creating a corpus 
of this kind in line with legal and ethical guidance. These procedures for collection and 
selection underpin the research presented in this thesis. Importantly, I reflected on my use of 
three sub-collections and the ethical considerations beyond standard guidelines. Moreover, I 
discussed the analytic particulars of an ethnomethodological approach and my methods: 
Conversation Analysis, Membership Categorisation Analysis and Discursive Psychology. I 
explained the relationship between these methods and their benefit to the investigation of 
social interaction.  
 
 In the following three chapters, I will present the findings of my analysis. These 
chapters will present a single phenomenon that address the theme of my thesis: how 
participants constitute a dispute. In this sense, I begin with Chapter 3, which investigates how 
members produce resistance to an on-going agenda. In Chapter 4, I build on Chapter 3 to 
further detail the structural features of disputing and examine more closely the relationship 
work that speakers accomplish during disputes, primarily from a Membership Categorisation 
Analytic perspective. I shall investigate partitioning as a members’ practice for bringing off 
and supressing challenges in and through talk in interaction. Finally, in Chapter 5, I address 
how participants in disputes metadiscursively formulate their own and others’ conduct in the 
production of some reasonable category. This explore how members themselves treat the 
structure of the dispute and build on the findings of chapters 3 and 4 to uncover members 
sense-making in disputes. This final chapter reflects the methodology and chiefly employs a 
Discursive Psychological approach. These are ordered to reflect a journey from a focus on 
structure and sequence of a dispute, to structure and categories of a dispute, and finally to 
 117 
how members themselves treat the structure of a dispute. By employing CA, MCA and DP as 
a combined ethnomethodological approach, I will offer original analysis of three specific 
practices for how participants do disputing.  
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Chapter 3: 
Resisting a normative challenge 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter represents the first step in the analysis – herein, I will describe a practice found 
across the dispute contexts (as outline in Chapter 2). This chapter takes a primarily 
Conversation Analytic (CA) approach and pays attention to the sequential organisation and 
structure of a dispute. To begin with, the practice I am first examining is that of enticing 
which has been previously detailed by Reynolds (2011; 2015); however, I will be focusing on 
responses to these enticers. This offers a novel examination of how participants prevent their 
position being challenged; indeed, as Reynolds (2015, p. 15) notes “the device [enticer] is not 
an altogether one-sided affair”, and that the “basic disagreement remains” – as such the scope 
of this analysis to explore the ‘other side’ and how targets can evade attempts at social 
control. This chapter examines the sequential placement and forms of resistance in response 
to an ongoing enticing challenge. Thus, I will explore the strength of resistance to these 
challenges (working from weak to strong throughout the chapter) and I will discuss how this 
interconnects with who-the-speakers-are and the overall structural organisation of the 
disputes.  
 
In this chapter I will show how participants, in and through the structure of the 
dispute, resist a challenge at its earliest projectable point. This chapter will be structured as 
follows: first, I will provide an overview of enticing in disputes – how they reverse the logic 
of the target’s argument. Second, I will then present an analysis of nine extracts (across six 
sequences) in three sections (complying with a challenge, pursuing a challenge and reversing 
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a challenge). I will then discuss these findings to consider how resistance may be smuggled 
into turns and the design of turns which restrict what a possible next turn could be.   
 
 
Parties in disputes challenge the opinions, views and attitudes of one another in and 
through talk. A ‘challenge’ is a practice which delivers some assertion (Koshik, 2003), that 
is, invites the other to defend their position when that position has been compromised. 
Responding to challenges is a problem for members and so, resistance is a member’s solution 
to this problem. One way that a challenge may be brought off is through ‘enticing’ sequences 
which are manufactured in order to reverse the logic of the other’s argument (Reynolds, 
2015). The extract below, as collected by Reynolds (2015), is taken from a protestor dispute 
between pro-life, and pro-choice activists.  
 
Extract 1 (Adapted from Reynolds (2015, p.301)). 
 
01 T:   [>but we’re talking about< <human beings.>] we’re not talking about  
02       destro:ying anything. you’re ju:mping to conclu[sions. ] 
03 C:                                                                             [>let me a]sk you something. 
04        =do you eat eggs.< 
05         (2.0)  
06 T:   <yes.> 
07 C:   that’s a foe:tus. couldn’t it be¿ if there’s a blood thi:ng 
08        [it’s->it’s a foetus.<] 
09 T:   [<we are talking >   ] about <the pi:ll ki:lling wo:men.> 
 
This enticing sequences unfolds by providing a momentary cessation (line 03-06) of the 
dispute (“let me ask you something.”) and rely on an affiliative/aligning move (“yes”, line 
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06) in the service of challenging some attested hypocrisy in the answer (“that’s a foetus”, line 
07). The enticing move occurs in line 03-04 where a straightforward, ostensibly non-
disputative question is asked to solicit a certain answer; in this case, a ‘yes’. This creates the 
grounds for C to challenge T, as T eats eggs therefore he is a murderer (which is incongruous 
with his liberal views).  
 
Enticing a response is accomplished by producing a seemingly unproblematic, 
straightforward and uncontroversial question or statement which, on the surface of the talk, 
does not openly oppose the target, but establishes a basis for some upcoming opposition 
(Reber, 2019; Reynolds, 2011; 2015; Sacks, 1995). These questions, either explicitly or 
implicitly, are produced as ‘innocent’; yet “asking a question is not an innocent thing to do” 
(Steensig & Drew, 2008, p.7), and innocent questions are thus inapposite to the local 
environment within which they occur. Indeed, Clayman and Loeb (2018, p. 128), in their 
analysis of political positioning questions (i.e. determining politicians’ stance on certain 
issues) note that “such questions are not primarily concerned with critically interrogating 
viewpoints […] but rather accountably linking politicians to positions for the record”. 
Enticers get produced to manipulate knowledge or interactional resources to set a trap, which 
creates some attribute, or ‘norm’ (i.e. a normative framework) and is designed to accomplish 
some action such as recruiting the target’s position against their own argument (Reynolds, 
2011; 2015) and/or claiming power and (counter) accusing (Reber, 2019).  
 
3.0.1 Enticing  
 
 
Enticing can occur across different environments (see Reber, 2019). They function as a 
device which challenges the normative position of another, and as such occur through 
disputes. As Clayman and Heritage (2014) on ‘first actions’ describe, that when a person is 
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confronted with a turn that proposes a future action (e.g. a straightforward question), that it is 
dealt with according to a perceived distribution of ‘benefits’ – i.e. what are the likely 
outcomes of answering a straightforward question in a disputative environment. Disputes are 
systematically organised by participants whose conduct is produced as orderly for their local 
context (Coulter, 1990; Maynard, 1985a; Reynolds, 2015). Two ways that a dispute is 
organised is through challenging and resisting. Challenges do not have to convey 
disagreement or disaffiliation with the other speaker; but, challenges are sequentially 
implicative as they initiate a new/different trajectory, and can thus be non-aligning to the 
previous turn(s). Similarly, resistance is managed through turn design (Drew, 1987; Drew, 
1992) and challenges are done in ways to pre-empt potential resistance. Enticers are an 
example of this – the device suspends a presupposition and traps the target into a line of 
argument before producing a challenge that is difficult to dismiss given the target’s earlier 
response. 
 
These devices, according to Reynolds (2015), rarely achieve a ‘win’ in the conflict-
talk, but instead accomplish a resetting of the conflict to halt the target’s line of argument and 
assert some control over the (new) direction of talk.  They may be deployed to negotiate, 
claim power and/or accuse (Reber, 2019). The production of this type of challenge then, 
positions the other as responding to the course of action being done by the producer. 
Additionally, the enticing provides for a pivot to a challenge sequence through initiating a 
new course of action, and although serving to cease the in-progress line of argument, it also 
maintains the gestalt of the overall argument to afford new or reintroduced arguables. To 
illustrate this, Reynolds (2015) detailed what he calls the “five distinct phases” of an enticing 
sequence, describing how someone is rendered a suitable target for the challenge which is 
built on by Reber (2019). The figure below is adapted from Reber’s (2019) work and 
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showcases the full sequence of which the ‘enticer’ occurs in phase (c), with the additional 
phase (d) as the point at which some form of resistance occurs which will be discussed 
throughout the analysis.  
 
Figure 3. The phases of an enticer, adapted from Reynolds (2011, p.52, 2015, p.304) and Reber (2019). 
 
The described use of an enticer is to bring off a challenge through in-the-moment 
compliance towards ultimately adversarial ends. Oppositionality between participants 
characterises ‘disputative interactions’ in that participants are collaboratively engaged with 
the disputed topic and furnish the talk with adversarial features such as disagreement (Antaki, 
1994; Coulter, 1990; Hutchby, 1996a; Maynard, 1985a). The full enticing sequences 
presented here are, at their core, disaffiliative in that they furnish talk with some inapposite 
activity. On a moment-by-moment basis a speaker may align with the prior turn, have a 
preferred turn shape, and may appear affiliative (e.g. “of course”), yet their outcomes avail an 
adversarial stance by the challenger to the target12. These enticing sequences seek to make the 
target ‘ordinary’ i.e. attending to presupposed social norms – at least in the service of 
demonstrating some oppositional, or problematic views or action of the target.  
 
12 Challenger/Target is an analyst’s category to characterise that current configuration of 
members depending on who has control of the direction of talk i.e. who is doing the 
‘enticing’ versus its recipient.  
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This chapter examines cases where the enticing sequence is derailed in some manner, 
specifically, by focusing on phase (d) as the point of derailment. I will show some cases of 
resistance to an enticer through the treating of seemingly straightforward questions as 
objectionable; moreover, this serves to answer (1) how resistance is manifest in and through 
talk, (2) if an enticer may be successfully derailed, and (3) if an enticer may be recovered and 
pursued following some resistance.  
 
3.1 Analysis 
 
In this section, I show how enticing questions are resisted. I focus on the sequential 
placement of resistance according to the phases of the overall enticing sequence; the analysis 
also presents some forms of resistance and discusses their strength in terms of what they 
accomplish, i.e. what their upshot is and to what extent the challenge is pushed back. Though 
I use the terms “weak/strong/passive/active”, these are grounded in whether the resistance 
complies with the challenge (i.e. aligns), or outrightly suspends the challenge (i.e. disaligns). 
The analysis is structured as follows: first, I will detail some cases where there is weak 
resistance – that is, the target does not suspend challenge but displays features that push 
against the challenge. Second, I will demonstrate a pursuit of a challenge. In this section I 
will show how the challenger deals with the target’s resistance by re-pursuing the challenge 
(with a different tack). I will also explore how resistance can be built across turns to make it 
difficult for the challenger to continue their challenge. Finally, I will demonstrate an example 
of strong resistance to an enticer, i.e. how a target outright rejects the enticer and reverses the 
challenge back onto the challenger.   
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3.1.1 Complying with the challenge 
 
 
The focus here is on how participants go along with the prior (and potentially challenging) 
turn. The analysis shows that when participants do go along with the prior turn, they do so in 
ways that mark their turns as non-compliant or as attending to something other than the 
challenge. Reynolds’ (2011) work outlined the practice of doing challenges via the use of 
these interrogatives in which enticers occurred and so the examples presented by Reynolds 
display successful attempts at challenging by the challenger. The extracts presented herein 
show that this is not always the case, and how participants work to push back against these 
challenges.  
 
This extract comes from a UK radio station in 2017. The radio host (Hos) has invited 
listeners who identify as “alt-right13” to call in to have a “discussion of views”. Tom has 
called in and has been answering questions regarding his views. Immediately prior to this 
extract they had been discussing the racially motivated protests in Charlottesville USA in 
2017, with the host questioning Tom on how he can reconcile being a member of the alt-right 
given the murder of a left-wing counter-protestor.  
 
Extract 2 ‘I think you’re racist’ [07:46-09:27] 
 
01 Hos:  j-just a finnal thought T#om. (0.9).hh  
02       >wh- wh- wha-< what would happen if you  
03       fell in love with a <°black woman.> or a-  
04       (0.7) brow:n. person°. What would happen?  
05 TOM:  erm .h(huh) .hh (0.7) well I- (0.5) personally  
06       I- I wouldn't (0.2) you’know it’s not a- (0.2)  
07       through:h. is- it’s a- >generally through< (0.4)  
08       my in group pref’rence that I would (1.0) would  
09       prob’bly- I would prefer to be-(0.7) you’know  
10       in love- (0.3) with somebody of my ow:n? (.) group  
11       (0.3)[by ((area/average))] 
 
13 The ‘alt right’ are a loosely defined collective category of (largely American) white 
supremacists, neo-fascists, neo-nazi, anti-semitic, anti-immigrant, and anti-intellectual 
(Massanari, 2018). 
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12 Hos:       [-you:r in:         ] group <preference>  
13       °what does that m’n?°  
 
The host produces a wh-question as an enticer – that is, it possibly sets up a challenge toward 
Tom’s espoused views by inviting an implication that ‘something bad would happen’ 
(Koshik, 2003). “What would happen if you fell in love with black woman or a brown 
person” notes a problem with who Tom is – though it is asking for information, it conveys a 
negative assertion, i.e. ‘something bad would happen’, and so by asking the question in the 
first place implicates Tom’s right-wing membership as problematic. The question is designed 
to highlight a possible contradiction: that is, if he did fall in love with a black woman he 
would be in a self-contradictory position.  
 
Here, the host dispatches from the prior talk and initiates a new sequence (phase b) 
with “just a final thought Tom” (line 01), with the “just a final thought” produced as a pre-
construction that proposes a pre-closing sequence (Dori-Hacohen, 2011). The action is an 
interrogative done in lines 02-04, which crafts the presupposition that falling in love with a 
black woman or brown person is problematic for Tom. The prospective understanding of 
Tom proffered (that he has a problem with people of colour) is produced with delicacy 
through a hypothetical to make the question’s terms “difficult (though not impossible) to 
resist” (Peräkylä, 1995, p.309). With the question formatted as what would happen if (line 
02) + hypothetical (line 03-04) + what if (line 04), it marks the upcoming talk as “up front” to 
ensure an aligned recipient (Speer, 2012), and secures a response constrained to the terms of 
the question (phase c). This question entices Tom to confront the bounded attributes of his 
alt-right membership through suspending the presupposition that loving a person of colour is 
uncontroversial, and by doing so the question prepares the grounds for a subsequent and 
projectable challenge. 
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Tom’s response attends to the imparted challenge and indicates some trouble with the 
question. His turn is peppered with speech perturbations and disfluencies; it begins with a 
“well”/“personally” (line 05), which avoids disagreeing with the hypothetical, but is 
epistemically independent from the prior, proffering a ‘my side’ response (Jefferson, 1987) to 
revise the terms of the hypothetical. Tom aligns with the activity (answering the host’s 
question) but resists the presupposition by responding in terms of his category membership 
norms “in-group preference” (line 08) (phase d). Additionally, his turn incorporates some 
minimising faculties – “generally” (line 07), “probably” (line 09), “you know” (line 09) – 
which collaborate with his resistance. The theoretical scenario then is responded to as an 
empirical matter, with Tom asserting himself as a member of group who does not mix with 
people of another race; thus, the pre-conditions for a mixed-race relationship are non-
existent.  
 
In extract 2 the host’s hypothetical entices Tom and sets up a disjuncture between his 
membership and an activity not associated with that category. If Tom accepts that he could 
fall in love with a woman of colour, then the host can highlight the contradiction between 
Tom’s political positions. So, Tom says (cautiously) that he would not fall in love with a 
woman of colour, and this gets him out of projectable trouble (although there is trouble ahead 
for Tom as the host pursues the question, but crucially, not the sort of trouble that he would 
be in if he conceded that he could fall in love with a woman of colour; he’s fended that off – 
at least temporarily). Certainly, Tom’s response is produced as tied-to, but independent from, 
the host’s hypothetical, privileging his own perspective; moreover, Tom resists the enticing 
question by attending to his category norms, which retrospectively recasts the scenario as 
factual rather than moral. Consequently, Tom’s going-along-with the Host’s challenge by 
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providing an aligned response (though dispreferred) does not outrightly resist against the 
challenge but his indications of unwillingness to affiliate with the host displays Tom as 
pushing back against the presupposition being assembled by the host – though the upshot of 
his turn reinforces his position as racist. 
 
3.1.2 Pursuing a challenge in response to resistance 
 
 
The following extracts detail the pursuit of an answer to the enticing question (phase c) – 
wherein some norms or attributes are treated as acceptable (i.e. a normative framework) – is 
established (phase b) followed by a prospective description of the target, which binds the 
target to a category that is incongruous with their argument/views. I examine how the targets 
of these challenges build resistance over a number of turns in response to block access to a 
third position turn; furthermore, I show how certain forms of weak or passive resistance push 
back against the enticing challenge, but do not necessarily avert the interactional trajectory of 
the enticer, unlike strong or active resistance.  
 
  In this example, Sam is calling the UK radio station ‘Leading Britain’s Conversation 
(LBC)’ a news, travel and weather station that often discusses politically divisive topics. Sam 
has called in response to a segment on the recent burkini14 ban in France (August 2016); Sam 
has called to respond to a previous caller who condemned the banning. Here, Sam advocates 
for all women to cover up, indicating that morals are on in the decline in Britain. The host 
(Hos) has taken an oppositional position. Throughout the next three extracts, we will see the 
host attempt to highlight a contradiction; that is, if Sam’s wife is more openminded, that puts 
Sam in a difficult position, so the host tries to lead Sam into that self-contradictory position.  
 
14 A portmanteau of ‘burqa’ and ‘bikini’ to describe a swimwear garment that covers the 
whole body besides the face, hands and feet.  
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Extract 3.1 ‘Bikinis’ [03:01-03:49] 
 
01 Sam:  >yenah well course you do< because mostly  
02       you’re perverts 
03 Hos:  oh I see so- so because I perhaps  
04       like i- g- appreciating the  
05       fe[male fo:rm. I’m a      ]pervert. now am I? 
06 Sam:    [if you’re not going to-] watching naked women 
07 Hos:  bo:[y.] 
08 Sam:     [wel]l of course you are 
09 Hos:  of cours- right so any many who likes looking  
10       at a woman in a bikini or .hhh possibly even  
11       if they go to the beach in south of Fra:nce  
12       and there some very ni:ce. .hh women wandering  
13       around with just bikini bottoms on they’re are  
14       all pe:rverts:  
15       (0.2) 
16 Sam:  yeah- they all perv they all gorp at them and  
17       [keep] staring at them of course.  
18 Hos:  [jee-] okay 
19 Sam:  >is that what you [do<    ] 
20 Hos:                    [an how-] how mu- (.) p’don (.)  
21       [no I don’t KEEp star]ing  
22 Sam:  [is that what you do ] 
23 Hos:  I don’t sit there LEEring at them and I think  
24       [my partner will probably have a view if I did?] 
25 Sam:  [(      ) hanhaha                              ] 
   26       hanhaha                         
27 Hos:  yea? How many children do you have Sam? 
28 Sam:  £sinx£ 
29 Hos:  s:i#x. do you mind my asking the age range? 
30 Sam:  eh. £eleven to- o:ne£ 
31 Hos:  °°ahright°° °well look after >them<°  
32       >do you hav-< Do they have an enlightened mo:ther. 
33       (0.7) 
34 Sam:  £of course they do.£ 
35 Hos:  they have R[Ight. so they are getting-] 
36 Sam:             [their ver- modest         ] 
37       their very modest and good mother.  
38       [(will/would)] cover up all the time  
 
The analysis will show the manufacture of a relevant description that challenges Sam on the 
basis of his previously espoused views, thereby reversing the logic of his argument. The 
enticing question works to cast Sam as being an inadequate father, because at least his 
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children have an ‘enlightened’ mother. This is achieved by rendering Sam as a member of the 
family device, which promotes his rights and obligations to align with the enticing question 
and occasions the challenge. The generation of the challenge is resisted by Sam, which 
results in the host reformulating his turns in order to address, or counter-resist. The question 
entices an answer which will generate a contrast between Sam and the mother.  
 
Prior to this sequence the host has attempted to move into a closing but Sam has taken 
control over the direction of talk to produce a description of the host (and men like him) as 
perverts. Lines 01-26 detail that description and show how the target of the analysis (lines 27 
onwards) arise. From line 27, the host receipts Sam’s laughter with “yea” and pushes the 
sequence in a different direction by soliciting some straightforward objective information 
about Sam’s children, which is hearable as pre-constructing (phase c). The pre-construction 
projects a closing with the summarising in line 31 (“well look after them”), obtains the floor 
and proposes an interactional trajectory in line 32. In building the pre-closing, the host makes 
relevant a categorisation of Sam as father, and as husband in line 27 and 32; this does 
partitioning work (Butler, 2008; Sacks, 1995) by making relevant different category 
predicates and the interactional affordances those predicates impart. Doing this allows for the 
“safe” generation of a contrastive challenge (Butler, 2008); it produces Sam as an inadequate 
father (because his children have at least one ‘enlightened’ parent) as his views are 
incongruent with being an adequate, enlightened person.  
 
The pivot affords the host the position to pause the on-going closing trajectory (“well 
look after them”) and initiate an enticing sequence (the additional turn construction unit 
marked with increased speed in line 32). The challenge sequence begins with a polar 
interrogative (“do you hav- do they have an enlightened mother”, line 32), which is hearable 
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as an enticing question (Reynolds, 2015) as it is produced abruptly and inappositely in terms 
of both sequence and design; moreover, the question foreshadows some action (the 
challenge) (Clayman, 2002), which is attempted in line 35. 
 
 The challenge in line 32 begins with a repair from the recognitional referent ‘you’ to 
the children’s perspective ‘they’, invoking the family category device and in doing so making 
relevant a response that assumes a yes answer (as in, the children have an enlightened 
mother). This interrogative is a request for information about the children’s mother with a 
candidate assessment. The question sets up the basis for a challenge (i.e. at least Sam’s 
children have one adequate parent): it explicitly invokes the asymmetrical-relational pair 
‘mother/child’, produces the host as not-knowing, and makes sense of the question through 
implying the symmetrical pair ‘mother/father’, which bounds Sam with rights to know. The 
supposed answer is a yes, with declination rendered unfitted to the category boundedness of 
Sam to the mother.  
 
Sam treats the question with a gap (line 33) that is responsive to the inapposite nature 
of the question (Stokoe, 2018), following which Sam produces an upgraded, non-polar 
response in line 34 (“of course they do”). This, on the surface, looks affiliative with the host’s 
normative basing; however, it is hearable as contesting the askability of the question (Stivers, 
2011) by treating the question literally (i.e. as a silly question (Stokoe & Edwards, 2008)). 
Sam’s “of course they do” aligns with the question by providing an answer but pushes back 
by refuting the need to ask in the first place without halting the interactional trajectory. 
Treating the response in line 34 as a yes, and redoing Sam’s response (“they have right”), the 
host progresses the challenge with a projectable challenge (that they are getting some good 
parenting) in line 35 (“so they are getting-”), which is produced to generate a contrast 
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between Sam and the ‘mother’. This can be seen with the initial reformulating of Sam’s 
response from “of course they do” to “they have”; and the “right” is hearable as a sequence 
closing third (Schegloff, 2007a) with the following “so” formulating the upshot of the prior 
(Schegloff, 1987). Specifically, the new sequence projects a challenge emergent from Sam’s 
response.  
 
Sam, in overlap, disaligns to infer his own understanding and provide an alternative to 
deflect the possible challenge. In line 36-38, Sam invokes his epistemic domain to 
retrospectively produce an understanding of what the predicates of ‘enlightened mother’ are. 
The retrospective work resists the implicature of the enticing work being done by the host 
through deflecting the trajectory of the challenge project; this then avoids complying with the 
contrastive work to reintroduce Sam’s opinions and tacitly counter the direction of talk. As in 
extract 2, we see a presupposition being subverted. In this case, Sam conveys that an 
enlightened mother would cover up, subverting the host’s use of ‘enlightened’.  
 
Extract 3.2 ‘Bikinis’ [03:01-03:49] 
 
39 Sam: [(will/would)] cover up all the time 
40 Hos: [I said sorry]  
41      when I say enlightened more broad-  
42      ah- more broadmi:nded mother. do they have a 
43      broadminded mother or is she-  
44 Sam: yeah she’s broadminded she’s not sh- sh-  
45      she’s not- she doesn’t have low self-esteem  
46      where [she feels like she] 
47 Hos:       [°no- I’m try-°    ] 
48 Sam: [has to get naked in front of other men. ] 
49 Hos: [what am I trying to get across here°.hhh] 
50 Sam: nno that’s what I’m getting across. 
 
Extract 3.2 sequentially follows 3.1 where we observed Sam’s retrospective work to produce 
an alternative understanding in order to resist the implicature of the host’s question. Here, the 
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host initiates a repair in line 40, which orients to a misunderstanding of ‘enlightened’ (“when 
I say enlightened”) i.e. the trouble source is Sam’s description of his wife which reveals his 
apparent misunderstanding of what enlightened means. This is in partial overlap with Sam’s 
turn (see extract 3.1). The production of the alternative description (Sidnell & Barnes, 2010) 
as ‘broadminded’ and not ‘enlightened’ works to progress the project of the challenge and 
prevent it from being completely subverted by Sam. Indeed, the host continues to entice an 
answer which will generate a contrast between Sam and his wife.  
 
This gets done in lines 42-43 (“when I say enlightened more broad- ah- more 
broadminded mother”) through explicitly attending to the retrospection, which asserts the 
host’s domain of knowledge in the repair operation and attends to this formulation as a 
displaced response that is interfering with the progression of the challenging project (Bolden, 
2010). The enticing question comes in lines 42-43 formulated as a polar design which 
embeds the invitation for a type-conforming yes (Koshik, 2015; Raymond, 2003).  
 
The host’s intonation and syntax “is she” do not indicate this as being a point of 
possible completion (line 43); however, Sam self-selects, which serves to interrupt the 
generation of a possible contrast that may have challenged Sam’s previously espoused views. 
Sam pushes back against the trajectory, building his resistance against the enticing sequence. 
Doing an interruption in this sequential position affords the next turn to be in alignment 
regardless of the answer, and as such, Sam attends to the question in a subversive way. The 
“yeah” (line 44) in response manages this with its positive valence to align with the prior 
question (Gardner, 2001; Gerhardt & Beyerle, 1997). Sam affirms the broadmindedness 
(“yeah she’s broadminded”, line 44), and thus bolsters his stance against the projected but 
unspoken alternative. Sam’s turn gets brought off like his previous description of enlightened 
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wherein he accepts the prospective description and then ascribes the predicates of that 
description. The ascription work occasions some perturbations (“she’s not sh- sh- she’s not-
”), which project a refutation of some predicates rather than ascribing an alternative 
understanding of the description. The understanding produced by Sam in lines 45-46 is 
congruent with his earlier turn “very modest” (extract 3.1, line 37) and previously espoused 
opinions (women ought to cover up) which are hearable as implicating those that wear bikinis 
as having low self-esteem. This exhibits some contestable matter with the prior turn, and this 
continuation builds on the aligned response to resist against the host’s trajectory (casting the 
mother as not being broadminded).  
 
The host self-selects and comes in to overlap at a point where it is hearable that Sam 
has redescribed what it means to be broadminded. In line 48 (“no- I’m try- what am I trying 
to get across here”), the host designs his turn as doing self-talk, which makes available a 
trouble that he is having in getting his point across adequately resulting in Sam’s 
misunderstandings. Sam’s responsive turn explicitly displays an orientation to his resistance 
and redescribing work (line 50: “no that’s what’s I’m getting across”) to privilege his right to 
put his point across and thus his agenda.  
 
To summarise, in this example a description gets occasioned by the host through the 
crafting Sam as ‘father’. This parental category reverses the logic of Sam’s argument (i.e. that 
one cannot have those views and be a good parent), which renders Sam in alignment with the 
ongoing project but susceptible to the contrastive challenge being generated by the host. 
Additionally, this example displays how resistance to challenges and their responses are 
managed by the participants on a turn-by-turn basis; this will be further exemplified in the 
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following extract which sequentially follows.  
 
Extract 3.3 ‘Bikinis’ [03:01-03:49] 
 
51 Sam:  nno that’s what I’m getting [across.] 
52 Hos:                              [.hhh   ] 
53       is she mo::re #ehh: r:e#laxed (.) than you: 
54 Sam:  Nick it’s none of your £busin’ss about my wife£  
55       to be fair (.) yeah £we’re on radio yeah£ 
56 Hos:  ahright okay look after the children enjo- .hhh  
57       have I enjoy- well >I s’pose have enjoyed speaking  
58       t’y’< I’m pretty horrified by some of your views. 
 
This extract concludes the conversation: the host forces an ultimatum to furnish Sam with a 
description that is inapposite within the family device. Here the call ends, and the challenge is 
closed. Following Sam’s resistance to the potential challenge through his describing work – 
and then his explicit orientation to it not being a misunderstanding but rather, an attempt to 
subvert the possible challenge – the host progresses the project to bring off said challenge. 
This is an instance of strong resistance as there is a full refusal by Sam to answer the 
question.  
 
In line 53, the host redoes the enticing question, which gets produced as contiguous 
with the prior sequence (“is she more relaxed”) rather than as a stand-alone first-pair part. 
This attends to Sam’s prior turn (extract 3.2, line 50) where his agenda comprised a part of 
the shared, and accessible knowledge in the interaction. Thus, the host’s turn is another go at 
producing an interrogative that will be adequately understood by Sam. The turn entices an 
answer which generates a contrast between Sam and the mother by being brought off with the 
increment “than you” (line 51), which makes relevant a second pair part that describes both 
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Sam and the mother15.  
 
 Sam treats this as a challenge by rejecting the question. This is achieved by attending 
to the project of Nick questioning Sam about his wife. Sam’s turn with the pre-positioned 
address term “Nick” (line 54) does not force recipiency (Lerner, 2003), but rather uses 
“Nick” to reproach the host for not having responded appropriately (Clayman, 2010; Rendle-
Short, 2007); that appropriateness portends revealing personal information (“we’re on radio 
yeah”, line 55) as inappropriate. Sam manages this rejection by framing the host as a non-
incumbent of his family device (“none of your business about my wife”, line 54), with the 
hedge “to be fair” (line 55) + account (“we’re on radio yeah”, line 55) to highlight the 
inappositeness of the question. This counters the turn with a non-conforming response 
containing a built-in account that (1) invokes the overhearing audience, (2) rejects the host’s 
request for epistemic access to the relationship, (3) orients to the talk as inapposite and, (4) 
invites agreement with the new direction with the pre-positioned address and turn-final 
“yeah”. The host does not contiguously pursue the challenge and instead returns to the 
sequence closing (“ahright okay look after the children enjo-”, line 56). However, the host 
pivots from the sequence closing to criticism, having failed to complete the challenge 
sequence as projected: here the host brings off a subject-side assessment in the closing 
sequence in line 58 (“I’m pretty horrified by some of your views”), which displays an 
adversarial stance toward Sam and his views. This criticism is hearable as a summary with 
the phone disconnection hearable in line 56, which allows the host to get the final word, and 
to distance himself from Sam’s views. 
 
 
15 Yes = Sam is not relaxed 
No = the mother is not relaxed 
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Throughout extracts 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, we observed the attempts by the host to progress 
the challenging project and craft a prospective understanding of Sam. This was done to make 
relevant a description or assessment, and thus challenge Sam on the basis of his views being 
non-normative and in contrast to someone (the mother) with whom he is in a standard 
relational pair. Sam attends to the host’s on-the-surface talk as being problematic and resists 
the implicature by retrospectively producing alternative understandings. Sam worked hard to 
forestall progression to the projectable challenge, and he succeed (cf. Tom in extract 2). Sam 
builds his resistance in response to the host’s turns to block the host’s access to a third 
position turn: initially Sam contests the question but does not strongly resist (staying aligned 
with the activity). The host displays an orientation to Sam’s epistemic domain through 
treating the retrospection as misunderstanding rather than resistance with his repair 
operations, instead of rejecting or confronting Sam’s alternative understandings. 
Consequently, it is not until the third attempt by the host at asking the question (designed as a 
polar question that limits what can be done in response) that Sam outrightly resists the 
challenge and suspends the talk’s trajectory.  
 
The following extract demonstrates a similar sort of sequence where a projectable 
challenge is forestalled by the target of that challenge. This demonstrates a members’ 
resistance to a challenging project, and the pursuit of the challenge project in response to that 
resistance. Like the previous extracts, this occurs in public with an overhearing audience; 
however, here, unlike the radio call-in, the overhearing audience is visible as this dispute 
occurs on a train in London. The dispute arises as Sue requests that Ann turn her music down 
as the sound from Ann’s headphones was disturbing Sue’s reading. This request is rejected 
by Ann, and escalates to name-calling, and a dispute over what is appropriate conduct for 
public transport. Immediately prior to this sequence, Sue has made a request for Ann to move 
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and has called Ann a “little schoolgirl”.  
 
Extract 4 ‘you’re unemployable’ [02:46-03:18] 
 
01 ANN:  ynou’re calling me a schnnoolgirl and you’re 
02       DA:ring me. (0.9) mate. (1.4) grow up 
03       (0.6) 
04 SUE:  NO you are very rude >and you have no< manners  
05       dno you hanve a job?  
06 ANN: °do [you°   ] 
07 SUE:     [do you ] wor:k yes I do >have a j’b< 
08 ANN:  thant’s good for [yonu:   ] 
09 SUE:                   [dno you ] hanve a jonnb? 
10 ANN:  thant’s good for yonu? O:h WOw:? 
11 SUE:  do you work? 
12 ANN:  O:h WOw:?= 
13 SUE:  =>are you emp<loy:ed.= 
14 ANN:  =round of app*lause for the working lady*  
15                    *clapping------------------* 
16 SUE:  so what you’re unemploy:ed. >well I’ll tell  
17       you what< I kno:w why. because you’re unemployable 
18 ANN:  [I me’n-  ] 
19 SUE:  [no employ]yer will touch you 
20       (0.5) 
21 ANN:  m[ate I wouldn ]’t wanna work for youn::? 
22 SUE:   [you are so g-] 
23       I wouldn’t eithe- 
 
This analysis will show an enticing question getting derailed during the first phases 
(Reynolds, 2015). I will detail the (1) attempted enticer, (2) the participant’s methods for 
resisting the enticer, and (3) the pursuit of the challenge project. The enticing question gets 
done in line 05 by Sue (“do you have a job”) which responds to Ann’s rebuttal against being 
called a schoolgirl. Sue exploits Ann’s rebuttal (that she’s not a schoolgirl) to ask whether 
Ann has a job (i.e. if she is not a schoolgirl, then she would be normatively expected to work; 
if she says she does, then the contradiction with her present behaviours can be exposed). Like 
the previous extracts, this extract displays (1) a projected contradiction: should Sue confirm 
that she has a job?; i.e. she could not behave like this in the workplace; and (2) resistance 
which is designed to forestall progression to the projectable challenge (in the form of the 
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display of a self-contradiction).  
 
Similar to the prior extracts, the enticing question (phase c) occurs at a juncture where 
Sue has done a possible evaluative sequence closing third (“no you are very rude and you 
have no manners” line 04), but has extended the turn to produce a first pair part (line 05), 
which serves to progress the conflict activity and manage the contingency that Ann could 
refute the evaluation. The enticing question (“do you have a job”, line 05) resets the talk and 
allows Sue to have control over the direction of the subsequent talk. Unlike the prior extracts, 
which assume a particular polar answer in order to progress the challenge, either a ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ could put Ann in a difficult position. If Ann is unemployed i.e. ‘no’, then the outcome 
can be a ‘no one will employ you’ (see line 19); if Ann says she is employed i.e. ‘yes’, then 
Sue would have the grounds to point out the contradiction between her present behaviours, 
and normative expectations of how one ought to behave. This is hearable as doing an enticing 
question in this interactional environment, as it is designed as though straightforwardly 
soliciting information, but this information is necessary for the action to follow. This is then 
observable in lines 16-17 where one of the possible challenge gets brought off; however, 
before this Ann does orient to the enticing questions in line 09, line 11 and line 13 in a 
variety of ways, all of which deflect and resist the challenge sequence. 
 
 Ann attends to this as a enticing question in line 06 by redoing the question as 
initiating a new adjacency pair rather than as an aligning second pair part, turning the 
question back on Sue. This displays an adversarial stance toward the question (Bolden, 2009) 
and actively resists going along with the trajectory. Sue reformulates the enticing question in 
line 07 (“do you work”) in overlap with Ann’s question reversal but responds to Ann’s line 6 
turn (“yes I do have a job”, line 07). The additional information gets deployed to mark the 
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talk as responsive to line 06 and ostensibly registers Sue’s normative framing of having a job. 
The response done by Sue affords Ann the space to produce an assessment in the third 
position (“that’s good for you oh wow”), which (1) displays an adversarial stance through 
sarcastic praise, and (2) makes available, to the overhearing audience and Sue, an ascription 
of Sue’s challenge (of being unemployed as a bad thing). This turn in line 08 and the repeated 
turn in 10 are doing sarcasm: the formulation appears affiliative, but within this local context 
of the dispute, it is non-normative to affiliate with the opponent. Structurally, the “that’s good 
for you” (line 08) sequentially deletes Sue’s turn by taking the slot in which an answer to her 
question could go. Sue has no option but to repeat that turn or it will not get answered as the 
interactional space has been taken by the pseudo-praise. Sue reattempts the enticing question 
three more times in line 09, line 11 and line 13 as a means to progress the project of the 
challenge: in each instance Sue provides candidate terms (“job”, “work”, “employed”) to 
solicit a fitted response, which Ann resists giving. Here, ‘job’ is produced as a noun, ‘work’ 
as a verb and ‘employed’ as an adjective. This move between alternatives is pertinent as the 
differing grammatical functions of each term affords differing interactional resources. This is 
observable in lines 16-17 where Sue abandons the enticing question phase and progresses 
with the challenge sequence (“because you’re unemployable”) (yielded by “are you 
employed” in line 13). 
 
The challenge done by Sue in lines 16-17 is delicately delivered in that it is not 
occasioned by a fitted response to the enticing question, and so knowing if Ann is employed 
is outside of Sue’s epistemic domain. The challenge is deployed with “so what”, which crafts 
the upcoming upshot as emergent from the pre-sequences i.e. treats absence of any response 
as a negative answer. The “you’re unemployed” then sets up the premise for the challenge 
and the idiomatic “well I’ll tell you what”, which projects that the next part of her turn will be 
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perspectival, non-straightforward, and anticipate resistance/disagreement. Consequently, Sue 
prefaces the challenge with “I know why”, which positions this as knowledge that is available 
to anyone and is a logical ascription from Ann’s ascribed predicates (rude, no manners). The 
upshot is an insult produced as “because you’re unemployable no employer will touch you” 
in line 17, which is a conclusive evaluation of Ann on the basis of Ann’s actions in this 
conflict as not just being locally situated to this interaction, but her unemployable disposition 
(see Edwards, 1997). Not only does this display Ann as belonging to the category of 
‘unemployable’ and harbouring the associated predicates, it ratifies Sue’s ‘employed’ 
category and Sue’s rights to make claims about Ann’s behaviours/predicates. Ann opposes 
the target challenge in line 21 by countering Sue’s ‘unwanted employee’ with an ‘unwanted 
employer’ categorisation (“I wouldn’t wanna work for you”). 
 
This extract demonstrates how (1) enticing questions get attempted, their sequential 
positions and how they set up some normative basis for a challenge; (2) members’ methods 
for resisting the enticing question through contesting and non-compliance with the course of 
action whilst making explicit, or available, the implicature (the challenge sequence) to the 
overhearing audience; and (3) the continued pursuit of the project, where the redoing of the 
enticing question with alternatives does not get brought off: the challenge then gets delicately 
delivered in a way that is tied to the prior non-responses and the challenger’s own categories. 
Ann strongly builds her resistance to Sue’s challenges by disaligning and producing 
responsive turns, which place interactional obstacles in the way of Sue getting an answer and 
block her access to a third position turn.  
 
The next extract features a dispute during an immigration protest in the US between 
Mas and Art. Art, a right-wing “political commentator”, is protesting a proposed change in 
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the US’s immigration policy; he is accompanied by one other person filming his encounters. 
Mas, a “Jewish liberal”, is counter-protesting. In this sequence Mas challenges Art by 
asserting that he’s not making the world a better place, specifically regarding his views on 
healthcare policies. Immediately prior they have discussed a different protest and Art has 
addressed the camera to call Mas a bigot.  
 
Extract 5.1 ‘giving them truth’ [15:26–16:01] 
 
01 ART:  How is that ju:st. (0.2)  
02       how is that acceptable=  
03 MAS:  =So what’re you doing to make the  
04       world a better pla[ce tell me] 
05 ART:                    [I'm alrea ]dy  
06       doing it now I'm educating others  
07       >I've reregistered voters< (.) I'VE  
08       HElped people i[n Cudahy get a new voi:ce.  ] 
09 MAS:                 [Are you helping people who a]re 
10       sick and who are ill?= 
11 ART:  =yes I am  
12 MAS:  How are you doing tha’. 
13 ART:  I’m doing that [by: I’m giving them tru:th] 
14 MAS:                 [by trying to ((         ))] 
15 ART:  I'm doing that by >giving them scriptu’e<=  
16 MAS:  =by taking awa[y their access        ] 
17 ART:                [I give it them >>by he]lping  
18       them get<< foo:d= 
19 MAS:  =to: basic er basic necessi[ties    ] 
20 ART:                             [who’s ta]king  
21       who from what. 
 
 
This analysis showcases Mas doing enticing to craft a description/assessment of Art that is 
incongruous with his espoused opinions to reverse the logic of his argument. The enticed 
answer is achieved through recurrent enticing questions that seek extended responses to 
impart a prospective understanding of Art. The continual challenges target Art in different 
ways. This then demonstrates (1) enticing as a practice to keep the target engaged in talk over 
which you have control, (2) bait the target into a line of argument that is a reversal of their 
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espoused opinions, and (3) resistance through complying with one’s own category-bounded 
terms. 
 
In line 03, the first attempt at a recognisable enticing question (phase b + c) occurs 
(“so what’re you doing to make the world a better place”), which expects an answer and 
imparts a force that predicts that whatever answer is given will be challenged in some way 
(i.e. asking presupposes some possible deficiency in the first instance). This turn gets built as 
a question but with a tag imperative directive indicating expected compliance. Art complies, 
and in overlap with Mas’ directive, prefaces their turn with “I’m already doing it” (lines 05-
06), which suppresses the upshot by disaligning from the terms of question (phase d) to push 
back against an inference that he’s not making the world a better place. The fitted response 
(lines 06-08) is done as Art provides an extended answer as a list to illustrate the morality of 
his position (as a good human who helps others) in order to counter the force imparted by the 
question, which is an accusation of Art of being immoral.  
 
Mas’ response (lines 09-10) is produced as a second inquiry within the category of 
‘making the world a better place’, which attends to Art’s resistance (“are you helping people 
who are sick and who are ill?”); this polar interrogative more closely resembles an enticer 
(Reynolds, 2015) in that it assumes a particular answer that projects a challenge that occurs in 
line 16. This ‘obvious’ answer is a yes, predicated by the pre (lines 03-04). Art’s response 
treats the yes as preferred, with it being delivered quickly (line 11). Although preferred, it is 
treated as insufficient by Mas: “how are you doing tha’” (line 12) (As the ‘yes’ draws on 
Art’s epistemic domain, which does not occasion a challenge). There is passive resistance to 
the challenge project with “I’m doing that” (line 13), with the repeat-prefaced response 
rejecting the appropriateness of the action (Bolden, 2009), attending to Mas’ agenda, and 
 143 
displaying an adversarial stance to the prior turn. The resistance is attended to by Mas, who, 
in overlap with Art’s fitted response, progresses the challenge project (lines 16-17: although 
this turn is inaudible, there is a reformulation in line 16). Art restarts with the repetition of 
line 13 and produces an additional list item initiated by the “truth” description with 
“scripture”, which is hearable as an expansion to lines 06-08. Art’s expansion to this turn 
does not sufficiently suppress Mas’ upshot (projected from lines 03-04 and lines 09-10) –  
“by taking away their access to basic necessities” – which gets grammatically tied to Art’s 
prior turn with the turn-initial ‘by’; there appears to be some adjustment to this challenge by 
Art in line 17, who in overlap redoes his response with an upgrade.  
 
The below extract follows the prior one; here Mas pursues the challenge project in 
response to Art’s continual pushbacks (phase d) by reinitiating the enticing question (phase 
c). This demonstrates a members’ method to counter resistance through a redoing of the 
question phase to reinitiate the challenge.  
 
Extract 5.2 ‘I have a hat on my head’ [16:01–16:24] 
 
01 MAS:  ↑WEll↑ for one thing you’re a big Trump  
02       supporter (.) correct? 
03 ART:  and it’s awesome [I’m proud of it ] 
04 MAS:                   [correct? are you]  
05       so you would li[ke to take away health care] 
06 ART:                 [I HAVE A HAT ON MY HEAD ANd] 
07       he asked me if >I’m Trump supporter<= 
08 MAS:  =you’d like to take away health care from  
09       y’know mill[ions of Americans        ] 
10 ART:             [HOw am I taking health ca]re  
11       from people 
12 MAS:  you would like to 
13 ART:  HOW am I 
14 MAS:  because you support the president's agenda  
15       which is to take away health ca[re from    ] 
16 ART:                                 [no it isn't] 
17 MAS:  million[ns of (.)   ]Americans. 
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18 ART:         [that's a lie]  
19       notice how they lie  
 
Following extract 5.1, Mas’ turn in response to Art’s question immediately projects some 
disfluency with the question (“Well”) and an extended turn at talk (“for one thing”) 
(Heritage, 2015). The disfluency accords with the insertion sequence that Mas’ answer is 
contingent somehow on Art being a Trump supporter; the shift to proffer the category of Art 
as a Trump support projects an upcoming challenge. Mas initiates the enticing question 
(phase a+b) by mobilising an alternate category for Art “you’re a big Trump supporter (.) 
correct?” (lines 01-02); this question prefers a ‘correct’ given its design (“you’re a”) and 
Art’s attire (line 06). Through mobilising this understanding of Art, Mas manufactures an 
incongruity between Art’s actions and the predicates of belonging to the category of ‘Trump 
supporter’; this is observable later in the extract where the incongruity is done as “you would 
like to take away health care” (line 05) and “because you support the president’s agenda” 
(line 14). Art claims primary rights to assess (see Clift, 2016) by providing an aligned but 
disaffiliative response (“and it’s awesome I’m proud of it” line 03). This response is a 
combination assessment where the “and it’s awesome” is an object-side followed by “I’m 
proud of it”, which is a subject-side assessment (Edwards & Potter, 2017); this form displays 
an orientation to epistemic independence from the prior action with a reassertion of Art’s 
own epistemic rights (phase d). Mas begins the production of a canonical enticer (phase c) 
(“so you would like to take away health care”, line 05) as it manufactures a challenge based 
on the suspension of a presupposition.  
 
However, the target produces their turn at a non-transition relevance place and in 
overlap (“I HAVE A HAT ON MY HEAD”, line 06). This turn outrightly rejects the 
challenge through momentarily disengaging with Mas to talk to the overhearing audience (the 
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camera). Mas’ “you’d like to take” (line 08) resumes his “you would like to take” (line 05) 
with the upgraded “millions of Americans”, which is a response to Art’s “who’s taking who 
from what” (extract 5.1, line 20); this renders his Trump-insertion as the premise for his 
claim “you want to take away health care”, which is serving as the answer to Art’s prior 
question (extract 5.1, line 20). Mas’ turn is hearable as accusing, whilst treating “take away 
health care” as an attribute of Art’s membership; this receives a reversal of interactional 
trajectory (“how am I taking health care from people”, line 10) through treating the 
accusation as a factual matter, though it does not refute the challenge being brought off by 
Mas. The answer comes in line 14 (“because you support the president’s agenda which is to 
take health care away from millions of Americans”), where the challenge gets put on the 
record – that is, the “taking away healthcare” is a responsibility of ‘Trump’ whilst Art’s 
attribute of “support the president” is tied to that responsibility. The combination of the 
enticing question and challenge makes explicit the challenge agenda to the target and 
overhearing audience. The sequence concludes with a rejection of the challenge with “that’s a 
lie” in line 18, which is afforded by the detailing of the challenge so that Art may invoke his 
epistemic primacy as a Trump supporter. 
 
Here then, Mas enticed Art to manufacture a description of him inapposite to his 
category of ‘Trump supporter’ and his espoused views. This was done through reinitiating 
enticing questions (phase c) in response to Art’s pushback (phase d). This demonstrated one 
way of resisting an enticed response, through complying with the enticing question but 
providing an answer that corroborates one’s own category predicates. This is ostensibly weak 
resistance by going along with the course of action, yet its upshot is strong insofar as it averts 
the course of that challenge. Moreover, this extract shows a solution to this resistance – 
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reinitiating the enticing question (phase b) to pursue and bring off the challenge (phase d). 
 
Extract 6 occurs during a protest. The protest is an anti-Trump demonstration on an 
American highway. Ant belongs to the anti-Trump protestors and has initiated an interaction 
with Tru, a counter-protestor who has explained that he is here to challenge the anti-Trump 
protestors and is, himself pro-Trump. Immediately prior to this sequence, Ant and a different 
pro-Trump counter-protestor were contesting whether illegal immigration is an actual issue 
for America. 
 
Extract 6 ‘Americans will pick strawberries’ [12:41-12:56] 
 
01 ANT:  >d’you know what Donald Trump says. he says<  
02       (.) oh they’re taking our jo:bs.  
03       d’you know what th’ illeg’ls do:? 
04 TRU:  what do they do:= 
05 ANT:  =pick <stra:wberries cucumbe[rs>] 
06 TRU:                              [Oka]y an-= 
07 ANT:  =orang>es? are you gonna do that?<= 
08 TRU:  =they’re still illegal 
09 ANT:  you’re AM[erican no-] 
10 TRU:           [YES yes   ] yes  
11       m[aybe americans will do tha]t.  
12 ANT:   [YAhh Ahh you lie          ]  
13       you lying 
14 TRU:  yes? (.) maybe americans will  
15       pick s[trawberries.  ] 
16 ANT:        [no they won’t.] 
 
Ant initiates a new sequence with a pre-telling (“d’you know what Donald Trump says”), 
which, given the local context, infers that he is leading to a point that challenges Trump. The 
telling occurs as reported speech in lines 01-02 (“he says (.) oh they’re taking our jobs”): the 
‘they’re’ is a reference to illegal immigrants as clarified in line 03, and the ‘our’ crafts co-
membership of Americans. This turn is hearable as setting up the basis for a challenge, for 
which the pre-telling in line 03 (phase b) projects a contrast – that what the “illegals” actually 
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do is different to what Trump says they do. Tru responds with a more than straightforward 
go-ahead (“what do they do”) in line 04. 
 
The response by Ant in line 05 is a continuation of the enticing question, further 
establishing a basis for a challenge sequence, of which Tru receipts and begins a turn-at-talk 
that is halted as Ant upgrades the basis in line 07 with a completion of the three-part list 
(“pick strawberries cucumbers oranges”). The enticing polar interrogative then occurs in line 
07 (“are you gonna do that”), which assumes a no response as observed later in line 12. This 
is designed to challenge the reported premise in line 02 of the illegal immigrants taking jobs 
(“he says (.) oh they’re taking our jobs”); this is hearable as doing pre-challenging in that the 
assumed responses makes relevant a third position assessment that ought to counter the logic 
of the reported speech. Tru, in line 08, resists the enticing question by giving a non-fitted 
response to counter the hypothetical through attending to the empirical basis of immigrants 
being ‘illegal’ (“they’re still illegal”), which undermines the reasonableness of the claim that 
“illegals” are contributing members of society by doing jobs others will not. With a pursuit of 
the challenge project, Ant does not do an alternative like in the other extracts, but rather 
attempts to invoke some co-membership in line 09 (“you’re American no”). This recasting 
shifts the target from Tru to reinforce the presupposition that no American citizens perform 
these tasks. Thus, Tru accepts the presupposition that Americans do not perform these tasks, 
but he resists the implication by providing the alternate “maybe they will” (line 11).  
 
In overlap with the recasting, Tru ostensibly aligns with Ant. The course of action 
here is the challenge, but it could also be to cease Ant’s control over the direction of talk; 
however, with the turns in lines 09-12 occurring in overlap, it becomes unclear what is 
responsive to what as line 12 appears to be responsive to line 10, and line 13 to line 11. 
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Certainly though, the challenging project gets brought off with exuberance by Ant in line 12, 
line 13 and line 16 as responsive to the answers given by Tru in line 11 and line 14. The 
challenge then is to disprove the logic of the reported speech in line 02 by recruiting Tru, as a 
Trump supporter, to reverse logic of his own argument. The reversal of logic is often the 
upshot of enticers, but in the previous extracts, the challenger’s pursuit of the project 
subsumes the target’s resistive responses in order to make relevant some assessment or 
description of issue/event/person; while in this case, it is to make relevant the assessment that 
Trump, and the pro-Trump protestors, are liars. 
 
The extracts in this section have shown how resistance gets built across and through 
turns. The analysis revealed how certain forms and positions of resistance passively push 
against the challenge trajectory – i.e. go along with the activity – but highlight something 
contestable with the prior turn(s). These weaker forms of resistance that align with the 
activity do not restrict the challenger, though they can influence its design as they deal with 
the contingencies which arise from the pushback. It is those active forms of resistance that 
are built following earlier contestations, which derail the challenge’s trajectory. For instance, 
the target of the enticer outrightly rejecting the ongoing action – disaligning from the prior 
turn – can push the sequence forward on an alternate trajectory. This manoeuvre appears to 
successfully halt the challenge, though the halting can be treated as accountable. 
 
 
3.1.3 Reversing the challenge 
 
 
The next extract details a reversal of the challenge where the response to a enticing question 
holds the questioner to account for asking the question in the first place. This example occurs 
in a public context, and as well as being done to covertly make relevant some prospective 
description and understanding of the other, it is also employed to solicit a response that 
 149 
ascribes some predicates to a category. In extract 7, Godfrey (GOD) is a right-wing politician 
in the UK and prominent spokesperson for his party, and INT is a journalist from a UK TV 
company. The clip begins with a group of journalists waiting outside of a building for 
Godfrey to leave; when he does the group follow him with this journalist asking a question. 
This sequence is the first point at which these two people talk. 
 
Extract 7 ‘no black faces’ [00:35-00:47] 
 
01 INT:  now >miste’ mister bloom< what do you 
02       make of the front- cover of this a- (0.8)  
03       your ah- THe conference bro:chure with  
04       no black faces on it. 
05       (1.7)------Godfrey gaze in Int’s direction------> 
06 GOD:  WHat a racist comment is that >how dare you.<  
07       that’s an appalling thing to say .hh you’re  
08       picking people out for COLour of their skin you  
09       disGUst ME get outa my way 
10       (2.0) 
11 INT:  >we- but I me’n< I’m making the point that you 
12       haven’t erm (0.6) got 
13 GOD:  you’re an appalling man 
14       (1.0) 
15 INT:  we- what’s appalling about [making that point] 
16 GOD:                             [racist           ] 
17       you sir are a r:a:cist 
18 INT:  whny-whny am I racist for saying there aren’t-  
19       [there aren’t any black people] 
20 GOD:  [you tell me this             ]  
21       and you’ve checked out pe- the colour of  
22       people’s faces (0.5) DISGRaceful (0.5) you’re 
23       disgraceful 
24 INT:  wne- whnat? 
 
The enticing question occurs in lines 01-04 where the journalist seizes the attention of 
Godfrey (“miste’ mister bloom”) with a interrogative (“what do you make of the front cover 
of this a- your ah- the conference brochure”) that solicits an answer from Godfrey’s 
presumed epistemic domain; however, an early indicator of the challenge occurs in line 02-03 
with the repair from (“this”) to (“your”), and that ‘pouncing’ on him as he leaves a building 
suggests the act of asking is the challenge i.e. designed for Godfrey to face the issue. The 
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design of the enticing question is such that it possibly invites an assessment, or description 
from Godfrey (“what do you make”) which would go against his political party in some way 
– that the black faces are intentionally absent (e.g. racist) or accidentally absent (e.g. a 
mistake/incompetence).  
 
 There is a 1.7 second gap where Godfrey gazes at the journalist, indicating some 
trouble with the prior turn, before resisting the enticing question. The resistance occurs with 
Godfrey delivering an attack to turn the tables (“what racist comment is that”, line 06) which 
understands the ‘racist’ aspects of the journalist’s question. Van Dijk (1992) details this type 
of rebuttal in counter attributions of racism as responses to initial accusations of racism. 
There is then an idiomatic increment (“how dare you”), which targets the producer prior to an 
object-side description of the enticing question in line 07 (“that’s an appalling thing to say”) 
and makes available the explanation in line 08. The turn concludes with the subject-side “you 
disgust me” in line 09, which shifts the target of the challenge to the journalist with the 
assessment, thereby reversing the challenge. The reversal ceases the challenge project, takes 
first position, and directs the direction of talk with the journalist now responsive to the 
accusation of racism. There is some orientation to this trouble in line 10, and a projected 
disagreement in line 11 – although before the journalist can complete his repair and provide 
an alternative understanding, Godfrey pursues his challenge in 13 (“you’re an appalling 
man”). The challenge culminates with the explicit categorisation of the journalist as a racist. 
This serves to avoid or mitigate the relevant assessment or description of Godfrey as being 
racist due to the brochure, as the direction of talk now concerns the noticing, rather than the 
production, of the brochure. The derailing of the journalist’s challenge gets accomplished by 
recasting the challenge in line 17 (“you sir are a racist”) to control the direction of talk, 
thereby rendering the initial direction pursued by the journalist untenable without being 
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challenged as ‘doing racism’. This demonstrates a method through which these enticing 
questions can be resisted, similar to extract 4, line 14 (“round of applause for the working 
lady”), which does a categorising the categoriser move (Whitehead, 2009) to counter the 
enticing question on the basis of the rights of the producer to do such a challenge or produce 
such a description or assessment. Both of these extracts involve responding to a question with 
a first-pair-part and do ‘not answering’ in this particular way. 
 
In this section I have examined a way that the target of an enticer can actively resist 
that challenge. This example shows how the target of the challenge reverses that challenge 
back onto the challenger; this disaligns by not answering the question and instead holding the 
challenger to account for asking this question in the first place. This uses the challenger’s 
turn against them: they are the ones ascribing these racists views and so they think in those 
racist terms. Unlike those earlier examples where the target contested some prior turn, this 
reversal does not provide the interactional contingency for the challenger to pursue their 
challenge, instead leaving them responsive to what has just happened. In that sense, it is a 
wonderful demonstration of the power of locality and immediacy in talk.  
 
3.2 Discussion 
 
 
In this chapter I have investigated the suppression of challenges during disputes in talk-in-
interaction. The challenger, through invoking these enticing sequences, seeks control over the 
other speaker and it is this evasion of social control that Reynolds (2015) mentions as an 
enticing sequence’s inherent weakness. It is during these disputative interactions that 
manufacturing challenges and thus controlling the direction of talk constitutes a local victory 
and is the reward for the successful production of an enticer, although the sequence does not 
usually result in a win or concession of the dispute (Reynolds, 2015). Resistance then, for 
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members, is a solution to the problem of an interactional and/or categorial incongruity crafted 
by the challenge through the reversal of the logic or production of an inapposite category.  
 
I found that resistance to an enticing sequence occurs following the enticing question 
(phase c) to halt the on-going trajectory and thwart the apex of the challenge (phase e). 
Resistance takes various forms which produce different contingencies for the other speaker. 
The types of resistance crudely specified at the beginning of this chapter 
(“weak/strong/passive/active”) map onto the outcomes which those resistive turns have. For 
instance, the weaker or passive forms of resistance push back against the challenge but do not 
necessarily halt its progress, whereas the stronger or active forms of resistance outrightly 
push against the trajectory and suspend the challenge from going any further (blocking access 
to the third position for the challenger). The selection of format may correspond to its 
sequential position, i.e. the earlier forms of resistance are passive, as the challenge is only 
projectable at those points; thus, it has high contingencies. Conversely, later forms tend to be 
more active (i.e. disrupt the trajectory) as the resistance has built to this point and the 
challenge is apparent so it has lower contingencies (i.e. resistance is not necessarily an 
unexpected response). 
 
The smuggling of a challenge through a seemingly straightforward question begets 
the smuggling of resistance through seemingly straightforward compliance. Given Steensig 
and Drew (2008) write “asking a question is not an innocent thing to do” (p.7), the degree to 
which an ‘enticer’ can ever be ‘straightforward’ is questionable. The interrogatives Reynolds 
examined seemed ‘odd’ in the context of the disputes – as suddenly off-topic, factual, 
personal etc. These are straightforward questions in some ways, but questions can be both 
non-innocent and straightforward and the ‘odd questions’ require getting a third position turn 
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and are most obviously a trap. Moreover, as shown in the final examples, producing an 
unfitted turn in second position prevents access to a third position turn thus disabling the 
‘trap’ opportunity. Considering resistance as a solution to a challenge will likely prove useful 
in understanding members’ orientations to ‘innocent questioning’. For that reason, a response 
to any question avails an opportunity for a divergent understanding and to push back against 
a possible understanding or inference. In the following chapter I will explore resistance and 
challenges in further detail by considering their categorial and moral implications and how 
people manage their relationship during a dispute.  
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Chapter 4: 
Partitioning: Exploiting category boundaries 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined how members resist enticing sequences by showing how 
speakers work to push back against or suspend the interactional trajectory at various points. 
In this chapter, I build on this to focus on another members’ method for accomplishing a 
challenge or doing resistance: partitioning. This chapter explores how the boundaries of 
categories in disputative interactions are exploited by the partitioning of Membership 
Categorisation Devices. ‘Partitioning’ regards the application of a new category device (i.e. 
politician/remainer/brexiter/voter as the device ‘Brexit16’) which reconstitutes how we ‘see’ 
people (e.g. as a ‘remain voter’, rather than as a ‘Conservative17 member’). In doing this, it 
affords certain actions to be done under the guise of the new category device (e.g. 
complaining about a ‘Conservative member’ on the basis that they’re a ‘remain voter’, and 
not a co-member as Conservative). I will demonstrate partitioning as an interactional 
accomplishment in the following section (4.0.1). In this chapter, I investigate how the 
invocation of a new device affords a particular action (challenge, complaint, account etc.) and 
thus allows the members to bring off those actions under the guise of ordinariness, thus 
rendering them harder to sanction.  
 
 
16 ‘Brexit’ describes the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. 
17 The Conservatives are a centre-right party in the United Kingdom.  
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In a number of ways, this current chapter crystallises the thesis’ core enquiries in that 
the analysis will (1) uncover a members’ practice for doing resistance, (2) the categorial 
implications of and in disputing, (3) how the relationship is actively (re)configured 
throughout the dispute, and (4) a resource that strangers are afforded in doing disputing. 
These aims will reveal how partitioning is accomplished, what partitioning accomplishes, and 
what this tells us about disputes more generally. There is very little research on partitioning 
(see Butler, 2008; 2016; Evans & Fitzgerald, 2016; Nishizaka, in prep; pers. comm.; Poulios, 
2016; Sacks, 1995; Stokoe, 2012a). This chapter offers a novel analyses of how divisions are 
cemented in and through talk-in-interaction through how members negotiate their 
relationship. When members do partitioning, they are markedly reconfiguring their 
relationship with the other participants through doing category work – that is, trading on this 
‘new’ category which affords certain actions to be brought off alters the constitution of 
members in that space and to which device they belong. Consequently, partitioning is tied to 
the moral order and acts of (dis)affiliation whereby speakers can be seen as ‘together’ or 
‘apart’ depending on the action which is being accomplished. Thus, this chapter explores the 
relationship between disputants by focusing on the structural organisation of talk and the 
categories and devices used.  
  
This chapter is organised as follows. In the following section, I describe and define 
partitioning by showing a clear example of partitioning, I will then locate partitioning in the 
broader literature on alternate, and recategorisation work to specify how and why this is 
unique. I will then detail the findings from the analysis, first showing two extracts where a 
speaker uses partitioning to produce a challenge. Second, I show six extracts (across two 
sequences) where there is remediation and resistance against a course of action that is 
accomplished by way of partitioning and third, I detail how speakers ostensibly do 
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‘distancing’ through partitioning. Finally, I discuss these findings and why partitioning is a 
useful lens for the close examination of the moral order and membership categorisation 
analysis more broadly. 
 
4.0.1 Partitioning 
 
 
People can generate co/cross-membership by introducing an alternate category device to 
exploit the boundaries of categories, and thus reconfigure who the participants are to each 
other. In this sense, the reconfiguration affords people to produce actions as fitted, and 
relevant to the current sequential environment (i.e. a man politician, and a woman politician 
discussing women’s reproductive health care – by introducing the category device ‘gender’ to 
cover the category device ‘politician’, it casts the woman of having epistemic authority and is 
thus able to accuse the man of having insufficient knowledge/rights/access over the topic). To 
illustrate partitioning, the below extract shows how two co-members (i.e. ostensibly within 
the same category as pro-Brexiteers) become partitioned so that one can challenge the other 
as an inauthentic member. In this extract, David Davies (a Conservative politician who is 
pro-Brexit) is arguing with Amy (a member of the public who is also pro-Brexit). Amy is 
antagonising David, as a politician, for the capitulation over Brexit i.e. the UK not yet leaving 
the EU. Immediately prior to this Amy has accused David of being anti-Brexit.  
Extract 1 “you’re a liar” (taken from Joyce & Walz, frth) 
01 DD:  I- I actually was campaigning for Brexit  
02      and have been for years so I don’t need to  
03      be- given lectures by people like y-  
04 BA:  did you- did you vote for the dea:l.  
05 DD:  I did vote for the deal but. 
06 BA:  Y’nO VOTED FOR THE DEnAL  
07 DD:  ye[aph] 
08 BA:   [OH ] MY GOD and tha- have you read the deal?  
09 DD:  yeah I read the deal= 
10 BA:  =and it means not to leave= 
11 DD:  =and how many of eM Pees how many- [yeah  ] 
12 BA:                                     [greant]      
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13      does it- it means we dopn’t leave= 
14 DD:  =how many eM Pees= 
15 BA:  =so you’re a liar you did not vote to leave. 
 
David rejects Amy’s assertion that he is anti-Brexit: “I actually was campaigning for Brexit” 
(line 01). This establishes their co-membership as pro-Brexit campaigners and subverts 
Amy’s attempted challenge (i.e. if he was anti-Brexit then he would be going against the 
referendum result, and against Amy’s position). However, instead of engaging with this, 
Amy partitions them: Brexiteers who voted for the deal18, and those who did not (“did you 
vote for the deal”, line 04). Later, voting for the deal is treated as a predicate of people who 
are remainers (“it means not to leave”, line 10). Indeed, by dividing these two populations it 
covers the ‘Brexit-voters’ device (to which they are both co-members), thus affording the 
space for Amy to conclude that David is an inauthentic member. This is accomplished 
because his ‘cover’ (of deal-voter) is incompatible with the predicates of leave voters (that 
authentic leave-voters would not have voted for the deal): “so you’re a liar you did not vote 
to leave” (line 15). Partitioning then allows Amy to continue her project of antagonising 
David – by dividing the social world it ignores their alliance (as leave voters) and drills into 
their differences. 
 
Throughout this chapter, I investigate three ways in which partitioning is used as a 
resource to accomplish an interactional move within the dispute. Specifically, I explore the 
interactional consequences of partitioning through how category devices are deployed and 
ratified. I do this in three ways. First, I examine how a reconfiguration of members can be 
done in the service of producing a challenge. For partitioning, the production of a challenge 
can be accomplished by creating an incongruity between who the participant is (i.e. what 
 
18 The ‘deal’ refers to a the prime ministers withdrawal agreement which was a 
proposal that would establish the terms of the UK’s exit from the EU.  
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rights, responsibilities, and obligations they have), and their current behaviour (i.e. as a pro-
Brexit person they cannot have voted for the Brexit deal).   
 
Second, I investigate how partitioning achieves a remediation of a challenge, or issue. 
This is done in contrast to the production of a challenge whereby a speaker can produce 
themselves as a co-member (i.e. within the same category device) to render that challenge as 
inappropriate in some way. The remediation of a challenge is done in ways which go along 
with the current sequential trajectory, with the speaker providing an aligned (and perhaps 
affiliative) response, but pushes the sequence in a new direction. For example, a member of 
the public responding to a police officer’s demand (e.g. to leave the area) by asserting 
themselves as ‘police commissioner’ to thus suppress that demand and subsequently make a 
request for privileged information (e.g. about what’s happened in the area).  
 
The final outcome of partitioning that I investigate is through its use to distance a 
speaker from some non-desirable characteristic in that moment. This will build on Poulios’ 
(2016) work to reveal that participants replace a category device with another, though I will 
question whether ‘distancing’ captures what partitioning accomplishes. For example, the 
police pulling a driver over for picking someone up at a drug dealer’s house and the driver 
replacing the relevance of ‘suspect-driver’ with ‘taxi-driver’. 
 
4.0.1.1 Mobilising identities and Alternative categorisation 
 
 
Identities are relevant for action-in-interaction and they are the basic link between individuals 
and a social structure: they are consequential for the outcomes of the actions that they 
occasion (Raymond & Heritage, 2006). Schegloff (1991, p.50) states that characterisations of 
the participants ought to be grounded in what is demonstrably relevant to the participants 
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themselves “at that moment that whatever we are trying to provide an account for occurs”. 
Raymond and Heritage (2006, p.680) draw a distinction between the ‘institutional talk’ 
program and the “open sea of ordinary conversation” where participants’ features are 
endlessly omnirelevant and omnipresent. The recurrent way that Conversation Analysts move 
forward in the analysis of identities is by examining their manifestation (Antaki & 
Widdicombe, 1999; Beach, 1996; Kitzinger & Mandelbaum, 2013; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Raymond & Heritage, 2006; Tracy, 2002; Tracy, Myers & Scott, 2006; Widdicombe, 1998). 
In this chapter, I show through the lens of membership categorisation analysis how 
‘identities’ are made relevant on a moment-by-moment basis and are introduced to 
reconstitute the relationship between the participants in and through talk-in-interaction, in 
order to accomplish some action.  
 
Sacks’ (1995) economy rule explains that a single category may be referentially 
adequate to understand a person; however, there are numerous studies which detail 
alternative categories being employed (Butler, 2008; Cruz, 2014; Jayyusi, 1984; Schegloff, 
2007a; Stokoe, 2012b; Widdicombe, 2017). This does not imply that we should throw Sacks’ 
definition out the window but rather clarify how members mobilise these alternative 
categories. Single categories are referentially adequate to locally accomplish an action, 
providing the single category is warranted, and more than one category can be relevantly 
available. Indeed, this is analogous to flouting the Gricean maxims (see Grice, 1975) to 
generate implicature; it does not disprove the rule, but rather shows what circumstances 
deviating from expectations are productive for action. For instance, a ‘mother’ (who is also a 
‘police commissioner’) may be a referentially adequate category to produce a complaint on 
behalf of her children, though her ‘police commissioner’ category remains relevantly 
adequate and thus the complaint may be rebuked by operationalising the ‘police 
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commissioner’ as an alternative, but single, category. It is then not about what categories are 
usable, but what the category that is being used is doing and what about that category is it 
practically accomplishing. Category boundaries thus get partitioned to accomplish an action 
(in the above example, rebuking a complaint), which imparts different affordances for the 
recipient of that action. Partitioning avows the alternate category as referentially adequate in 
a particular sequential location as a pre to some upcoming action, or relevantly adequate for 
the in-situ action.  
 
Alternate categories (Butler, 2008; Stokoe, 2012a), category-transformations (Hester 
& Eglin, 1997), recategorization (Housley, 1999; Leydon et al., 2013; Watson, 1978), and 
category types (Jayyusi, 1984) deal with changes in the constitution of members belonging to 
particular categories and devices. These varying descriptions of people serve to manage the 
in-situ talk-in-interaction and the configuration of relationships between members 
themselves. As Hester and Eglin (1997) explain, categories get constituted in their uptake – 
and in that uptake they reflexively constitute who the speakers are to each other. For instance, 
shopkeepers and customers operate with respect to each other, and it’s in this realisation of 
categories (in a gestalt contexture) where the categories are hearable as being in mutual 
relationship to each other (i.e. shopkeepers treat customers as customers and not as 
shopkeepers, and in doing so constitute themselves as shopkeepers). In this sense, for any 
category there is an alternate category available to participants: that may be a generic 
category (“person/guy”), an equivalent/symmetrical category (“mother-father”), an 
asymmetrical/hierarchical category (“student-teacher”), or some other category which is 
inconstant with the current/prior category (“teacher-female”). 
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Moreover, partitioning is a distinct practice from recategorization as described in 
Watson (1978) whereby a recategorization is accomplished as a repair operation – speakers 
correct some misunderstanding, mishearing, or provide a more accurate description as a 
solution to a trouble in the talk. Indeed, Housley (1999) and Leydon (2013) both treat 
recategorization as part of repair, and as deployed to shift the category (and its associated 
predicates) to accomplish a certain activity. Housley’s (1999) example is taken from joint 
decision-making whereby the ‘decision’ over how who gets to use an ‘office space’ is 
accomplished by shifting ‘office space’ to ‘registered office’ (a community space) – and this 
recategorization of space achieves agreement. 
 
Partitioning then, is accomplished with regard to cover categories – and as described 
above, these are categories which ‘hide’, or ‘replace’, or take precedence over the previously 
operative category. For instance, pro-Brexit members can be divided on the basis of having 
voted for the withdrawal deal or not – the ‘pro-Brexit’ category is covered by ‘voters for the 
deal’ and ‘voters against the deal’; actions will then trade on those covers, i.e. 
disagreeing/antagonising (as in Extract 1) because of the cover ‘voters for the deal’, and not 
because of the pro-Brexit category.  The (a)symmetrical relationship between the single 
category and the cover category may be oppositionally produced or complementary to the 
action (“police commissioner-mother” vs “police commissioner-woman”), though opposition 
and complementariness are treated with respect to the culture-in-action produced by the 
members themselves. Specifically, cover categories deal with the practical problem that 
obligations and entitlements of one category (bridge player) do not get precedence over the 
obligations and entitlements of the alternate category (police officer) in particular contexts 
(e.g. bridge players can sanction someone for bidding ‘no trumps’ when they have a void 
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suit19, but they could not arrest someone for speeding). However, and with regard to conflict, 
cover categories can work as the grounds for failing to fulfil category-bound obligations (an 
incongruence may occur if the obligations of a bridge player are treated as having precedence 
over the obligations of a police officer). This disjuncture between the cover and its category 
is discussed by Jayyusi (1984) who details three types: Category-disjunctives where there is a 
deletion of an avowable category which is substituted for an alternate category that is 
contrastive in its upshot. Contrastively-usable-categories which do not revise the 
applicability of the alternate category but trade on its categorial relevance; these are used to 
describe an incumbent of the category in a way which attributes an alternate behaviour. 
Category-feature-disjunctives arise from a disjuncture between the category and its local 
environment: they provide for an oppositional or substitutive alternative. This renders cover 
categories as morally implicative and assessable in terms which are category-relevant but 
able to violate category bound obligations and entitlements.  
 
In the following sections I present an analysis of members demonstrably exploiting a 
membership categorisation device partition in the accomplishment of some action. First, I 
provide a description of Sacks’ (1995) ‘partitioning a population’ wherein I consider 
partitioning as a members’ concern. Then I examine ten extracts from the data to illustrate 
how partitioning is used to (1) bring off a challenge, (2) remedy a conflict and (3) permit a 
speaker to distance themselves from a category attribute. These extracts best represent 
partitioning as it occurs in a disputative environment; in each case, the participants are 
working to create a division, or alliance as part of their interactional project. Finally, I 
summarise the findings and conclude with some avenues of inquiry for partitioning, and for 
 
19 One cannot bid ‘no trumps’ if they have a void, or singleton of any suit (spades, 
hearts, diamonds, clubs). At most a player can have one doubleton (see Klinger, 
2001).  
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membership categorisation analysis.  
 
4.1 Analysis 
 
In this section, I show how partitioning is interactionally accomplished and dealt with in 
disputes. I focus on the accomplishment of a social action and the methods with which 
partitioning is exploited by the participants. For each example, I first discuss the local 
context, I then detail what occasions the partitioning and how it is managed in and through 
the talk, and finally I examine how the action which has occasioned the partitioning is treated 
by the other participant(s). I begin with examples that detail how, through exploiting the 
partition, categories are mobilised to establish grounds for a challenge. I will then show how 
partitioning is exploited to remediate an in-progress challenge.  
 
4.1.1 Partitioning to produce a challenge 
 
One way in which partitioning occurs is through the production of a challenge. The following 
examples outline two ways of exploiting category boundaries: (1) in order to craft some 
incongruence with the participants’ categorial relevance and (2) renegotiating the relevance 
of a certain category (see Sacks’ (1995) rule of economy) to generate a disjuncture by 
promoting one’s obligations and entitlements so as to diminish the other’s own obligations 
and entitlements.  
 
The first extract (as previously shown in Chapter 3, extract 3) is taken from a radio 
call-in from 2017. Sam is calling the UK radio station ‘Leading Britain’s Conversation 
(LBC)’ (a news, travel and weather station that often discusses politically divisive topics). 
Sam is responding to a previous caller who has championed the banning of the burkini. 
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Instead, Sam is advocating for all women to cover up, indicating that morals are on in the 
decline in Britain. The host (HOS) has taken an oppositional position. Immediately prior to 
this extract, Sam has been discussing how bikinis ought to be banned, that homosexuality is 
vile and disgusting, and that the host leers at women in bikinis. In this extract the host 
exploits the partition, which (1) renders the family category device as categorially relevant 
and (2) produces a contrast between a symmetrical standard relational pair to challenge Sam. 
 
Extract 2 ‘Bikinis’ [03:01-03:49] 
 
01 Sam:  yeah- they all perv they all gorp at them  
02       and [keep] staring at them of course.   
03 Hos:      [jee-] okay  
04 Sam:  >is that what you [do<    ]  
05 Hos:                    [an how-] how mu- (.)  
06       p’don (.) [no I don’t KEEp star]ing   
07 Sam:            [is that what you do ]  
08 Hos:  I don’t sit there LEEring at them and I think   
09       [my partner will probably have a view if I did?]  
10 Sam:  [((inaudible))haha                             ] 
11       hahaha     
12 Hos:  yea? How many children do you have Sam. 
13 Sam:  £sinx£ 
14 Hos:  s:i#x. do you mind my asking the age range? 
15 Sam:  eh. £eleven to- o:ne£ 
16 Hos:  °°ahright°° °well look after >them<°  
17       >do you hav-< Do they have an enlightened mo:ther. 
18       (0.7) 
19 Sam:  £of course they do.£ 
20 Hos:  they have R[Ight. so they are getting-] 
21 Sam:             [their ver- modest         ] 
22       their very modest and good mother.  
23       [(will/would)] cover up all the time 
24 Hos:  [I said sorry] when I say enlightened more broad-  
25       ah- more broadmi:nded mother. do they have a 
26       broadminded mother or is she-  
27 Sam:  yeah she’s broadminded she’s not sh- sh-  
28       she’s not- she doesn’t have low self-esteem where  
29       [she feels like she has to get na:ked in front  
30       of other men] 
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31 Hos:  [°no- I’m try-° what am I trying to  
32       get across here°.hhh] 
33 Sam:  nno tha?t’s what I’m getting across? 
34 Hos:  is she mo::re #ehh: r:e#laxed (.) than you: 
35 Sam:  Nick it’s none of your £busin’ss about my wife£ 
36       to be fair (.) yeah £we’re on radio yeah£ 
37 Hos:  ahright okay look after the children enjo- .hhh 
38       have I enjoy- well >I s’pose have enjoyed speaking  
39       t’y’< I’m pretty horrified by some of your views. 
 
The analysis of this extract will focus on how the action of a challenge is produced by the 
radio host (HOS). The challenge is produced by exploiting the partition to render Sam’s 
views (produced as a radio-caller) as incongruous with the cover category reintroduced by the 
host of ‘father’ as part of the family device.  
 
Prior to this, Sam has used his children as grounds for his argument (i.e. women 
should cover up because he does not want his children to see them); this allows the host to 
reintroduce his children, as he does in line 12: “how many children do you have Sam?” with 
a further question in line 14 (“asking the age range?”). The radio phone-in device remains in 
operation throughout with respect to how the interaction is organised, but these questions 
make the caller’s membership as father locally relevant, though the action to which this line 
of enquiry is attending remains opaque at this point. We can see the partitioning occurring 
here as the host is trying to make some categories relevant (mother/father) as part of his 
attempt to lead Sam into a self-contradiction: “how many children do you have Sam?” (line 
12). These categories ‘cover’ the category previously in operation (chastiser of people who 
are morally corrupted), and by doing so change the trajectory of talk, and introduce an 
alternate body of common-sense knowledge (Schegloff, 2007a). Sam positions himself as a 
moral commentator, but the host subverts this by transposing the same actions (i.e. 
condemning others for being gay / wearing bikinis) in the family context – his children 
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become collateral damage by bearing witness to Sam’s behaviour. The host is reconfiguring 
the relationship, not between himself and Sam, but between Sam and the targets of his 
judgements.  
 
The host occasions the asymmetrical parent-child device rather than the symmetrical 
husband-wife device, notably with the repair “do you hav- do they have” (line 17) to treat 
Sam as having the epistemic rights to know about amount and age of the children as well as 
the attributes of this specific ‘mother’ person. The cover of ‘family’ over ‘chastiser of people’ 
is morally implicative and assessable as Sam is treated as violating some normative 
obligations as a father (i.e. loving his children) given the views he espoused as ‘chastiser of 
people’. Indeed, in lines 12-14 the host treats Sam – as a co-member of the family device – as 
having the epistemic rights to (dis)confirm an attribute of another member with whom he is 
in a standard relational pair (mother-father) (“do they have an enlightened mother”). 
Subsequently (in line 17) the host splits the standard relational pair into two parent-children 
sets – children with a bigoted parent, and children with an enlightened parent – which, given 
an enlightened parent, assumes the children’s welfare and instructs care for the children, 
projecting a contrast between both of them. This means that the host accomplishes 
partitioning to challenge Sam on the basis of his espoused opinions (i.e. as chastiser of 
people) being incompatible with his membership within the family device (as a father), and 
as such he can be seen as a bigoted parent (thankfully, unlike the mother).  
 
In the next extract Tucker Carlson (TC) on his show (Tucker Carlson Tonight) is 
discussing the confirmation of Brett Kavanaugh by Susan Collins onto the supreme court of 
the United States. Tucker, a conservative political commentator, is discussing this 
confirmation with Monica Klein (MK), a political strategist. The previous 3m 40s have 
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comprised a discussion surrounding the rumours that Susan Collins’ honorary degree will be 
removed on basis that she “lacks integrity” due to her confirming Brett Kavanaugh onto the 
supreme court. This discussion has reached a point where TC has been making attempts to 
characterise/assume Monica’s position as ‘chilling’ and ‘scary’ (line 10), despite Monica 
arguing that Tucker is wrong in his assumptions. This extract concludes their discussion.  
Herein, Monica exploits the partition by mobilising a symmetrical but contrastive category in 
order to promote her own rights and entitlements in the ‘gender’ device whilst counter-
challenging Tucker through casting him as a cross-member within this device.   
 
Extract 3 ‘saying something that’s obviously true’ [03:40-04:37] 
(taken from Humă, Joyce, Ferraz de Almeida, Doehring & Ristimäki, in prep) 
 
01 MK: [maybe we just disagree on the              ] 
02     word inte#grity?# is (.) I don’t think she has it 
03 TC: wel’e- (0.7) integrity means ho:nesty  
04     (.)[decency] 
05 MK:    [I don’t] think she has honesty or  
06     decency I don’t think Brett Kavanaugh does  
07     either and I think it’s ridiculous that  
08     she confirmed him for the >supreme  
09     co[urt< and I think she will be vo:ted o]ut 
10 TC:   [I think th’t your world view is scary] 
11 MK: because women are extremely frustrated with  
12     Susan Conllins ringht now because she’s  
13     [supported a sexual predator  ] 
14 TC: [well not every woman feels th]at way 
15     and [you don’t speak for all women j]ust so you know. 
16 MK:     [okay but there is a thirty-    ] 
17     oka[y thank  ] you f’r [mansp ]laining that t(h)o me 
18 TC:    [°mopnica°]         [°okay°] 
19     (0.6) 
20 TC: .hhum I’m not mansplaining? (0.4)I’m saying something  
21     that’s obviously tru:e. 
22 MK: [there    is    a     thirty      per]cent gap  
23 TC: [°I appreciate you coming out thanks°] 
24 MK: in between democrats and republicans  
25     >the fact th’t [women  are  su]pporting democrats  
26 TC:                [°°swell yeah°°]                           
27 MK: thirty per[cent mo]re< 
28 TC:           [got it°] 
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29 MK: [because the republican party is offending won#men# ] 
30 TC: [I read t-I read the polls I just don’t think people]  
31     w- disagree with- (.) °okay° >thanks a lot monica<  
32     good to [°see you again.°] 
33 MK:         [nice talk to you] 
 
First, let us examine how the partitioning gets occasioned. In line 01-02, Monica provides an 
understanding of the argument, though this is done in overlap and so produces an extension 
to her turn (“we just disagree on the word integrity is (.) I don’t think she has it”), which 
reaffirms her position. In response Tucker produces a definition of integrity, which displays 
some epistemic authority as his membership of ‘host’, and treats the definition as taken-for-
granted. Tucker’s definition is tacitly accepted by Monica, though she pursues her previous 
line that Susan Collins does not have integrity warranted by Tucker’s definition that Susan 
Collins lacks honesty and decency (thereby rendering her without integrity). This gets 
managed as a my-side formulation with the prefaced “I don’t think she has honesty” (line 05 
and 06) and “I think it’s ridiculous” (line 07 and 09). This displays their adversarial stances 
for competing claims with both Tucker and Monica attempting to discredit one another’s 
understanding.  
 
We can observe the first mobilising of an alternate understanding at a possible 
transition-relevance place and in overlap (“I think tht’t your world view is scary”, line 10). 
This is not attended to by Monica; instead she continues her turn and is thus hearable as 
speaking on behalf of women (“because women are extremely frustrated with Susan 
Collins”) in lines 11-13, which introduces the gender device with ‘woman’ as a cover 
category for Monica – that is, Monica is hearable as speaking as a woman, and not simply as 
a political commentator (though this also remains in operation). Tucker attends to ‘woman’ 
by holding Monica accountable for that assertion “well not every woman feels that way just 
so you know and you don’t speak for all women” (lines 14-15), which is produced in overlap 
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at a non-transition-relevance place. The particularisation (Billig, 1987) done by Tucker in 
line 15 counters Monica’s category-based claim; reflexively, Tucker’s mobilising of 
Monica’s category as a woman provides a warranted basis for Monica to use his category of 
‘man’ to explain his actions (Stokoe & Edwards, 2007). Tucker’s uptake of the proffered 
category of ‘woman’ provides a basis for Monica to produce the accusation.  
 
Monica’s turn is produced as a safe action (Sacks, 1995) as it has the format of 
‘praise’ which acts as a vehicle for the accusation to be produced. This is seen in line 17, 
where the partitioning occurs; the accusation of mansplaining is produced to pause the in-
progress sequence by describing the prior turn and push the sequence forward in an alternate 
direction whilst sequentially deleting Tucker’s turn in lines 14-15.  The partition is exploited 
through a reconfiguration from co-members of ‘political discussants’ to cross-members of 
gender – that is, invoking her membership of ‘woman’ avails the category-bounded 
challenges that can be brought off against Tucker with ‘mansplaining’, and promotes 
Monica’s right to speak as a member of that category. The accusation sequentially deletes 
Tucker’s prior challenge of particularisation and momentarily disrupts the activity of the talk 
show. Tucker responds with a preferred denial (Atkinson & Drew, 1979) which is produced 
as a contrast-structure “I’m not mansplaining”, though Monica resumes her talk from lines 
18-20 in line 29, returning to the talk show activity. Tucker, as host, initiates a closing in line 
30 and the activity is concluded.  
 
This extract demonstrates how the partition may be exploited in order to promote 
one’s rights, responsibilities and obligations to a particular category. Here, Monica was 
challenged on the basis that she did not speak for all women, and so introduced an alternate 
understanding to promote her rights, responsibilities and obligations as a member of that 
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category. This reflexively counter-challenged Tucker on the basis of him being cross-member 
to render him as having limited rights to challenge Monica on the basis of her being a 
‘woman’ member. The conflict here is unlike the prior extract where Sam is challenged for 
not fulfilling certain obligations; here, Tucker is challenged by Monica exploiting the 
partition between the ‘discussant’ and ‘gender’ devices which manufactures a disjuncture 
with the upshot being that Tucker, as an incumbent of the contrastively usable category 
‘man’, is ascribed an attribute of an alternate behaviour ‘mansplainer’. 
 
 In this section I have shown how the partition can be exploited in order to bring off 
some challenge which is generated by some incongruity, or disjuncture between alternate 
categories or alternate understandings. The two examples outline two different ways this is 
accomplished. The first introduced the cover category ‘father’ to highlight an incongruity 
between the obligations of one category and the local context (being a bigot being 
incompatible with being a good parent). The second introduced the cover category ‘woman’ 
which afforded a challenge on grounds of the disjuncture between their two memberships 
‘man’-‘woman’ and the ascribed behaviour of ‘mansplainer’; it reconfigured who the 
participants are to each other – not as political commentators discussing an issue (with a 
fairly even distribution of knowledge rights – i.e. knowing about the supreme court nominee), 
but as a man and a woman (with an uneven distribution of knowledge rights – i.e. women 
having authority over their reproductive healthcare). In these examples the invoking of an 
alternate category device reconfigures who these people are to each other; the partitioning 
reframes the talk to step outside of the current matters being discussed in order to disrupt that 
prior talk. In contrast, the following section shows how the partition can be exploited in order 
to reconfigure members relationships in a way which supresses a projectable, or in-progress 
challenge. 
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4.1.2 Partitioning to remediate 
 
A further way that partitioning occurs is through remediation of a trouble, or the stopping of a 
challenge. The remediation of a challenge means that the challenge is stopped, but the 
stopping of a challenge does not necessarily mean that it has been remediated – in the 
previous extract, Monica stops Tucker’s challenge by producing her own challenge (accusing 
him of mansplaining) – and so does not remediate (by being seen as co-members); however, 
these examples will demonstrate how partitioning who-these-people-are-to-each-other seeks 
a solution, and leads to a (momentary) remedying of the challenge/issue. And indeed, 
‘remedying’ is a subjective act – who gets to say what a remediated course of action looks 
like? Consequently, these examples will largely regard attempts to be heard/seen as being in 
an alliance (as co-members) with their co-interlocutors.    
 
The first example involves a passenger (PAS) on a train in the UK in 2012 who has 
been found to not have a valid ticket to travel by the train guard (TG1) and so must pay the 
£3 ticket cost and a £20 fine. The previous 12 minutes have comprised the passenger 
complaining about the payment, accounting for not having a valid ticket, and not complying 
with the institutional business of purchasing a ticket. Immediately prior, the passenger and 
train guard have called over a second train guard (TG2) to assist in remedying the situation, 
and TG2 repeats the institutional processes of payment and the process of formally 
complaining to the company.  
 
Extract 4 ‘actually a nice guy’ [12:54–14:37] 
 
01 TG2: then you’ve got seventeen- yu’ve got twenny one  
02      days to make your appe[al <and say why.>       
03 PAS:                       [I’m willing to do that but I     
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04      think err your colleague here is inadequate. and  
05      that if eet wasn’t for you here he wouldn’t have  
06      known any of these things. >so I am willing to do  
07      that. and thank you very much for being here?< but I  
08      think you have no idea what you’ doing? 
09 TG2: well listen- my  
10      colleag[ue has been doing this for a while.]  
11 PAS:        [your colleague- your colleague     ] 
12      [was actually closing this]  
13 TG2: [and hhe has-             ] 
14 PAS: and he was gonna h- he- he’s pissed off. so he’s not  
15      act’lly a-acting l-like you[you’re meant to act’]lly  
16 TG1:                            [okay s-sorry        ] 
17 PAS: [deal with a passen- general public.]  
18 TG1: [I’ve be’n- I’ve been actually quite]  
19      >I’ve been actually quite< 
20 PAS: no you haven’t [and I’m not even willing to-]  
21 TG1:                [No yes I have?              ] 
22 PAS: no you haven’t= 
23 TG1: =alright 
24 TG2: I j- I just think you have a stronger personality  
25      than. (.) he does he has to be polite i[n here so:.]  
26 TG1:                                        [I ‘ave to  ] 
27      be polite b- but unfortunately you’ve y-y-y you-you-  
28      you’ve (1.3) >no I’m not gonna do this no I’m not  
29      gonna do this< this is wha you said the whole time= 
30 TG2: =he’s actually a nice guy okay take the  
31      three pounds an’? 
32 TG1: >okay< [so you have to pro]vide us with your details 
33 TG2:        [you do have to    ]  
34      provide your name and address 
35      [in order to make a card payment] 
36 TG1: [just (throw in / thirty) five  ] quid please? 
37      (5.0) 
38 PAS: and I’ll have to provide you with my address  
39      when you said- ah’I don’t have to do that now. 
40 TG2: [no if] you were paying in full then [don’t have to]  
41 TG1: [but  ]                              [it’s a card  ] 
42      [payment so basically they (   )-  ] 
43 TG2: [but because you’re making a card p]ayment the way  
44      they have to correspond with you. 
45 PAS: right s:ure. 
 
In this extract TG2 exploits the partition which (1) accounts for a co-member’s actions, (2) 
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accounts for a co-member, and (3) remedies the trouble so that compliance with the 
passenger is accomplished. Through exploiting the partition, a pn-adequate device (a general 
category to which anyone can belong) is invoked which crafts a disjuncture between the train 
guard as an institutional member and the train guard as an ordinary, everyday member. In 
lines 01-02, TG2 has taken an extended turn at talk to give an explanation of the institutional 
process of making a complaint to the train company so that the passenger may receive a 
refund of the £20 fine; this displays TG2’s responsibility as a train guard to be 
knowledgeable about the institutional processes and his rights to do informing of those 
processes.  
 
The passenger produces a complaint (“but I think err your colleague here is 
inadequate”) in line 04 that attends to TG1’s purported failure to fulfil his responsibilities as a 
train guard. TG2’s response in line 09 has a tacit display of co-membership with TG1 through 
reusing the passenger’s term, “colleague”. The passenger, in line 14 and 15, highlights this 
failure (“he’s pissed off. so he’s not act’lly a-acting l-like you”); the guard’s responsibility is 
transgressed with “he’s pissed off” and the co-membership yields the challenge with “he’s not 
act’lly a-acting l-like you”. This is dealt with by remedying the passenger’s negative assertion 
(that TG1 is not a good train guard), which will result in compliance from the passenger with 
the train guard’s project (getting the passenger to pay for their ticket). The passenger self-
repairs from “passenger” to “general public” (line 17) which is a generalised category that 
anyone can belong to (i.e. the upgrading TG1’s failure to deal with all people, not just 
passengers). This opens the door for TG2 to interject with an account-for (Flint & Merrison, 
forthcoming) in lines 24 and 25 “I just think you have a stronger personality”, providing a 
reinterpretation of the offence as being expectable because of their relationship imbalance. 
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In line 30, TG2 exploits the partition as he invokes the category gloss of “nice guy” as 
a general category which mirrors the passenger’s use of ‘general public’ i.e. outside of the 
specific passenger-train guard relationship. This general category glosses who TG1 is – it is a 
descriptor which is applicable across all of his memberships, and indeed, goes outside of the 
narrow ‘train guard’ relationship, like the passenger did with ‘general public’. The partitioning 
reconfigures the passenger-train guard relationship to a general public-general public 
relationship whereby the institution (the train) accounts for the passenger’s complaint, but that, 
as co-members of ‘general public’, they do not have sufficient reason to be arguing. This 
revision of TG1 remedies the passenger’s complaint through allaying the relevance of the 
passenger’s assessment in line 04 and dealing with a possible negative assertion conveyed (i.e. 
TG1 is fulfilling his train guard responsibilities (“he has to be polite in here”, line 25), and the 
passenger’s complaint toward TG1, as a train guard, is inapplicable given that he is a ‘nice 
guy’). The remedial work disavows the passenger’s complaint and achieves compliance with 
the on-going task.  
 
The exploitation of the partitioning is uncontested, with TG1 returning to the 
omnirelevant ‘train guard’ device in line 32 to conduct the institutional business of “okay so 
you have to provide us with your details”, with the “okay so” arising as a move accepting and 
building on the prior turn. The partition exploitation – allowing TG1 to be seen as outside of 
the category ‘train guard’, that he is, in fact, a ‘nice guy’ and also a member of the public – 
successfully deals with the passenger’s complaint as she begins completing the form. The 
challenge is then remediated with the partitioning relying on the omnipresent pn-adequate 
devices (person, guy, man, woman etc.) to act as a cover for the single category of ‘train 
guard’, which achieves compliance by moving from an asymmetrical device (passenger-train 
guard) to a symmetrical device (nice guy-person). We can see this dispute as resolved given 
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the dispute ceases and the participants align through compliance.  
 
This next interaction occurs in the US: the police (PO) have pulled over a car that is 
not correctly registered. The passengers are all young adults and one of them has called their 
mother, Caren Turner (CM) to arrange for her to pick them up, as they are no longer able to 
drive their car. Caren arrives and begins questioning the police regarding their reason for 
impounding the car. The police will not answer her questions as she is not the driver, so she 
pursues her line of questioning and begins to invoke alternate categorisations to solicit an 
answer – that is, she attempts to remediate the problem by introducing herself as a mother, as 
being the police commissioner, and as being a member of the public. Though this extract 
features institutional business, and complaints, it can be understood as a dispute on the basis 
that: (1) Caren is a third-party to the initial business, (2) Caren and the police officer are 
pursuing different trajectories, and (3) their versions (and espoused opinions) of what ought to 
occur clash as to who has the legitimate authority to assert their version; therefore, the 
contestation of opinions and disagreement mark this as disputative. 
 
This interaction unfolds over the next four extracts in order to show how partitioning 
may occur over an extended sequence (like Butler’s (2008) fairy club).  
 
Extract 5.1 “do you know who I am” [01:10-01:45]  
 
01  CM: hi is- I’m a resident >here you go< 
02  PO: °>it’s fine<° we don- I don- I don’t need that? 
03  CM: okay fine [I’m Caren Turner.  ] 
04  PO:           [you’re jus’ here t-] 
05      you’re just here as a ride alright? 
06  CM: no I’m no:t=  
07  PO: =okay 
08  CM: I’m here as A concerned citizen  
09      a[nd  ]friend of the mayo:r, 
10  PO:  [okay] 
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11      okay 
12  CM: and be’n in Tenafly for twenny years I take full  
13      responsibility for them? and what is ther- reason  
14      they were pulled over= 
15  PO: =he- the driver has all the information  
16      he’ll tell you. 
17  CM: >>no no no no no.<< I need to know 
18  PO: no you don’t need to know 
19  CM: okay? 
20  PO: you ar’ not involved here you’re picking  
21      them up?= 
22  CM: =>no no no< I’m involved (0.2) trust me  
23      [I’m very involved ] 
24  PO: [well I’m not going]  
25      to tell you he’s the driver of the automobile? 
26      (0.3) he’s over eightee:n (1.1) that’s all you  
27      need to know. 
28  CM: ehm  
29      (2.0) 
30  P2: >okay okay<  
 
This analysis will highlight the attempts by Caren to exploit the partition in order to achieve 
compliance like in the prior extract. There is minimal uptake of Caren’s proffered categories 
by the police as they treat the single category of ‘mother/guardian’ as adequate for their 
interactional business. In this extract I will focus on the mobilising of alternate categories and 
explicate how this reconfigures the participants’ relationship and thus observably affords 
particular actions. 
 
Extract 5.1 marks the beginning of this interaction. This is the first point at which 
Caren and the police interact. Caren introduces herself as a “resident” in line 01 whilst 
handing the police a document (later to be revealed as her police commissioner credentials, 
line 32); although Caren introduces herself as a resident, she is seeable as a co-member of the 
group from the car who need transport. The category proffered here has minimal valence 
other than accounting for her presence. The police focus on her membership of ‘transporter of 
these people’ with a rejection of the credentials with “it’s fine”, “I don’t need that,” and an 
 177 
orientation to Caren’s obligation to transport them: “you’re just here as a ride” (line 05), and 
“you’re picking them up” (line 20). The minimal responses produced by the police mark a 
move toward a closing and conclusion of their business (the impounding of the car): “the 
driver has all the information” (line 15). This is whilst Caren attempts to partition categories 
by negotiating the relevant category (and thus how they can make sense of her turns) in an 
attempt to remediate the impounding of the car. Her negotiation includes: “I’m Caren 
Turner” (line 03), “I’m here as a concerned citizen” (line 08), “friend of the mayor” (line 09): 
these are produced as responsive to the minimal acknowledgment tokens by the police and 
prior to the request on line 14, and speak to the action entitlements that can be claimed 
through those categorisations. At this point, though there is little uptake by the police 
officers, self-identifying by her full name and ‘friend of the mayor’ provides for the officer to 
recognise her as someone with influence which alludes to her institutional clout as a police 
commissioner.  
 
Caren’s self-identifications serve to reconfigure the who-they-are: as Caren is seeable 
as a person providing transport, these alternate categories produce an alternate understanding 
that Caren is doing more than simply transporting. The request for information in lines 13-14 
“what is ther- reason they were pulled over” is prefaced with Caren establishing herself as a 
co-member – “I take full responsibility” – at least as a co-member in an asymmetrical 
category set (parent-child) in the ‘family’ device (i.e. as mother she is responsible for her 
children). The action in lines 13-14 (“what is ther- reason they were pulled over”) is designed 
as an interrogative, but given Caren’s position and influence, it is hearable as requesting 
some remedial action (for them and their car to be released). Here then there is some potential 
exploiting of who Caren is, as someone who is not straightforwardly here to collect the group 
and is doing more than is necessarily required to deal with the business at hand. The police 
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officer attends to Caren’s co-membership with the comment “the driver has all the 
information he’ll tell you” (line 15) which, though non-aligning, provides a solution to the 
request though not the solution sought by Caren. Moreover, in the continuing turns, the police 
officers treat Caren as an ordinary member of the public (and not eligible to know): “you 
don’t need to know”, “you ar’ not involved you’re picking them up” (line 20), and “that’s all 
you need to know” (line 26). This understanding is resisted by Caren, who stops their 
trajectory with “no no no” (line 22) and “I’m very involved” (line 23) which, like the request 
in line 14, does more than countering the police officer’s turn in line 20 and alludes to her 
institutional clout mentioned earlier (e.g. as friend of the mayor).  
 
Though not explicitly produced, this extract displays the defeasibility of partitioning. 
Caren’s turns are treated as straightforward actions (request, rejection, assertions), but carry an 
implicature that alludes to her institutional clout. Caren negotiates the relevant category 
memberships and the action entitlements that can be claimed through those categorisations. 
The police avoid Caren’s allusions and continue to treat her as ‘ordinary member’ (someone 
providing transport). We can see here then that Caren has attempted to partition and 
reconfigure her relationship with the police officers by introducing some asymmetrical 
categories (“friend of the mayor-police officer”, “Caren Turner-policer officer”) and thus cover 
her category of ‘transport provider’, or ‘citizen’ to which the officers have been treating her. 
This is in the service of achieving a remedial outcome – the releasing of the car. The police 
officers, however, retain their current asymmetrical pair (“police officer-citizen”), rendering 
Caren as having insufficient obligations and entitlements to accomplish certain actions (like 
requesting information) and successfully remediating the problem of the car impounding. The 
introduction of these alternate categories by Caren does afford certain actions to be 
accomplished, which can be observed in the following extracts. The extracts below provide an 
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example of embodied exploiting of the partition, which is the physical reconfiguration of 
members in a space to produce some action. 
 
Extract 5.2 “do you know who I am” [01:10-01:45] 
 
 
 
 
 
Extract 5.3 “do you know who I am” [01:45-02:30] 
 
31  CM: if you c’n- 
32  P2: w-we don’t need to see credentials=  
33  CM: =°okany° [°okany°] 
34  P2:          [#w:    ] #we’ve [explained already] 
35  CM:                           [I- you need an-  ]  
36       you need a- 
37      (2.0) 
38  CM: if you can give me a little bit of (.)  
39      s:pace here. 
40      (2.0) 
41  CM: [°what is the nature of°] 
42  PO: [who-  who  is   this?  ]  
43      [are you a commissioner?] 
44  CM: [°I’m the commissioner° ]  
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45      °°I am the commissioner°° (1.2) one of the  
46      commissioners  
47      and I’m heading up? 
48  PO: do you have an eI Dee with thant? 
49  CM: that is my eI Dee and that is my business card  
50      (0.5)  
51  CM: I am the commissioner? (0.2) of the port  
52      authority.  
53      and I’m heading up over four thousand police  
54      °officers° okay? 
55  PO: °okay° 
56  CM: SO if there’s a pronblem? I think I have-= 
57  PO: =there’s no problem? 
58  CM: well I think there is a problem. 
59  PO: it’s an unregistered vehicle 
60  CM: okay let’s hear what is- why were they pulled  
61      over first of all. 
62  PO: miss [I resp-] 
63  CM:      [>NO  DO]n’t< call me miss I’m commissioner  
64      thank you. 
65  PO: commissioner.  
66  CM: yes= 
 
 
Following the prior extract, this extract showcases an example of embodied partitioning 
accompanied by the articulated actions. The unsaid membership of ‘police commissioner’ is 
explicitly articulated in order to remedy some trouble; however, articulating that trouble or 
accomplishing an action gets delicately managed given the now-asymmetrical category pair 
(“police commissioner-police officer”) produced by Caren. This asymmetrical pair renders 
certain actions, such as an instructing to let these people go as a breach of the police officer’s 
obligations (to uphold the law). The remedial work of releasing the car, and thus fixing the 
problem, is prevented by the police officers – and though there is little uptake, we can examine 
how Caren’s solutions trade on her partitioned categories. 
 
The embodied partitioning begins with Caren explaining that she is “very involved” 
(lines 22-23, extract 5.1). This assertion by Caren that she is involved alludes to some alternate 
category. It is at this point that Caren hands something (not seen on camera) to the police 
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officer who, in line 32, hands back the document after inspection (as shown in the comic strip 
above) whilst asserting that “w- we don’t need to see credentials”; the document which the 
police have been handed is Caren’s police commissioner badge. The handing over of the badge 
is done without any accompanying explanation as to why these credentials are being shown at 
this point, and it is not until line 48 where the police inspect the credentials (“do you have an 
ID with that”) that the badge becomes visible to the police as a police commissioner’s badge. 
The attempted handover of Caren’s credentials thus offers a revision of the prior request, now 
that Caren has produced a slightly more explicit understanding of her cover category as a 
‘police commissioner’, and can thus remediate the problem of the car being impounded. 
 
Despite Caren’s efforts to introduce, and trade on an alternate category, the police 
reject the actions Caren is attempting to accomplish: “we’ve explained already” (line 34). In 
response to this turn Caren explicitly partitions the group by altering the constitution of 
members in the physical space. This is done as a hand movement and initiated in lines 38-39 
“if you can give me a little bit of space here”; the accompanying hand movement selects a 
target for the turn, directs the movement, and creates physical distance between Caren and the 
group to which she had been seen as a co-member (“I take full responsibility”, line 12-13). 
Caren then positions herself closer to the police whilst producing her turn on line 41, which is 
done in overlap with the police confirming who Caren is (“are you a commissioner”) which is 
affirmed by Caren (“I’m the commissioner”) in line 44 and revised to be fitted to the police 
officer’s turn in line 45 (“one of the commissioners”). Here then, is the first point at which the 
police acknowledge the alternate understanding being pursued by Caren, though they ask for 
further proof of who they are “do you have eI Dee” (line 48); the unspoken category (police 
commissioner) has now been produced following the reconfiguration of members in the space. 
Caren mobilises the concrete feature of the badge to indicate to the police officers that she can 
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see a relationship (as someone that is their superior) and invites the police officers to see that 
same relationship and understand her actions with reference to that relationship.  
 
The delicacy to which these actions are being accomplished by Caren and the police 
officers speaks to the obligations and entitlements of the relationship between their categories. 
That is, the projected action of requesting information “if there’s a problem I think I have a 
right” (line 56) is not a straightforward request, instead relying on the policer officer’s 
common-sense knowledge to treat this turn as a request rather than an assertion; the police 
officer rebuts the premise for the assertion with “there’s no problem” (line 57). So despite 
Caren’s efforts to avow her responsibilities as a police commissioner (“heading up over four 
thousand police”), smuggle in some other action (“I think I have a right”), and achieve 
remediation of the situation (releasing the car), there is no uptake so those actions remain 
sanctionable. Let us see what happens next. 
 
Extract 5.4 “do you know who I am” [11:44-12:40] 
 
66 CM: GET AWAY from me? 
67     (2.0) 
68 PO: you keep coming [to me  ] 
69 CM:                 [I’m A:S]KI-  
70     >no no< I came to [see his address ] 
71 PO:                   [thi- thi-this is]  
72     a police employee. 
73 CM: I came to get his ahdress. 
74 PO: this is a police contractor (with the police) 
75     (1.3) 
76 CM: you’ve made five people miss (br/lunch) time (.)  
77     I hope you’re happy (.) >you’re an ass< 
78 PO: just doing my [job  ] 
79 CM:               [and y]ou-  
80     NO °no you’re not°  
81 PO: °°ohkay°° 
82 CM: °you’re not° 
83 PO: you’re all free to go how about that 
84 CM: how abou:t- 
85    (8.8) 
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86 CM: I’m not even gonna talk to you because  
87     it’s not worth it. 
88     (0.7) 
89 CM: th[ank   ] 
90 PO:   [I agr-] I agree 
91 CM: you:: ARe not a nice person.  
92     (0.4) 
93 CM: an five cry:ing. .h you’ve ruined their easter  
94     you’ve ruined their pa:ssohver. You’ve got someone  
95     >an investment banker< from Lo:ndon you’ve ruined  
96     this- >they were just goin’ for a hike?< an’ you’ve  
97     can’t even- I hope you’re very happy because you seem  
98     to have a smug ahss look on your face and this seems 
99     to please you? 
 
In this part of the extract we can observe Caren manoeuvring away from the ‘police 
commissioner’ category to reintroduce her non-institutional ‘ordinary member’ category. 
This affords her (and she attends to) the necessary obligations and entitlements to produce a 
challenge on the grounds that the police are not fulfilling their obligations, thereby violating 
their category-attributes, and not adequately acting as police officers. Her complaint about 
the police officers trades on her ‘citizen’ membership, and does not explicitly display 
remediation work, but rather – it comments on the failed remediation (by complaining about 
the police’s (in)action), and it is through this failure that Caren’s remedial work across this 
extended sequence can be seen.  
 
The extract begins with Caren issuing the directive “get away from me” (line 66), 
though she moves toward the officer, which is oriented to by the officer with “you keep 
coming to me” (line 68); this is produced as an on-line comment on the conduct of the police 
officers as adversarial. This is resisted by the police who assert their category “this is a police 
employee”, “this is a police contractor” (line 71 and 74): these turns display an orientation by 
the police that Caren is not treating them as having sufficient rights and entitlement to (1) 
deny her access to the requested information, and (2) the authority (over Caren) to impound 
the car. In line 10 Caren embeds a troubles-telling, revealing her stance toward the 
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impounding “you’ve made five people miss (br/lunch) time”, which also treats herself as a 
co-member (there are four members from the car plus herself) and thus as being entitled to be 
a complainant. This then is partitioning, as Caren produces the alternate understanding of 
herself as a co-member of this group with the ratio becoming 5:2. Consequently, her negative 
assessment of the police officer “you’re an ass” (line 77) trades on her co-membership with 
the group (i.e. as a citizen, and not as the officer’s superior), and the officer’s failure to 
engage in remedial work.  
 
Caren’s turn is receipted by the police officer with “just doing my job” (line 78), 
which orients to the partitioning, that is, the turn reasserts their institutional entitlements to 
impound the car (“my job”); however, this also alludes to some co-membership by invoking 
an alternate understanding of themselves as an ordinary member orienting to some category-
bound responsibilities to enforce the law with the minimising faculty of “just doing” 
(Holmes, 2014). The response engenders an interactional asymmetry between Caren and the 
policer officers – that is, Caren is pursuing a trajectory to remediate the situation and stop the 
impounding of the car through mobilising herself as a co-complainant, whilst the police 
officers pursue the matter as institutional business. The solution is rejected by Caren – “no no 
you’re not” (line 80) – on the basis that the police officers are violating their category-bound 
responsibilities, which is treated with a minimal acknowledgment by the police officer in line 
81 with “okay”. The minimal acknowledgement (“okay”) is treated as insufficient / in 
opposition by Caren through the repetition of her turn on line 82 (“you’re not”).  
 
Thus far we have seen Caren introducing multiple understandings of herself and the 
police officers and treating those categories as affording different actions. The police officers 
are offering very little uptake to Caren’s challenges and implicit actions, thereby attending to 
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their category-bound attribute of ‘upholding the law’ – preventing Caren from successfully 
remediating the situation. The next extract concludes the sequence. The final extract of this 
sequence brings to a close Caren’s attempts to accomplish an action (letting the group drive 
on unimpeded) after various tries at mobilising alternate categories.  
 
Extract 5.5 “do you know who I am” [12:40-13:25] 
 
100 CM: I don’t know why it’s so hard to say what  
102     (   ) or where the car (    )  
103     (1.1) 
104 CM: [wh:y ] 
105 PO: [cause] you work with police officers right  
106 CM: yeah I work with (      ) 
107 PO: I’- I’m just little bit disappoi:nted that 
108 CM: you don’t get to be disappointed in me 
109 PO: you don’t seem like a very good (1.2)  
110     ve[ry good  ] police support. 
111 CM:   [you don’t] 
112 PO: I dunno 
113     (0.5) 
114 CM: [NO   ] 
115 PO: [we th]ought you’d have more of an inside eh:  
116     look at t[he job] 
117 CM:          [you kn]ow what Ma:tt 
118     (2.0) 
119 PO: just caught me by surprise °based off your  
120     demeanour a little bit° 
121 CM: Yeah ohkay= 
122 PO: =using inappropriate words and such. 
123 CM: yea:h yea:h yeah yeh you know what Matt? 
124     (1.0) 
125 CM: this isn’t gonna go down nicely? 
126     (0.7) 
127 PO: ohnkay 
128 CM: you’re no::t a nice person? 
129     (0.5) 
130 PO: ohnkay= 
131 CM: =an’ it really hard for me to understa:nd why you  
132     can’t say the PRO:Blem is: (0.8) the:y don’t have  
133     this or do they do have that (0.5) >two sentences< 
 
The extract continues from the prior with Caren complaining about the police officer’s 
adherence to their category obligations. This is receipted by the police officer with a 
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projectably extended turn-at-talk (“you work with police officers right”, line 105) which 
attends to the relevance of Caren’s membership as a policer commissioner whilst treating her 
as partial member and not necessarily as part of a category set to which the police officers 
belong. This demonstrates that although category boundaries can be exploited to afford the 
opportunity to produce some social action, those categories remain relevant and members can 
thus be sanctionable for those actions which are incongruent with the partitioned categories. 
This is displayed by the police officer here who, after producing the pre in lines 105, then 
produces an assessment “I’m just a little bit disappointed”, which is designed as a challenge 
toward Caren on the basis of her current actions being attributed to the alternate category 
produced earlier (as a police commissioner).  
 
The disappointed evaluation gets challenged “you don’t get to be disappointed in me” 
(line 108), rendering the police officer as having insufficient rights to assess, which is fitted 
to the police officers’ mobilising of Caren’s alternate ‘police commissioner’ membership in 
the prior turn. Caren’s turn is produced at a non-transition relevance place but at the point at 
which police officer’s turn is projectably bringing off a challenge (“a little bit disappointed 
that”) – that is, with Caren producing an interjection in line 108 of the police officer’s 
trajectory (toward an accusation), she attempts resistance by delaying his turn or at least 
produces a denial as a preferred response turn shape (Atkinson & Drew, 1979). The 
accusatory challenge is brought off in the next turn in line 109 “you don’t seem like a very 
good […] police support”, accounted for in line 115 “we thought you’d have more of an 
inside look at the job”, which incrementally upgrades the challenge to Caren’s membership 
as a police commissioner. On line 123, Caren stops the in-progress action (the challenge) 
“yeah yeah yeah yeh” (Stivers, 2010) and does a pre-telling “you know what Matt?”. Caren’s 
turn is designed as a pre-telling of some new information that is directed to the police officer 
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with the use of his forename, which reconfigures her rights to be entitled to use the officer’s 
name. The telling occurs in line 125 “this isn’t gonna go down nicely”: because of the failure 
to resolve the problem, there is a threat of some future consequence. This is produced with 
the general category of “nice person” in line 128. Like the previous extract, this glosses the 
police officer’s rights and responsibilities as a police officer to categorise the categoriser 
(Whitehead, 2009) i.e. Caren as having rights to assess who is a ‘nice person’ as she is a nice 
person.  
 
The partition exploiting conducted by both the police officers and Caren in this 
extract displays a continuous negotiation of who-they-are and what-they’re-doing; in extract 
5.1 we can observe Caren returning to her membership as ‘mother/carer’ to be seen (and thus 
treated) as a member of the non-police group so that she is hearable as a co-complainant 
rendering her complaint as non-sanctionable, since she is also someone who has suffered. 
However, the tables are turned in the proceeding part as the police officers finally orient to 
Caren as police commissioner from her earlier attempts at remediating the issue. The officers 
then, do not treat Caren as a cross-member ‘mother-police’, but as a co-member ‘police 
commissioner-police’ which renders Caren as sanctionable for her complaint. Caren’s 
complaint is sanctioned on the basis of this partitioning, as the police officer challenges 
Caren as category-bound to the attributes of a police commissioner, which in this instance 
regards Caren’s unprofessionalism. 
 
These extracts have shown how partitioning can be used to seek a remediation of a 
situation, in this case, the release of the car. The success of the remediation is not of 
importance for the analysis – rather, it is how interlocutors work to achieve a course of action 
desirable to themselves through introducing alternate categories on which certain actions can 
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trade. The observations throughout this section show speakers craft themselves as co-
members in order to halt and in-progress challenge. Indeed, these alternate categories render 
particular actions (like complaining) as being relevant and fitted to the ongoing activity. 
Moreover, by partitioning the members in these spaces it reconfigures the moral order by 
which the participant’s relationship is organised i.e. the cover category alters who the people 
are to each other and what responsibilities they have to each other, and not attending to these 
responsibilities transgresses a social norm, and possibly the law. Consequently, how people 
treat each other through the actions they produce is culture-in-action insofar as those people, 
their relationships and the context are crafted in and through talk-in-interaction.  
 
4.1.3 Partitioning to ‘distance’ a category 
 
The final extracts will show what Poulios (2016) explains as ‘distancing’ oneself from less 
desirable categories – Poulios shows how ‘old’ actors renegotiate what it means to be old, 
and that by introducing an alternate understanding of themselves (in their cases as ‘theatre 
actors’) it can defend against the negative assertion that they are elderly. I argue that, 
although participants do ‘distancing’ in one sense, it does not adequately capture what is 
happening – rather, it is how one category is replaced by another in order to evade a negative 
assertion and prevent their co-interlocutor from accomplishing their course of action.  
 
This interaction comes from the US; here the police (PO) have pulled over a car. The 
car is an Uber (a taxi-like service) which has been pulled over as the police have seen the 
rider (RI) leaving a ‘drug house’. The police are questioning why the car’s occupants have 
been visiting the drug house, with them both insisting that it was to pick up a cheque. The 
driver (DR) is resistant to the police searching his vehicle given that he is just an Uber 
fulfilling his rider’s request to drive between places – there is a dispute over the 
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appropriateness of the police’s actions (questioning the driver). In this extract the partitioning 
occurs to replace the category of ‘suspect’ with ‘uber/taxi driver’, that is, the attributes of 
‘uber/taxi driver’ who is ‘just doing his job’ are invoked to replace the relevance of the 
attributes of ‘suspect’. In this case the attributes of ‘suspect’ are constructed by the police as 
visiting a ‘drug house’ and having possible illegal items in the car, whereas the attributes of 
‘driver’ disavow culpability, rendering the driver as innocently doing his job.  
 
Extract 6 ‘you’re leaving a drug house’ [01:20-01:50] 
 
01 PO:  okay. do you have anything on you sir: anything on   
02      vehicle that you’d need to be concern’d about? 
03 DR:  no not[hing at all]. 
04 PO:       [would you  ] mind if I look, 
05      (0.3) 
06 DR:  I- I do mind because [I haven’t] done anything (.) 
07 PO:                       [okay,    ]                          
08 DR:  [but I mind.] 
09 PO:  [okay.      ]   
10      (0.6) 
11 PO:  what- you- you- you’re leaving a drug house, 
12      (0.7) 
13 DR:  okay (guy) (.) I don’t know I- (.)  
14      I showed you my uber drive. =somebody  
15      just had me drive them to  
16      [somewhere and got them back.] 
17 PO:  [I understand that           ] you go to a  
18      drug house you drop somebody o:ff, 
19      (0.4) 
20 PO:  [and  ] they came right back to your car, 
21 DR:  [okay,] 
22      (0.5) 
23 PO:  and he says he want to go pick up a cheque, 
24 DR:  okay, 
25 PO:  and he [has-   
26 DR:        [it] (.) it [has nothing  ] to do with me  
27 PO:                    [(this mendez)] 
28 DR:  and[it’s] my car.  
28 PO:     [(-)] 
29 DR:  if you want to search him by his permission  
30      [that’s fine.] 
31 PO:  [ you have an]ything  
32      on you mister le[wis here] to be concerned about? 
33 RI:                  [no: sir] 
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34 RI:  no: not a thang sir.= 
35 PO:  =alright why don’t you step outside and check  
36      you (a quick.) 
37     (9.8) 
38     ((RI steps out of car)) 
 
 
Prior to this extract beginning, the driver and the rider have been speculating the reason for 
being pulled over whilst waiting for the police to approach the car. As with most traffic stops 
by police, the police address the driver, who has the responsibility for the vehicle; this may 
be different for a taxi. However, with this being an Uber, there are few (if any) signs that 
indicate that this is a professional driver collecting a fare, and not just someone offering a lift 
to a friend. The extract begins with the police treating the driver as a suspect (“anything on 
you sir:”, line 01), (“would you mind if I look”, line 04), (“you’re leaving a drug house”, line 
11”) which reinforces the asymmetrical pair of ‘police-suspect’ rendering themselves with 
rights to direct, assess, inform, request etc. and thus the citizens (the driver and rider) with 
obligations to comply. These get receipted with resistance “I do mind because I haven’t done 
anything” (line 06) whilst accounting for this reluctance to comply with “I showed you by 
uber drive” (line 14) displaying incumbency of a cross-category engaged with the ordinary, 
category-bound activity “somebody just had me drive them to somewhere” (line 15). This 
exploits the partition, in that the current constitution of members in this device is 2:1 (two 
suspects to one police officer) so in doing partitioning it rearranges the constitution of 
members to 1:1:1 (one suspect, one driver, and one police officer).  
 
We can see this as partitioning as the ‘driver’ category does not categorically belong 
with the ‘law enforcement’ device (police-suspect), and so this cover category establishes 
cross-membership with their device. This ‘driver’ category then, as a cover-category, serves 
to sanction the ascribed activities to treat them through the lens of ordinariness. There is 
uptake of this proffered cover category by the police as they pivot to target the rider as a 
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suspect “you have anything on you mister Lewis” (line 32). This follows some avowing of 
the driver’s attributes as an uber driver: “you drop somebody o:ff” (line 18), which regards 
his responsibilities; “nothing to do with me and it’s my car” (line 26-28), which repudiates 
any relationship with the rider; and “he says he want to go pick up a cheque” (line 23), which 
is reported speech that disclaims any validity and reinforces his category of driver with ‘taxi 
driver talk’ as an activity being made relevant. Though there is no explicit acceptance of the 
driver’s proffered cover category by the police officers, that course of action (questioning the 
driver) gets abandoned in favour of questioning the rider. 
 
 To summarise, the partition can be exploited in order to replace the relevancy of a 
category by introducing an alternate category. This example outlines how one may ‘distance’ 
themselves from a category which has been ascribed (in this case, ‘suspect’) by introducing a 
cover category which is a cross-member with the other participants in the interaction. Rather 
than use the term ‘distancing’, which glosses the structural organisation of the interaction, we 
may instead understand this outcome of partitioning to be accomplishing an alternate 
trajectory of action which gets occasioned by the cover-category. Here the police officers 
pivot to question the rider rather than the driver. 
 
The following extract is taken from a UK based radio station in 2014. Here Elizabeth 
Jones (Liz), who is the vice chairperson for a far-right UK political party (UKIP), has been 
invited onto the show to debate their tax policies. Liz is debating Helen Pattison (Hel), a 
member of the socialist party and Mahmood Faze (Mah), a liberal democrat. The host is 
Adam Awedu (Hos). Immediately prior to this extract Liz has outlined the merits of a flat-
rate tax system which Helen and Mahmood have opposed. This extract shows how an 
alternate device can replace the omnipresent and current in-use device in order to remedy a 
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disruptive turn and minimise a political point that is being made. Here, Liz initially highlights 
some problematic conduct that has disrupted her interactional trajectory. Liz is then 
sanctioned for her own problematic conduct; it is in this sanctioning that the partitioning 
occurs.  
 
Extract 7 ‘DON’T INTERRUPT ME!’ [13:40-14:44] 
 
01 Hel: =bec’use big business and- rich people  
02      [get] away with tax avoidance and that’s wh’- 
03 Liz: [no.] rig[h- no- as long a]s they’re-             ] 
04 Hos:          [how- we- how we-] 
05 Hel:          [how can they get away with it they don’t] 
06 Liz: WILL YOU SHUT UP? 
07 Hos: no no- le- let’s let’s be 
08 Mah: calm down (.) please it’s an intellectual discussion  
09 Hos: no eh- h[ow would it-] 
10 Liz:         [I’ve jus-   ]I’VE just had really enough.  
11      since two thousand and ten I’ve had the left wing  
12      [shouting and shouting and shouting at? mne?   ] 
13 Hos: [explain it to us explain it- explain it to us-] 
14 Liz: and I’m not go[ing to tolerate it anyMOre it] 
15      ends now 
16 Hos:               [e-    e-   eh.  Listen       ]  
17      this is the opportunity for us to 
18 Mah: if you’re calling up the station (I’m not shouting)= 
19 Liz: =I won’t discuss wi[th you] 
20 Hos:                    [no no ]=  
21 Hel: =>I’m not gonna shout<= 
22 Hos: this is the opportunity for us to explain ourselves 
23      [so explain- our pro- and tell them-] 
24 Liz: [yes of course and I will explain my]self  
25      I:F [you be quiet >whilst< >>I] explain myself<< 
26 Hos:     [we did it to a- we are-  ] 
27 Liz: >DO NOT INTERRUPT ME< 
28 Hos: let us- let us 
29 Liz: [RIGHT] 
30 Hel: [>ehah]ah< I’ve never been spoken to so rude  
31       in m[y entire life?] 
32 Hos:      [well you so-  ]you so-           ] 
33 Liz:      [WEll good     ]well aren’t you lu]cky then 
34      tonight’s the fi:rst it won’t be the la:st 
35 Hos: this is- voice of African radio= 
36 Liz: =if you’re gonna go for politics 
37 Hos: this is afro- afro beat ninety four the voice  
38      of Africa:n radio we discuss anythi’ her’?= 
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39 Liz: =yes 
40 Hos: .hh ehh and we want to clear. the air whatever 
41       happens here (.) it’s: part of the game 
42      [we ]make it fairer. 
43 Liz: [yes] 
44 Hos: and is good for all of us The Socialist coalition  
45      Of the socialist party who explain th- 
  
The extract begins (lines 01-05) with the prior discussion where the participants are 
discussing the implications of alternate tax-systems in the UK. There is interjacent overlap 
between three of the participants, which is attended to by Liz in line 06 with “will you shut 
up” and expanded in lines 10-12 to cast the other participants as “left wing” and thus 
ascribing their shouting as a left-wing disposition. This attends to the participants within a 
political device through speaking to them as co-members and thus their “shouting” behaviour 
is problematic relative to Liz’s own ‘ordinary’ behaviour – doing this move treats all 
participants as belonging within the same moral order and thus sanctionable on that basis.  
  
The host, following transgressive talk (for the local environment) appeals to the other 
participants to act in accordance with the local norms: (“explain it to us”, line 13), (“listen 
this is the opportunity for us”, lines 16-17). These turns seek a cessation of the disruptive 
trajectory where the participants are blaming one another for the disruption. There is uptake 
to the hosts turn with Mahmood attending to the radio device “calling up the station” (line 
18); however, Liz rejects the host’s plea for civility with “I won’t discuss with you” (line 19), 
which is hearably directed at Helen (who is positioned as having caused the original 
infraction) and characterises Liz’s own actions as inapposite to Helen’s (discussing vs. 
shouting). Helen rejects this as a problematic attribute for this category device of radio talk 
show (where ordinary conduct precludes shouting): “I’m not gonna shout” (line 21). This is 
displayed in both the host’s turn “opportunity to explain ourselves” (line 22) and in Helen’s 
uptake, with ‘discussion’ being a predicate of the device ‘radio show’. Helen treats 
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‘discussion’ as inapposite through her rejection of an uninvoked attribute of ‘shouting’. Thus 
far, the radio show guests have responded to the meta-talk disruption caused by Liz by 
attending to their co-membership as ‘radio show guests’, with the bounded predicates of 
doing ‘discussing’ and ‘explaining’ relevant for this device.  
 
The partition is exploited to reconfigure the participants from the ‘radio’ category 
device to a more general category device; thus far, the participants’ actions have been done 
under the ‘politics’ and ‘radio’ category devices insofar as blaming is done on their 
disposition as left/right-wing member. The partitioning is accomplished through covering of 
these relevant devices through the “entire life” which goes outside of the both devices and 
speaks to all of Liz’s (countless) memberships. It is understandable in this local context of 
radio-show that the other participants are also speaking across their memberships. The other 
party’s uptake of the partitioning is through well-prefaced assessments (“well good”, line 33), 
which can be heard as sarcastically availing an undesirable stance toward the partitioning 
work – however, the host initiates a closing in line 34 by talking to the audience to mark this 
segment as finished. Helen invokes the cover category to replace the relevance of the 
‘politics’ and ‘radio’ show and to distance herself from the disruptive behaviour of 
interrupting and shouting; it also challenges Liz as being in breach of the expectation that on 
political radio shows the participants ought to act respectfully to one another.  
 
This extract shows how partitioning can be used to distance oneself from an ongoing 
challenge (where a particular category is being targeted) and how a category disjuncture can 
be brought about to cast the other as transgressing their category responsibilities. Here Liz 
highlighted her own conduct though this invited a reflexive uptake by Helen and the host 
regarding their own conduct. Following an attempt to readjust the interactional addressee to 
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the topic rather than the metadiscourse, Liz remedies this attempt and is thus held 
accountable with the partitioning work done by Helen in which she renders herself as 
innocent and not currently belonging to the same device as Liz, who is cast as disruptive to 
the ongoing activity. 
 
In this section I showed how the practice of partitioning does ‘distancing’. Achieving 
‘distancing’ is useful across contexts, but particularly in disputes – being able to be avoid 
vilification means that interlocutors, because of some alternate category device, are able to 
refute a problematic attribute/characterisation on the basis that it is incongruent with who 
they are. This responds to Poulios’ (2016) work to further specify what distancing means for 
members and for analysts. The findings reveal that by introducing a cover category it 
ostensibly creates ‘space’ between two alternate categories. Specifically, however, a speaker 
doing this move to introduce a cover category splits the category device so that it renders the 
other speaker as being transgressive of some social norm or category attribute. Moreover, 
rather than seeing it as the distance between category and attribute, it accomplishes an 
alternate trajectory of action as made relevant by the cover category. These observations are 
reflected in the discussion section below within the broader practice of partitioning.  
 
4.2 Discussion 
 
 
In this chapter, I have examined how people introduce alternate understandings of themselves 
and the situation through exploiting the partition. I focused on how, through partitioning, 
people are able to reconfigure their relationships with their co-interactants. I demonstrated 
that, in the context of disputes and through the reconfiguration of relationships, that 
challenges may be both brought off or remedied, which shows the multifaceted applications 
of partitioning for members in and through talk-in-interaction. This extends our knowledge of 
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social interaction, particularly through the lens of membership categorisation analysis. My 
approach is underpinned by an examination of the moral order, how this is negotiated 
amongst parties to a dispute, and how it is collaboratively constructed. Whilst this chapter 
focused on specific organisations inside of a dispute (challenging, resisting, and distancing), 
the analysis has shown the delicate categorial work that speakers do and their attendance to 
certain categories and their affordances and constraints.  
  
 This chapter contributes to interactional research on relationships by examining a 
previously under-researched phenomenon: how relationships may be reconfigured in order to 
accomplish some social action. EM/CA studies have tentatively investigated partitioning as a 
phenomenon through which actions can be accomplished ‘safely’, and how relationships get 
reflexively constituted. However, to date, there are relatively few studies which explore how, 
through exploiting the partition between categories, that relationships get reconfigured with 
the purpose of accomplishing some social action. This chapter then offers insights into the 
boundaries of Membership Categorisation Devices by showing how people use these 
bounded devices to invoke alternate bodies of common-sense knowledge (Schegloff, 2007a). 
By invoking family categories or generic personality categories to ‘cover’ institutional (radio 
talk show/mass transit) categories, participants challenge, resist, and/or remedy resistance by 
smuggling potentially-sanctionable actions under seemingly-innocent moves. This provides 
participants a resource for producing or repairing the disorder brought about by resistant and 
conflicted interactions. For instance, in the production of challenges, speakers’ turns are 
hearable as reconstituting the category device and in doing so casting their challenge as 
appropriate (‘how many children do you have’, Extract 2 and ‘not every woman feels that 
way’, Extract 3). These produce a disjuncture between the target’s prior talk and the new 
‘cover’ device – and it places the onus on the target to respond in a manner that would 
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transgress their previous, or current, category. The invocation of a ‘new’, or different 
category device changes who these people are to each other. Exploiting the partition between 
devices reframes the talk so that people can ‘step outside’ of the current ongoing matters as 
way of disrupting that prior talk.  
 
 Remedying a challenge/issue, or more broadly the action or implication which has 
been done in the prior turn, is a recurrent feature described in this analysis. The remedying 
occurs in ways which solicit compliance (‘he’s actually a nice guy’, Extract 4) to progress 
some institutional agenda, or by availing oneself with the rights and responsibilities to 
misappropriate a challenge in the first place (‘do you know who I am, Extracts 5.1-5.5). 
Remediation is useful across contexts (e.g. Kidwell & Martínez, 2010; Rhodes et al., 2006; 
Yu, Wu & Drew, 2019) in order to moderate the ongoing talk and thus reduce or deal with 
the hostility from the prior turn, and partitioning is one way that remediation can be achieved. 
The final way that I examined partitioning was through its usage to ‘distance’ (‘show you my 
uber driver’, Extract 6 and ‘never been spoken to so rude in my entire life’, Extract 7). I 
showed that although a possible understanding of these turns is to ‘distance’ the speaker from 
a prescribed characteristic which has been built in prior turn(s), the actual work done by the 
speaker through partitioning is to replace one category in that moment. This distancing then, 
goes outside of the prior talk to do more than simply challenge or remediate, but affords the 
opportunity for the speaker to craft themselves as reasonably attending to (their) moral order, 
similar to the findings shown in the next chapter on meta-talk.  
 
Therefore, this analysis has shown members’ own demonstrable orientations to invoking 
alternate bodies of common-sense knowledge in bringing off some action. Previous 
examinations of partitioning have focused on the viewer’s maxim (Sacks, 1995), affording 
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the generation of safe actions (Butler, 2008), how children organise who is included or 
excluded from play (Butler, 2016), to sanction others’ behaviour among friends (Robles, 
2019), distancing oneself from a prescribed attribute (Poulios, 2016), and the embodied 
practice of basketball training (Evans & Fitzgerald, 2016). This chapter builds on these 
studies and furthers the remit of partitioning to demonstrate how it is accomplished in 
generating a challenge, as a resource for non-compliance, and in remedying resistance. This 
chapter reveals the mundane reasoning and sense-making practices (Butler et al., 2009) used 
in the local production of social (dis)order. In the following chapter I will return to the 
structural aspects of a dispute by focusing on how participants treat that (dis)order in and 
through talk-in-interaction.  
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Chapter 5: 
Doing being (un)reasonable 
 
5.0 Introduction 
  
In this chapter I will illustrate how speakers negotiate reasonableness in interaction, 
specifically how people interactionally produce their conduct as orderly and conforming with 
the local context’s norms – that is, what it takes to be seen as not ‘breaking the rules’ of how 
people ought to act in certain environments. This chapter focuses on how interlocutors 
explicitly talk about what conduct is (un)acceptable; by examining how people in disputes 
talk about talk, it informs us of how members themselves fashion morality as an interactional 
accomplishment (i.e. what conduct is good/bad or right/wrong).   
 
Disputes are ritually organised, with participants attending to and collaborating in the 
co-construction of disputes as joint activities. One such way that disputes are organised is 
through attending to the moral order whereby speakers leverage their knowledge, or position 
their own talk as common-sense, with respect to their co-interlocutor(s). Namely, a speaker 
can appeal to their moral order as the moral order (by which all talk and conduct should 
adhere) in order to claim that the other speaker’s conduct as transgressive in some way. 
Whilst these claims are managed delicately throughout the sequences, they do convey a 
negative assertion toward the conduct of their co-interlocutor and are therefore challenging. 
Indeed, in the fictional example below, a challenge toward a speaker’s stance is produced, but 
the challenger is held to account for making the challenge (that they are rude), and thus the 
target is able to subvert the challenge. For example: 
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 Speaker A: I THINK YOUR OPINION IS JUST RUBBISH! 
 Speaker B: Why are you shouting and being so rude? 
In this invented example, Speaker A asserts their position toward Speaker B’s prior opinion 
with a just that suggests the concept is unreasonable and without grounds (see Goodman & 
Burke, 2010). Rather than rejecting A’s assertion, B generates a counterchallenge toward A 
by appealing to their moral order (as being calm and polite) to dismiss their turn. B sanctions 
A on the basis that their conduct and not their talk is transgressive, which neatly packages 
their turn as responsive to the prior (without acknowledging the content of challenge) and 
frames A as unreasonable and the one who is doing challenging. In this sense, B’s turn 
fashions a witnessable account of A’s conduct to undermine A’s position and dismiss the 
content of A’s turn (see Potter, 1996 on stake).  
 
Constructing one’s actions as reasonable is done to provide a morally creditable 
account to one’s argument (Greenland et al., 2018), particularly if there is an audience 
(Heritage, 1985). The construction of reasonability is done at the interactional level and at 
times when claims, accounts or descriptions could be contested and thereby heard as 
unreasonable, or irrational (Edwards, 2005). For these reasons, drawing attention to one’s 
conduct as problematic does two things – it indicates how one should act and how one should 
not act (Billig, 1998). As Billig (1998, p.208) goes on to explain, “practically every utterance, 
if delivered inappropriately, carries the possibility of moral censure […] as such, everyday 
we practice this conversational morality habitually. As we make habitual utterances which 
have never been said before, we run the risk of transgressing the morality which permits such 
utterance”. This then is two-fold, in the sense that any utterance may be possibly 
transgressive of morality but also, rendering that utterance as transgressive is a resource to 
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produce the other speaker as irrational. 
 
Showing reasonability and being a ‘moral citizen’ is recurrent feature of disputes (see  
Clarke, Kitzinger & Potter, 2004; Condor et al. 2006; Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Rapley, 
2001). It can be brought off in various ways, often done in the service of some other action 
and to cast the other as behaving in some non-orderly, problematic way. These issues of what 
conduct counts as ‘normal’ and ‘ordinary’ are given attention through observing and 
reporting that conduct which, as moral activities (Atkinson, 1982), constitute an 
interlocutor’s understanding of the dispute’s gestalt, and who occupies categorial roles in that 
dispute (such as: aggressor – victim). This chapter will reflect the methodological ordering 
discussed in Chapter 2 to take a chiefly Discursive Psychological approach and primarily 
draw on DP literature where appropriate. This chapter will be structured as follows: in the 
analysis, I demonstrate two ways that members accomplish ‘appearing reasonable’: (1) 
presenting one’s own conduct as ordinary, and (2) presenting the other’s conduct as non-
ordinary. Finally, I provide a summary and discuss the findings in the context of the 
categorial demands of participants in disputes. The following section details explicit 
orientations to reasonableness: these extracts represent where speakers invoke ‘reasonable’ 
as a move toward a concession of a point, but do not necessarily represent orientations to 
conduct as being reasonable, which the findings in the main body of the analysis will 
subsequently demonstrate. 
 
5.0.1 Orientations to reasonability  
 
Doing being reasonable is, in most contexts, an orderly thing to do. There appears to be an 
orientation across disputes of being a ‘reasonable’ person, that is, being seen as reasonably 
responding (and not disputing) is treated as orderly conduct – despite the fact that they are 
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doing disputing. However, what constitutes ‘reasonable’ as a moral category is unclear – in 
disputes one recurrent way participants claim incumbency of that category is by doing being 
‘ordinary’ (Sacks, 1995). However, I am not treating ‘reasonable’ as equivalent to ‘ordinary’; 
one of the ways that ‘reasonability’ is constructed by members is by attending to what is 
‘ordinary’ (irrespective of environment), throughout this chapter I will tease out some of the 
ways that one can appear as a ‘reasonable’ person in a public dispute. Reasonable as a moral 
category (i.e. conduct that is treated as good/right) can be understood to be a member’s 
resource to sanction the other speaker. How members manage and negotiate ‘reasonableness’ 
in and through talk is what the analysis focuses on. Explicit orientations to doing being 
reasonable are rare in my data set: throughout the entire corpus there are only six cases where 
some form of ‘reasonable’ is mentioned in the talk. I will present three instances of these 
explicit orientations to highlight how interlocutors treat ‘reasonable’ to (1) characterise their 
own actions, and (2) characterise an other’s actions. This is done to demonstrate how 
‘reasonable’ is understood by members themselves, and although this slightly differs to the 
primary analytic focus (on metatalk), it provides a starting point for how interlocutors 
describe behaviour as reasonable. The main body of the analysis will build on these brief 
analyses to uncover ‘(un)reasonable’ as something which can be appealed to, accused of, or 
simply described. In these cases, reasonable is regularly oriented to as a description of some 
on-going action other than the avowed crux of the dispute. 
 
 This first two extracts are taken from a US talk show. TC, a right-wing commentator, 
is discussing an advert which attacked the US Republican candidate for the Governor of 
Virginia, Ed Gillespie with LJ, a member of the Democrat party. Here, TC is conveying that 
they are making concessions and staying calm, despite LJ’s non-cooperation. 
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Extract 1.1 ‘trying to be reasonable’ [05:20-05:39] 
 
01 TC: what did that have to do with ed Gillespie  
02     (1.2)  
    03 LJ: [It has to do- ]  
    04 TC: [I mean- look I]’m trying to be reasonable I’m not 
05     sure you’re capable of it but I’m trying to walk  
06     through it slowly and a:sk you why what happened   
07     in Charlottesville relate to >Ed Gillespie< why  
08     is he responsible for it. I mean maybe I’m too   
09     literally maybe I’m caught in y’know ancient   
10     linear thinking #here.  
 
Here, in line 08, TC makes the claim “I’m trying to be reasonable,” which points to some 
difficulty and the potential for claims to the contrary to be made. This goes outside of the 
current discussion to metadiscursively highlight a problem with the on-going talk; we can 
observe this in the rest of TC’s turn: “I’m trying to walk through it slowly” (lines 09-10). 
TC’s describing of what he’s doing, then, renders LJ as (purposefully) not understanding. In 
overlap with LJ, TC initiates repair (line 04) arising from the gap (line 02) thus ‘reasonable’ 
formulates his stance and points to the issue that LJ is being uncooperative in not providing 
an answer, thus limiting TC’s understanding as he cannot get the required information from 
LJ. The following extract occurs 16 seconds later, in this time LJ has been refuting TC’s turn 
from extract 1.1.  
 
Extract 1.2 ‘deeply unreasonable person’ [05:55-06:05] 
 
01 TC: =°you’re a [hater° °°thanks°°  ]  
02 LJ:            [what you care about] it is what it   
03     depicts .hh you: wanna show that the confederate   
04     flag is a part of our heritage I salute   
05     o[ne flag that’s the American flag ]  
06 TC:  [°I never said anything okay fine°] °°we’re  
07     done°° you’re a deeply unreasonable person  
08     I hope you never get near power  
 
 
TC uses ‘reasonable’ again, but this time to cast LJ as “deeply unreasonable” (line 07). This 
highlights LJ’s conduct as problematic, specifically targeting the lack of attempts made to 
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remedy the conflict. This usage of ‘reasonable’ speaks to LJ and the overhearing audience 
(the TV show’s audience) and furthers the use of ‘reasonable’ in the prior extract as his 
stance to explicitly produce LJ as holding views which are comparatively 
problematic/unreasonable.  
 
In the next extract, there has been a traffic incident with the Mom and her young-adult 
daughters standing outside of their car waiting for the police to arrive. A person (the camera 
operator: REC) has begun filming them for an unknown reason (ostensibly to document the 
incident) and one of the daughters (GIR) is trying to take the mother away from the 
conversation. At this point in the conversation, GIR has asked REC to stop filming and 
asking questions about how the traffic incident occurred. He refuses this in lines 01-04.  
 
Extract 1.3 ‘being very reasonable’ [06:33-06:53] 
 
01 REC: If I walked up to you in the street  
02      when you were doing something and I  
03      asked you what you were doing would  
04      you have a responsibility to answer me   
05 MOM: if they were filming you yeah.  
06 REC: No and I know and you know what you  
07      know your mother is being very reasonable  
08      I understand where she's coming from.  
09 GIR: I’m so uncomfortable right now  
 
Here ‘reasonable’ is used to characterise the mother’s actions “your mother is being very 
reasonable” (line 07), which excludes GIR from the ‘reasonable’ moral category thus 
pointing to a problem with GIR’s conduct. REC sympathises “I understand where she’s 
coming from” (line 08) to affiliate with Mom. This turn is straightforwardly affiliative with 
the mother’s actions, and arises from REC’s interrogative “would you have a responsibility to 
answer me” (line 04), solicits an answer from the mother. The mother extends her turn 
though and provides a qualification to describe REC’s behaviour – in response, REC displays 
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his own reasonableness by showing his understanding to ‘meet her half-way’ in the service of 
characterising GIR’s action (of extracting her mother) as unnecessarily adversarial in light of 
the ‘conversation’.   
 
 Concrete descriptions of being reasonable are produced to accomplish a number of in-
the-moment actions, but they all regard some on-going conduct that is either problematic or 
worthy of highlighting. ‘Reasonable’ then, along with ‘ordinary’, is a morally-loaded term – 
this language is used to position oneself as acting in accordance with some tacit local 
expectations and in disputes, thus serves to present that speaker’s own agenda whilst 
diminishing the others’ agenda on the basis that it violates those tacit local expectations. 
Unlike ordinariness, which refers to that which is expectable, and can be examined on the 
basis of interlocutors working to adhere to their environment’s ‘norms’ (i.e. doing being a 
patient in a doctor-patient interaction); being ‘reasonable’ is a category that is produced in 
public disputes to both (1) characterise the producer as acting appropriately (i.e. not 
disputing), and (2) characterise the opponent as acting inappropriately (i.e. disputing). The 
following section presents an analysis of doing being reasonable where I will show how 
speakers present their own conduct as reasonable and diminish the other’s conduct as 
unreasonable.  
 
5.1 Analysis  
 
 
In this section I will demonstrate two ways that members appear reasonable via concrete 
practices in disputes. In the first section I will outline how one may present the other 
speaker(s)’ conduct, I will then outline how the speaker may present their own conduct. The 
analysis considers how ‘reasonable’ gets constructed by participants – that is, how members 
metadiscursively trade on some previous (or on-going) conduct to make orderliness (for that 
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environment) a relevant and desired category.  
 
5.1.1 Presenting an other’s conduct as unreasonable 
 
 
The following extracts show how participants in disputes present the other’s conduct as being 
objectionable in some way. Objectionable conduct, in this sense, is treated as the other acting 
in breach/violation of the objector’s moral order (presented as the moral order). This 
highlighting of objectionable actions produces a reflexive understanding of the objector as 
acting in accordance with a moral order and as entitled to object to the other’s conduct. The 
circumstances whereby these objections occur are examined in the following extracts; the 
analysis shows: (1) how an objection presents the other’s conduct, and (2) rearranges the 
structural organisation of the talk to return to a normative sequential order. 
 
The first extract comes from a dispute between protestors. Jayda Fransen (Jay) is a 
representative of Britain First, a far-right political party in the UK. Here she is holding a rally 
and is approached by Ali Dawah (Ali), a youtuber. The interaction begins with Ali calling 
over Jayda to discuss aspects of Islam. Immediately prior to this extract Ali and Jayda have 
been drawing comparisons between Britain First and Nazism; it is whilst discussing this 
comparison that their contrasting opinions are disputed. This extract shows how an appeal to 
normative turn-taking practices presents the other’s conduct as inappropriate – that is, by not 
allowing someone to speak and turn-take in a reasonable way, they can be held to account for 
acting adversarial (despite this being a disputative environment!).  
 
Extract 2 ‘can I talk’ [08:30-08:53] 
 
01 Jay:  >cause you’ve just said< that those who follow the Nazi 
02       ideology are as bad as the Nazis killing?= 
03 Ali:  =yes= 
04 Jay:  =the Muslims following Isl[a:m] as an ide[ology] are as 
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05 Ali:                            [yes]          [yes  ] 
06 Jay:  bad as the musl[ims ki]lling?=  
07 Ali:                 [no- no]  
08 Jay:  =because it’s *i:n t[he book  ]       * 
09 Ali:                *..head shake-------,,,,* 
10                           [no °no-° ] °°no°°*   
10 Jay:  ye↑s it is ye↑s i[t is you’ve ju]st  
11 Ali:                   [I’ve heard you]  
12 Jay:  clo↑sed your own case? 
13       >can I- can I talk<  
14 Jay:  d’you know what you need to do. 
15 Ali:  °yeah° 
16 Jay:  you need to::. accept Jesus into your heart. 
17 Ali:  >I already have< 
 
This extract examines how Ali tacitly objects to Jayda’s conduct to present that conduct as 
relevant and violative in order to secure a turn and pursue their own, alternate trajectory. The 
turn inspected is “can I- can I talk” (line 13), produced by Ali. Jayda reformulates Ali’s point 
in order to transform it into her own my-side argument; this is accomplished through seeking 
agreement with reported speech (“cause you’ve just said”, line 01). This reported speech 
repeats an earlier turn by Ali, and establishes the grounds for some upcoming challenge, 
though at this point the turn achieves a preferred acceptance (“yes”, line 03). This permits 
Jayda to bring off her challenge, which uses Ali’s argument to compare Islam to Nazism. 
This does enticing (see Chapter 3) whereby the first turn by Jayda is treated as 
straightforwardly soliciting a preferred response, but subsequently reverses the logic of Ali’s 
turn by suspending the presupposition that Muslims are unlike Nazis. Whilst Jayda takes her 
turn to produce the enticer, Ali intersperses ‘yes’ in overlap (line 05), which work as response 
tokens to Jayda’s ongoing action; yet the frequent production and non-transition relevance 
place placement provides for Ali to have an aligning and non-disruptive turn at talk.  
 
Ali’s ‘yes’ (as a continuer) is changed to ‘no- no’ (as a disagreement) at the point at 
which Jayda’s turn is projectably doing challenging (“as bad as the muslims killing”, line 06) 
– this is done in overlap and is not receipted at this point by Jayda, who continues (“because 
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it’s in the book”, line 08). Ali outrightly rejects Jayda’s challenge with “no no no”, though 
Jayda counters this turn with a reformulated repetitive response (“yes it is yes it is”, line 10) 
and produces a further increment; however, it is at this point that Ali engages in the 
metadiscourse (“I’ve heard you”, line 11), which is accompanied by a gesture to his ear 
which is in the service of showing his readiness to take a turn, or at least halt Jayda’s turn. 
Ali’s turn highlights a trouble with Jayda’s conduct – that she is not allowing/recognising his 
turns. This is crystallised in the following transition relevance place where Ali says, “can I- 
can I talk” (line 13), which is designed as contingent on Jayda’s (tacit) approval (Curl & 
Drew, 2008). This request is used in the service of highlighting Jayda’s failure to turn-take in 
a reasonable way – asking to take a turn suggests that normal turn-taking practices have been 
disrupted. Ali is demonstrating that he cannot take a turn, and as such, extreme remedial 
action is needed (i.e. a request). This turn is not so different from formulations such as ‘can I 
just say’ which attend to a turn-taking violation by managing the sense to which it is 
interruptive (see O’Reilly, 2006). Jayda disaligns to resist the implicature of Ali’s turn, 
highlighting her conduct by sequentially deleting Ali’s turn; nevertheless, Jayda’s response 
“you need to accept Jesus into your heart” (lines 14-16) launches a new action sequence by 
using a three-part sequence structure ((1) “d’you know what you need to do”, (2) you need to 
accept Jesus into your heart) to place Ali in the position of ‘requesting’ a third-part (see 
Sacks (1995) on misidentifications). 
 
 In this regard, Jayda neatly gives the floor to Ali by addressing them in line 14 with 
“d’you know what you need to do”. This provides recipiency for Ali in order for Jayda to 
then complete the third-part of the sequence with “you need to accept Jesus into your heart” 
(line 16). Sequentially, this solves Ali’s orientation to normal turn-taking practices being 
disrupted by doing canonical turn-taking (one speaker after another) and sequentially deleting 
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his request with the new sequence. Consequently, Jayda’s turn also treats Ali as violating a 
moral order in some way by not having ‘accepted Jesus’.  
 
This extract shows how a challenge may be subverted by the target. Here, Ali 
addresses the metadiscourse as a tool to highlight Jayda’s way of talking (the structure of 
talk) rather than engage with the content of her talk. Conversing normally (i.e. taking turns) is 
a pre-requisite for doing discussion and criterial for being reasonable. Doing being reasonable 
is done by attending to a normative turn taking structure, rather than as a request or as a turn-
initial projection (given that the turn does not project any upcoming talk nor is a request fitted 
since Ali is, and has been, talking). Therefore, attending to normative turn-taking practices 
highlights Jayda’s conduct as transgressive in contrast to Ali’s own conduct, which is 
rendered as reasonable by comparison (appealing to ordinary turn-taking). Jayda resists this 
characterisation by treating the turn unambiguously as a request, forcing recipiency and 
providing an alternative to doing ‘talk’ with ‘accepting Jesus’ (you do not need to talk, you 
need to accept Jesus).   
 
The following extract is taken from a UK based radio station in 2014, and previously 
shown in Chapter 4 (extract 6). Here Elizabeth Jones (Liz) (the vice chairperson for a far-
right UK political party (UKIP)) has been invited to debate UKIP’s tax policies. Liz is 
debating with Helen Pattison (Hel) (member of the socialist party) and Mahmood Faze 
(Mah), (liberal democrat). The host is Adam Awedu (Hos). Previously, Liz has outlined the 
merits of UKIP’s proposed tax system, which Helen and Mahmood have opposed. Their 
opposition has been disruptive and has hijacked Liz’s interactional trajectory, to which Liz 
exclaims “will you shut up”; this is unfitted to the ongoing talk, thereby suspending the tax-
talk and inviting others to address the metadiscourse. 
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Extract 3 ‘do not interrupt me’ [14:20-14:44] 
 
01 Liz:  I will discuss wi[th you] 
02 Hos:                   [no no ]= 
03 Hel:  =>I’m not gonna shout< yeah?= 
04 Hos:  =this is the opportunity  
05       for us to explain ourselves. 
06       [so explain- our pro- and tell them-] 
07 Liz:  [yes of course and I will explain my]self  
08       I:F [you be quiet >whilst< >>I] explain myself<< 
09 Hos:      [we did it to a- we are-  ] 
10 Liz:  >DO NOT INTERRUPT ME?< 
11 Hos:  let us- let us 
12 Liz:  [RIGHT] 
13 Hel:  [>ehah]ah< I’ve never been spoken to  
14       so rude in m[y entire life.] 
15 Hos:              [well you so-  ]you so-           ] 
16 Liz:              [WEll good     ]well aren’t you lu]cky  
17       then tonight’s the fi:rst it won’t be the la:st 
18 Hos:  this is- ((boys)) of African radio?= 
 
 
This extract shows the reflexive, and interactionally managed constitution, of reasonableness. 
Here Liz initially highlights some troublesome conduct that has disrupted the interactional 
trajectory; however, she becomes accountable for her own conduct as being disruptive to the 
ongoing activity of ‘radio show’. 
 
 The extract begins with Helen rejecting a problematic attribute for the participants of 
the category device of radio talk show (“I’m not gonna shout”, line 03), which is responsive 
to Liz’s ascription of ‘discussing’ (line 01). Helen treats Liz’s use of ‘discussing’ as 
reflexive: with Liz claiming that she is willing to discuss, it points to a failure of Helen to 
‘discuss’, and so Helen treats it that way and reveals her own willingness to engage in that 
discussion by not shouting. This is displayed in Helen’s uptake, with ‘discussion’ being a 
predicate of the category device ‘radio show’. Helen reflexively renders discussion as doing 
being reasonable with her treatment of ‘discussion’ as inapposite through her rejection of an 
uninvoked attribute of ‘shouting’. Furthermore, the host interjects with an assertion (“this is 
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an opportunity for us to explain ourselves”, line 04), which attends to the relevance of ‘radio 
show’; in addition, he issues an instruction “so explain-” (line 06), which provides a space for 
the following turn to repursue a trajectory that deals with the tax topic rather than addressing 
the metadiscourse. However, the host’s turn is done in overlap with Liz, whose uptake 
affiliates: “yes of course I will explain myself” (line 07). This aligns with her prior doing of 
‘being ordinary’ in this radio show device – that is, acting in accordance with the 
environment’s norms. The “of course” (line 08) problematises the instruction – it looks 
backwards rather than forwards in the sequence. It contests the ‘tellability’ of the host’s turn 
(Stivers & Rossano, 2010), and the presupposition that Liz needs telling or an instruction as 
to what this interaction is an opportunity for. 
 
Liz attaches an if-conditional to her acceptance “if you be quiet whilst I explain 
myself” (line 08), thereby rendering the reason for trouble as the other members: the “you” is 
ambiguously produced to refer to all members and not just the host. There is some 
simultaneous talk, which is attended to by Liz by speeding up her talk and exclaiming “do not 
interrupt me” (line 10). This formulates the others’ talk as breaching conversational norms 
and treats interruption as a member’s issue (Bilmes, 1997; Eglin, 2000). In response to Liz’s 
formulation of their ongoing conduct, Helen renders Liz accountable for her own conduct 
with the extreme case formulation: “I’ve never been spoken to so rude in my entire life” (line 
13), which questions the appropriateness of Liz’s behaviour. 
 
This extract shows how the activity of disputing is managed via the structure of talk 
rather than its content. In this sense, doing being reasonable is a structural concern of talk as 
participants treat one another’s talk as violating conversational norms. Here Liz formulated 
her own conduct, though this invited a reflexive uptake by Helen and the host regarding their 
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own conduct. Following the host’s attempt to formulate ‘the context’ (why they are there) 
and orient to the radio category device and its application, Liz treats the formulation of ‘the 
context’ (the opportunity to discuss) as self-evident, and proposes that she does not need 
telling: it’s the (mis)conduct by the other participants that are preventing her from doing what 
should be done.  
 
The next extract is slightly different: it demonstrates a similar phenomenon where a 
participant addresses their own and the other speaker’s conduct from an earlier sequence in 
order to negotiate who is being ‘ordinary’ and who is violating the local norms – however, in 
this example, though a similar outcome is achieved, it is done without using metatalk.  Here, 
Holly and Pippa are arguing over a seat on the train. Holly has characterised Pippa’s request 
(to move her bag from the seat) as racist, subsequently rejecting that request and calling her 
out for racism. Pippa is surrounded by friends (Jane + Pa4) who interject with support and 
create conversational schisms from the primary dispute between Pippa and Holly. Holly 
works to present the others as being aggressive and pompous – that is, by describing and 
ironicising the conduct of the other interlocutors, Holly presents herself as the target of their 
attacks (and thus they are cast as being unreasonably aggressive toward her). Immediately 
prior to this extract, Pippa has told Holly to calm down, which has occasioned this sequence 
of why ‘calming down’ is an unreasonable request.  The encounter is being filmed by two 
uninvolved passengers (Fi1 and Fi2). 
 
Extract 4 ‘don’t speak to me like that’ 
 
01 Hol:  no you are there is a se’t here there is 
02       many seats on this trai:n you came at me  
03       CLIcking your f[inger tapp]ing your la:p.  
04 Pip:                  [>ok ok<  ] a 
05 Hol:  asking me to move my bag-=  
06 Pip:  =a:t what point- 
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07 Hol:  you don’t speak to me like tha’= 
08 Pip:  =at-  
09 Hol:  I don’t know you you don’t know me,  
10       [you don’t speak to me] like that 
11 Fi1:  [respe-               ] 
12 Pip:  [at what point        ]at what  
13 Jan:  a:lice- 
14 Pip:  *↑nono no no no not ra:cism? 
15 Hol:  *--------gazes down at phone in hand---> 
16 Fi1:  you tell ‘em? 
17 Fi2:  yeah tell ‘↓em 
18 Jan:  she’s a fucking cunt. 
19 Pip:  *n↑ono↑NO no↑t        * what I’m sa↑ying  
20 Hol:  *--looks up from phone* 
21 Pip:  I don’t understand where racism comes: 
22 Jan:  (  )you’re better than her you’re better than her? 
23 Fi1:  ((HOLD Y[OUR own   ])) 
24 Jan:          [Look at he]r fucking shoes ((    )) 
25 Pip:  >no no no< don’t start on tha:t. 
26 Hol:  £oh lhuoho£- oh yeah she’s better than me  
27       look at my shoes what am I wearin’:. look at  
28       yOU what’s in your hai:’ what is in your hair? 
 
This extract displays how some earlier sequence is invoked metadiscursively in the 
accomplishment of positioning oneself as ordinary and reasoned in respect to the other as 
violating some local expectations. Here, Holly presents Pippa’s conduct as unreasonable 
through reporting on that conduct – this renders Pippa (and her friends) as the aggressor, and 
Holly as the victim of their aggression.  
 
The sequence begins with a preface that establishes the basis for Holly’s disagreement 
with her assertion (“there is many seats on this train”, line 02); this is followed by the cause 
of the dispute (“you came at me clicking your finger tapping your lap”, line 03). This turn 
then establishes the grounds to excuse Holly from blame – that she need not have moved her 
bag in the first place as there were many seats available; moreover, it presents Pippa’s 
conduct as the source of the dispute (“clicking your finger tapping your lap”) – it is her 
conduct which is to blame, and not anything that Holly has done. Holly’s talk is delivered as 
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an extended turn, which restricts the space for Pippa to take a turn-at-talk without interrupting 
or overlapping Holly (though Pippa does make attempts to take a turn at relevant places).  
 
Holly is pursuing a trajectory that blames the other speakers and is hearably defending 
herself against their reported insults (“you don’t speak to me like tha’”, line 07) – again, 
presenting their conduct as inappropriate. This is while Pippa pursues a trajectory that rejects 
an earlier characterisation of herself and her friends as racist: “no no no not racist” (line 14); 
however, the rejection does not receive explicit uptake from Holly, who is instead 
disattending whilst looking at her phone. Meanwhile there is some commentary from Pippa’s 
friend (Jane) and the camera operators (Fi1 and Fi2), who oppose Pippa’s attempt at rejecting 
the earlier racism accusation and stoke the dispute: “tell ‘em” (line 16), “she’s a fucking 
cunt” (line 18), “you’re better than her” (line 22). This stoking is perhaps responsive to Holly 
positioning herself as the victim as it calls her out for also being disputative.  
 
It is not until line 24 where Jane does “look at her fucking shoes” – which provides an 
observation of Holly’s appearance that is hearable as mocking – that Holly responds. There is 
already some orientation to Jane’s turn being problematic by Pippa “>no no no< don’t start 
on that” (line 25), which appeals to remedying the dispute through disavowing her co-
member’s turn by casting it as reprehensible. Holly’s uptake of Jane’s turn provides an 
interpretation through self-depreciation, “oh yeah she’s better than me” (line 26), that 
sarcastically goes along with the mocking. In this environment an affiliative turn transgresses 
local expectations, thus the self-deprecation is rendered ironic, and highlights the insult that 
has been levied against Holly (particularly with the increment “oh yeah she’s better than me” 
in line 26). Crucially, by faux-accepting Jane’s insult (and not going meta), “she’s better than 
me” also presents Jane as being the aggressor: though this does not directly speak to Jane’s 
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behaviour, it does speak to Jane’s character (and her alleged pomposity). Holly’s presentation 
of Jane, and her conduct, displays an orientation to herself as the target/victim, which may be 
drawn upon as a resource to portray Pippa and her friends as violating local expectations (i.e. 
they’re the aggressive, pompous people in this interaction).  
 
The three extracts in this section display how members present the conduct of the 
other speaker in order to render themselves as ‘reasonable’, and acting in accordance with 
local expectations. A dispute disrupts the orderliness of those local contexts, thus 
‘orderliness’ may be easily deployed as a challenge with minimal management, unlike other 
challenges that are managed through preface work. Presenting the other’s conduct as 
unordinary (or unreasonable) occurs through metadisursively producing a report or 
observation of some earlier point in the dispute that casts the other as violating the local 
expectations, which renders them as the aggressor or cause of the dispute. This reflexively 
casts the speaker as ‘ordinary’, invoking the relativity of categories (Sacks, 1995) whereby 
the speaker is seen as belonging to a category with respect to their co, or cross-members. 
More to this, as the meta-talk observes some trouble with the prior turn(s), it does so in a way 
which attends to the structure of talk. This goes ‘outside of the talk’ and so the 
metadiscursive turn does not directly address the prior turn (possibly averting some 
challenge) but addresses the audience as speaking ‘for the good of society/norm etc.’. In this 
sense, meta-talk is not just about the interaction but larger social norms to which the 
participants are attending. Consequently, this neatly packages the casting of the other speaker 
as unreasonable, evades the prior turn and puts the onus on the other speaker to account or 
reject the metadiscursive turn.  
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5.1.2 Presenting one’s own conduct as reasonable 
 
This collection regards how participants in disputes promote their own conduct as 
unobjectionable to recast the other’s conduct as objectionable. Here then, it is not that the 
members are objecting to conduct, but rather that they are attending to their own conduct as 
non-violative of a common-sense moral order. Like the prior extracts, this reflexively 
understands one’s own action as ordinary to recast the other’s objection as unwarranted. The 
two lines of action (depicting one’s own conduct, and depicting another’s conduct) tend to go 
hand in hand – as such, for each extract presented in this section, I will detail the core 
practices and how these relate to the presentation of conduct. The analysis here will show two 
things: (1) how a promotion of one’s own conduct recasts the other’s objection as 
unwarranted, and (2) the attending to a normative sequential and/or moral order to subvert the 
other’s disruption. The first two extracts will reveal how participants attend to a normative 
sequential order, and the latter two extracts will reveal how participants attend to a normative 
moral order.  
 
This following extract takes place on the London underground. Chad (who is wearing 
a bright red suit) is exclaiming that Trudy is racist, characterising some prior action (a request 
to move) as being done because of his race. Trudy is rejecting this understanding, instead 
accusing him of bumping into her. Neatly, this extract also contains rebuttals which present 
another’s conduct (section 5.1.1) as troublesome. Immediately prior to this extract Trudy has 
stated that she does not have a problem with “you guys” and that she is not racist as she has 
“black friends”; Chad rejects this assertion and begins to challenge the action of which he has 
been accused.  
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Extract 5 ‘why are you shouting’ [00:20-00:37] 
 
01 Cha:  I WOULD HAVE bumped into you when I was THEre  
02       how is that possible this is what  
03       ((demarcates us))  
04       [this is what ((demarcates] us?)) 
05 Tru:  [and why are you shouting?] and  
06        wh[y are you shouting?] 
07 Cha:     [cause I don’t even ]  
08       know you you just started on ME? 
09 Tru:  I said [politely (.) pl:ea::se move.          
08 Cha:         [I mind my own business Im not a violent  
09       person am I dressed like a vi[olent >>person.<<  
10 Tru:                               [you are very  
11       aggressive obviously? 
 
This extract demonstrates the sequential position and moral work accomplished through 
promoting one’s own conduct; here Trudy rebuts a challenge with a promotion of her 
conduct, thereby veiling herself with ‘ordinariness’ through tarnishing Chad with a 
description of actions inapposite to her ordinariness.  
 
 This extract begins with a renegotiation of the terms Trudy is challenging (“I was 
there how is that possible”, line 02) to invalidate her claim. Trudy receipts Chad’s prompted 
revision with a highlighting of his conduct (“and why are you shouting”, line 05); this is the 
first move by Trudy to attend to some ordinary conduct, in that ‘shouting’ is treated as a 
marked activity, thereby rendering her as in accordance with doing ordinary conduct. In 
addressing the metadiscourse, this crafts her turn as not directly responsive to the prior 
(though it does formulate the prior turn in terms of the nature of its delivery). 
 
  Chad attends to Trudy’s turn by providing a second fitted response to rebut her 
presentation of self (“I don’t even know you”, line 07). Chad continues with his turn (“you 
just started on me”, line 08) that shifts the trajectory to readdress the topic of ‘who caused the 
offence’ to resist Trudy’s highlighting of ordinariness. Trudy’s uptake of this shifted 
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trajectory reports her speech as evidence (“I said politely (.) please move”, line 09) for her 
ordinariness to counter the inference from Chad’s “you just started on me” so as to re-
describe her action as unproblematic. This turn promotes Trudy’s conduct as unnoteworthy: 
“I said politely” with evidence “please move” does not dismiss Chad’s claim that Trudy 
“started on me,” but renders Chad as accountable for his response through metadiscursively 
pointing at his conduct. Though this turn is produced in overlap with Chad, there is an 
orientation in his treatment of Trudy’s prior turns – “I’m not a violent person” (line 08) – 
which responds to Trudy’s presentation of his conduct by denying a specific attribute which 
has, thus far, been implicit (Stokoe, 2010).   
 
Chad’s response to Trudy’s presentation of his conduct is done as two TCUs: the first, 
“I mind my own business” (line 08), is produced completely in overlap at a non-TRP and 
does the business of attending to the local expectations (on public transport, attending to 
others’ business is violative). The second TCU, “I’m not a violent person” (line 08) then, 
upgrades the prior TCU but occurs at a possible TRP following “I said politely” and speaks 
to the interpretation of his conduct being produced by Trudy. Chad’s turn concludes with an 
incremental question “am I dressed like a violent person” (line 09) to which Trudy responds 
with a redescription “you are very aggressive obviously” (lines 10-11) that counters Chad’s 
claim of non-violence. This solves the problem of answering Chad’s question – that is, 
wearing a bright red suit is treated as a non-violent attribute, therefore the fitted response is 
‘yes’, which would suspend the presupposition that Chad’s conduct is non-ordinary; thus 
Trudy’s solution is to answer by revising the terms of his claim. 
 
In the continuation of the prior extract we can observe the tussle between interactional 
trajectories and their addressees. In the first instance Trudy moves to address the 
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metadiscourse to rebut Chad’s invalidation of her claims; this garners a multi-TCU turn that 
pivots from treating her turn as a first to readdress the dispute topic. Trudy’s promotion of her 
own conduct avows ‘ordinariness’ through treating it as unnoteworthy, rendering Chad’s 
response as the ‘arguable’ (Maynard, 1985a), which tarnishes him with a category of non-
ordinary actions. The upshot is that Chad attends to this non-ordinary category of actions as 
‘violent’ and rejects that ascription in a way that creates a problem for Trudy.  
 
Extract 6 ‘who ask you politely’ [00:40-00:58] 
 
01 Cha:  I don’t have to speak to you man you ((depress))  
02       [sorry] 
03 Tru:  [yeah ] you said and the- then start (.) 
04       [shouting yeah         ] 
05 Cha:  [mind your business man] I don’t want to speak to  
06       you I don’t even know why I- (.) come sit- stand  
07       be-beside man (.) why should I even see you  
08       today I don’t even want to see you today I don’t 
09       even want to see people like you when I come 
10       out of my house I fuck with at  
11       [I see people ((bu]nch of people)) 
12 Tru:  [people like me?  ] Who ask you politely? 
 
This extract sequentially follows extract 5 where the dispute continues. Chad asserts his 
ability to disengage with Trudy “I don’t have to speak to you” (line 01), which reinforces his 
prior assertation (“I mind my own business”, extract 3, line 08); this turn places its outcome 
as independent from Trudy’s actions and tied to local expectations. Moreover, this turn 
pursues a particular trajectory that crafts Chad as independent from Trudy in the sense that it 
positions Trudy as the aggressor whilst continuing the argument. Trudy receipts Chad’s turn 
(“yeah you said”, line 03) as known, and counters his inference by reciprocating with a tit-
for-tat formulation (Mandelbaum, 2003) that pushes back against the implication that Trudy 
is responsible for the dispute (“and then start shouting”). Chad reformulates his point to 
“don’t want to speak to you” (line 05) from “don’t have to speak to you” (line 01), which 
deals with Trudy’s counter by invoking his own personal feelings rather than local 
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expectations of public conversations. This turn is followed by two increments: (1) “I don’t 
even know why I come sit- stand beside”, and (2) “why should I even see you today”, which 
claim innocence and position Trudy as the aggressor.  
 
Chad displays his acting as an ordinary public transport user (that being in any other 
location would be unproblematic), thus positions Trudy as having caused the dispute. 
Furthermore, Chad ambiguously and reflexively infers a category “people like you” (line 09) 
for Trudy which is inapposite to his own ‘ordinary’ category through his doing of ordinary 
activities, e.g., “when I come out of my house” (lines 09-10). The ambiguous production is 
defensible against any direct denial of a category, though its strength is also its weakness in 
that its uptake can be “people like me? who ask you politely” (line 12). The repeat of “people 
like you/me” points to the unit of talk being dealt with by “who ask you politely”; Trudy 
resists the inference of some non-ordinary category ascription. This pushes back against 
Chad’s inferential work to characterise Trudy as the aggressor by providing a reinterpretation 
of her actions to highlight an incongruous (and perhaps illegitimate) claim made by Chad.   
 
 In this extract, the two speakers negotiate an understanding of one another by 
managing their own morality. Chad pursues a trajectory which frames his actions and talk as 
being ordinary, everyday, and thus unproblematic, and positions Trudy as the problem. Trudy 
reciprocates Chad’s framing by resisting the inferential work that casts her as the cause and 
acting as ‘un-ordinary’ as relative to Chad’s ordinariness and the local expectations of their 
environment. For both Chad and Trudy, being ‘ordinary’, or at least providing an 
interpretation of their own actions as ordinary, serves to progress the argument whilst 
blaming the other in a way that does not require the explicit use of any category that may 
cause a trouble, instead relying on violations of this environment’s (public transport) local 
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expectations.  
 
The following extract is taken from a radio call-in by a self-identified Muslim parent 
to LBC, a UK radio station. He is discussing segregating boys and girls in UK schools with 
the host, James, and how this may be reconciled with his own Islamic culture. The host is 
questioning his views as being incongruous with western culture and values. This extract is 
not about violations in turn-taking or sequence, but metatalk about how people ought to act in 
certain environments – that is, how the participants negotiate what is acceptable conduct for 
who they are, and what they are doing. Immediately prior, they have been discussing Cal’s 
answer to “why do you think boys and girls should be kept apart”, which the host disagrees 
with on that basis that it is discriminatory.  
 
Extract 7 ‘you’ve misanswered it twice’ 
 
01 Hos:  d’hey hey hey d-no you need to understand  
02       what my question is because you'v- you’ve  
03       misanswered it twice? .hh why do you personally  
04       think it's a good idea (0.3) or even perhaps  
05       important to keep nine year old boys separate from  
06       nine year old girl. .h  
07 Cal:  James. you might not like my answer (0.2)  
08       but that is the a:nswer (.) you might not  
09       agree with it but it’s  
10       t[he °answer°.    ] 
11 Hos:   [but then its dis]crimination.  
12 Cal:  no n- according to you:r spin on it [°you migh-°] 
13 Hos:                                      [ no no not ]  
14       at all y-you’re saying that boys and girls must  
15       be kept separate because it >says so in a  
16       religious book< that's the >definition of  
17       discrimination< 
 
This extract shows how the target (Cal) can resist the host’s attempt to challenge his answer 
on the basis that the original answer was incorrect. That is, how Cal progresses his own 
trajectory and promotes his own views and beliefs in response to a direct challenge; this 
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extract demonstrates the moral work done to privilege a perspective whilst playing down an 
alternate understanding. Cal and the host are engaged in metadiscursive talk whereby their 
talk attends to some earlier sequence, with their dispute arising as a consequence of some 
trouble in that earlier sequence.   
 
Lines 01-06 show the host’s presents Cal’s answer as insufficient, with the host 
soliciting a specific ‘personal’ answer to the question of why Cal believes girls and boys 
should be segregated in UK schools. This appears to be an attempt to challenge Cal’s 
religious beliefs, given that he has answered this question in accordance with what it states in 
the Quran. Cal’s response begins with a disclaimer (“you might not like my answer (.) but 
that is the answer”, line 01); this turn is designed as two parts to first scrutinise the host’s 
understanding (“you might not like my answer”), which privileges his own perspective and 
trades on the local environment where espousing views is ordinary – and that the host should 
not attempt to change his answer, but by doing so “according to your spin” (line 12), the host 
is acting unreasonably. This gets upgraded with “but that is the answer”, which promotes his 
answer as unambiguously sufficient, dismissing the host’s trouble (“you may not like”) 
through not providing an explanation or repair. Cal reformulates his prior TCU (“you might 
not agree with it but it’s the answer”, lines 02-03) that places ‘agreeing’ as an unrequired 
second to pre-empt any push back by the host. It also reaffirms his dismissal, though the host 
interrupts with “but then it’s discrimination” (line 11), managed by the “but” which connects 
this with Cal’s “you might not agree with it but” as a consequence (and hedged accusation). 
The accusation of discrimination is produced as a possible understanding of Cal’s answer but 
is open to revision depending on whether Cal changes his answer, thus managing the 
potential for outright denial of the accusation. Cal pursues his earlier turn by attending to the 
host’s interpretation of the answer being discriminatory as “according to your spin on it” (line 
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12); this calls out the host’s agenda by putting on the record the host’s attempts to subvert his 
answer. The calling out receives an immediate rejection (“no no not at all”, lines 13-14) with 
a pivot to reorient the talk to the host’s trajectory with the preface of Cal’s prior talk: “you’re 
saying that” + a challenge arising from his prior talk: “definition of discrimination”. 
 
The extract displays how participants manage metadiscursive talk: through remaining 
‘on-topic’ but referring to some earlier sequence, it permits certain challenges against the 
individual’s character that would otherwise be unfitted. In this extract the host identifies a 
trouble with Cal’s earlier answer (that he has not provided a fitted one), but rather than 
provide a correction or explanation to remedy that trouble, Cal pursues a trajectory that 
rejects the existence of the trouble for him. We can see then that privileging or presenting a 
perspective in a way that is tied to in-situ membership (that Cal, as caller, has the rights to 
provide an answer) affords opportunities to call out others not orienting to their memberships. 
In this extract then, both of the interlocutors are engaged in talk about talk – namely, what 
counts as an answer. They both make attempts to characterise one another’s conduct as 
troublesome in some way (“your spin on it” and “you need to understand what my question is 
because you’v- you’ve misanswered it twice”); each is appealing to reasonable conduct for 
their category (i.e. as radio host, they should not change a host’s answer, and as host, they 
should provide fitted answers to questions).  
 
This next extract follows extracts 4 and 5 where Holly and Pippa have been arguing 
over a train seat. Pippa’s remedial efforts in the previous extracts to support some de-
escalation between Holly and Pippa’s friends have not worked. In this extract the dispute 
continues between Holly, and Pippa’s friend: Jane. Though not shown in the recording, the 
context indicates that Jane has been the primary escalator of the dispute thus far. Herein, 
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Holly presents her own conduct as that of the victim, and herself as the target of Jane who is 
violating the moral order by acting inappropriately by being hostile (despite being in a 
dispute). This extract blurs the line between the two sections (like extracts 4 and 5) whereby 
the presentation of Holly’s own conduct has ramifications for how Jane is understood. 
Immediately prior to this extract Holly has been accusing Pippa and her friends of believing 
in racial stereotypes. 
 
Extract 8 ‘shut up before I hit you’ 
 
01 Hol: ((you this)) you’re showing yourself  
02      you’re so cla:ss:y well done I work  
03      for gu[ugle I have a job,] 
04 Jan:       [je:::sus  oh my   ]god.  
05      you can >write a fucking news article< o↑h m↑y g↑od 
06      [shit] th[at (hurt) me since I was fucking eighteen] 
07 Hol: [ye:s]   [and you work for google you can use a    ] 
08      computer Yeah? you’re such a classy woman. 
09      (.) look at you [work f’r] google? 
10 Pip:                 [>nonono<] 
11 Hol:  don’t you look so  
12         cla[ssy don’t you look so classy ] 
13 Jan:     [>do you want a fucking punch<] 
14 Hol:  don’[t you look so classy] 
15 Jan:  SHU↑T THE FU↑CK UP BEFORE I FU↑CKING HIT YOU? 
16 Hol:  {V!}COME ON TH[E>N{V!} COME ON (.) COME ON] 
17 Pip:                [no no NO   NO NO           ] 
18 Hol:  FU↓CKING HIT ME THEN Y[OU C]UNT? 
19 Pip:                        [NO: ] 
20 Hol:  {V!}CO↓ME ON TH[EN WHA- ] 
21 Pip:                 [Leave it]leave i[t leave it     ] 
22 Hol:                                  [no don’t ta:lk.]  
23      if you wanna hit me hit me bitch  
24      I’m here (.) I’m HEre?   
 
In line 1, Holly does sarcasm by producing a description (“you’re so classy”), which is 
ironicised (Edwards, 2005) as Jane’s talk is in opposition to the attributes of ‘classy’; this is 
done four times (lines 02, 08, 12 and 14). In the second instance (line 7) (“you’re such a 
classy woman”) the description gets done with a marker of gender, which displays a 
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specification of the description and makes explicit the inference of ‘classy’ being a gendered 
term. Holly also does a repetition of Jane’s talk (“I work for google”, line 03), upgraded with 
“I have a job”; here Holly, by repeating Jane, draws attention to the turn which gets designed 
to display a problem insofar as Jane has positioned themselves as better than Holly, which 
makes relevant Holly’s invoking of racism. In response to Holly, Jane produces an 
exclamation of disbelief (“oh my god”, line 04) and the possibly ironic: “you can write a 
fucking news article” (line 05). Holly produces her next turn in overlap with Jane, to do a 
riposte to orient to Jane’s disregard of ‘google’ (“and you work for google”, line 07) and 
feign amazement at her skills (“you can use a computer”, line 08). This feigned amazement 
by Holly serves to resist Jane’s diminishing as it offers a retort to Jane’s comment (“write a 
fucking news article”) with “and you work for google”. Holly continues with further mocking 
(lines 08-12) and, produced in overlap, Pippa uses a repeated saying to attempt to stop the 
course of action (“nonono”). This repeated ‘no’, immediately, and straightforwardly seeks a 
stop to the current in-progress action (see Stivers, 2004).  
 
 In orienting to Holly’s talk, Jane produces a high entitlement request with a threat 
(“shut the fuck up before I fucking hit you”), and like in the previous fragments, Holly 
responds with a similar turn (“come on then come on (.) come on fucking hit me then you 
cunt”). This turn aligns with Jane, insofar as doing goading/threatening goes along with the 
proposed activity of threatening/hitting. Jane becomes an incumbent of ‘disputers’ as 
produced on the basis of the threat. Consequently, any responsive turn by Holly would be 
non-compliant with Jane’s threat and thus display a congruent stance toward the proposed 
activity (hitting); as such, Holly’s continuation in line 23 “if you wanna hit me hit me bitch” 
does not counter but incites the proposed activity. Jane’s threat hinges on the demand ‘shut 
up’, for which a compliant response would be no response – however, by taking a turn Holly 
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is able to reasonably incite Jane and cast her as the aggressor. In this case, by attending to the 
structure of talk, Holly is able to provide a fitted, non-compliant response and cast Jane as 
disputative.    
 
In this example, we can see the local norms of arguments being displayed with Jane 
producing a high entitlement request and Pippa producing multiple sayings of ‘no’ to halt the 
course of action in progress as the dispute escalates across these high contingency turns. 
Across her turns, Holly deals with Jane’s threats by highlighting Jane’s conduct as hostile – 
and as “not classy”; indeed, this can be claimed as ‘highlighting’ here as the claim of 
classiness is ironicised i.e. “don’t you look classy” means that Jane is not acting with the 
attributes of someone who is actually classy. This works to present Jane’s conduct as 
violating the moral order – by acting hostile (despite being in a dispute), Jane is sanctioned 
for being the aggressor. Consequently, Holly utilises the structural organisation of talk in 
order to incite Jane and present her conduct as hostile, and thus transgressive of ordinary, 
everyday conduct.  
 
These extracts have shown how a speaker may promote their own conduct as orderly, 
in contrast to the prior extracts where the other speaker’s conduct is promoted as disorderly. 
Like the previous section, however, by presenting one’s own conduct as reasonable and 
ordered, it reflexively casts the other interlocutor(s) as not being reasonable or orderly. This 
way of explicitly doing being ordinary marks the others speaker’s conduct in some inferential 
way as non-ordinary in the dispute. Moreover, this collection shows how the speaker may 
subvert the other’s challenges through the attendance to the everyday ordinary (normative) 
expectations of how one ought to behave in public. Presenting one’s own conduct as ordinary 
(and reasonable) is achieved through metadiscursively producing a report or observation of 
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some earlier point in the dispute. This mobilises ‘ordinary’ as a relevant category for the 
speaker, rendering them as attending to local expectations – that is, their behaviour does not 
violate or breach norms, and is orderly (in the sense that their turn ostensibly progresses the 
talk), despite their engagement in the dispute. This reflexively casts the other as the aggressor 
and cause of that dispute. Speaking to the structure of the dispute (and the overhearing 
audience) is a useful way of pushing back against the other speaker – it attends to some social 
norms of how people ought to behave (e.g. politely) and thus casts the other as transgressive. 
Consequently, invoking this moral order accomplishes what the first section described: a turn 
which does not directly respond to the prior and is difficult to respond to as it does not 
directly address the other disputer.  
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
This analytic chapter has employed a primarily Discursive Psychological approach to outline 
two ways that participants in disputes manage subjectivity in attending to some 
(un)reasonable behaviour. These two ways are: (1) presenting one’s own conduct reasonable, 
and (2) presenting an other’s conduct unreasonable. I began this chapter by showing 
examples of explicit orientations to reasonable in talk, in which concrete descriptions of 
‘reasonable’ are used to concede and point backwards to some problem in the talk. These 
stand relative to the examples shown throughout this thesis where ‘reasonable’ is not 
explicitly used, but rather invoked as a moral category to which participants belong. 
Participants (re)work witnessable conduct to sustain (un)reasonableness and provide a 
rational account for that conduct (see Clarke, Kitzinger & Potter (2004) on normalising 
accounts). 
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Presenting another’s conduct as unreasonable has a similar force where the speaker 
points to some violative or breaching behaviour by the other participant(s) in order to cast 
them as being non-ordinary (or unreasonable) – this reflexively casts the speaker with the 
rights to do this reporting and thus renders them as doing being ordinary. Throughout my 
collection this appears to be exclusively used to bring off a challenge and pursue the 
challenger’s agenda. Extract 2 showed how Ali attended to the structural organisation of the 
talk in order to present Jayda’s conduct as transgressing ‘normal’ expectations of 
conversation. Similarly, in the following extracts (3 and 4), going metadiscursive and 
attending to that structure highlights a failure of the other speaker to turn-take in a reasonable 
way. These extracts demonstrate a members’ practice – not to cease the dispute – to achieve 
an uninterrupted turn-at-talk. Consequently, in disputes, despite their disruptive nature, 
participants orient to their turns at talk as momentary ‘wins’ as they (1) return the talk to 
some ‘normal’ structure, and (2) allow the speaker to pursue their trajectory.  
 
Presenting one’s own conduct gets brought off to cast the speaker as acting in 
accordance with the local expectations: in doing this it reflexively casts the other as the 
aggressor and as not acting in accordance with local expectations. Going meta, and ‘outside 
of the talk’ is a lay-analysis of the conversation by members and is a practice which attends 
to the structure of a dispute rather than its content. In this sense, by attending to the structure 
of a dispute, the speaker is able to attain a turn-at-talk to craft the(ir) moral order to which the 
other speaker(s) is accountable. Extract 5, 6 and 7 showed how a speaker describes their prior 
talk as being unproblematically done; these backward-looking turns do not directly address 
the prior turn but do formulate it by the nature of its delivery. Extract 8 showed a similar 
feature but that gets accomplished so that a speaker can reasonably incite the other. 
Consequently, responding in this metadiscursive way to present one’s own prior conduct 
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disrupts the sequence to launch a new sequence that is contingent on the prior, yet 
independent from it.   
 
Across all of the extracts presented, the two lines of action (depicting oneself, and 
depicting another) are interlinked and co-occur. Moreover, each extract where metatalk is 
produced largely regards two components: the sequential organisation of talk (i.e. not 
answering the question), and the moral order (i.e. acting inappropriately for the environment). 
Indeed, this chapter could have been divided along those lines, but that would miss the 
nuance of what the outcome of the work – sequential, or moral – has. In the first section, by 
presenting another’s conduct as unreasonable in some way, it allows a sequential position 
which is responsive to the prior turn, but does not directly address that turn. In the second 
section, by presenting one’s own conduct as reasonable, it can subvert a negative assertion 
(on the basis of its applicability). Discursive Psychology has a long tradition of examining 
how speakers attend to their notion of ‘the world’ and the(ir) moral order grounded in the 
witnessable here-and-now. Indeed, Edwards (2007) discusses how the reworker of the 
discourse displays their disposition to see the ordinary and assume ordinary explanations. For 
example, Potter and Wetherell (1988) examine how people work to not be seen as racist, but 
more importantly, elaborating the relationship between the individual and the ‘world’. This 
contributes to Discursive Psychology through reiterating and adding to the work that shows 
how individuals work to be seen in a way that is conducive to their agenda.  
 
This chapter has examined two ways that speakers produce themselves as reasonable 
and as being rationally accountable. Through deploying metadiscursive talk to focus on the 
structure of the dispute rather than the content, it affords speakers a turn that (1) allows them 
to pursue their own trajectory, and (2) be ostensibly aligned/affiliated with the other 
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speaker’s activity/stance yet resist the specific challenge of their turn. Being rationally 
accountable is a practical accomplishment that is reflected in and through talk-in-interaction. 
As Edwards (2007, p.47) explains: “there are special arenas of social life where doubt and 
dispute, or motivated bases of saying things, are themes endemic to the setting”. In disputes, 
the talk reflects a sensitivity to rational accountability in the there-and-then of witnessing and 
the here-and-now of its telling. Indeed, despite the ‘special arena’ status of the dispute, being 
reasonable and rational operate as pervasive across contexts as speakers contend to be 
ordinary (Garfinkel, 1967) – disputing, like most interactional activities, is governed by those 
disputing with respect to a normative sequential order (i.e. taking turns one at a time). People 
cannot escape the social fabric of everyday life – cooperating in interaction (even through 
disagreements) is treated as favourable (at least, for the purposes of encouraging further 
disagreement). This chapter has served to outline one of the key findings of this thesis: how 
speakers treat the structural organisation of a dispute rather than the content of turns. I will 
explore this further in the discussion (Chapter 6).  
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Chapter 6: 
Discussion 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
This thesis makes an original contribution to work on dispute research across disciplines, 
particularly in psychology. I used an empirically-grounded interactional approach to study 
how people behave in disputes, without relying on what participants think they do in disputes 
(cf. Chun & Choi, 2014; Overall et al., 2011). Specifically, this original research (1) provides 
an empirically-grounded and interactionally-focused examination of disputes, (2) showcases 
a methodological framework for combining ethnomethodological approaches, and (3) 
investigates how people produce their moral and social order in public. Throughout this 
thesis I discussed the sequential and moral orders of public disputes by identifying and 
analysing interactional and relational features involved in their production and organisation.  
The guiding questions for this thesis were as follows: 
(1) What resources are strangers afforded in a dispute? (Chapter 3).  
(2) What are members’ practices for doing resistance in disputes? (Chapter 5).  
(3) What are the categorial implications of disputing? (Chapter 4 and 5).  
(4) How is the relationship between participants (re)configured during a dispute? 
(Chapter 4).  
 
I found that people employ a variety of intrinsic and extrinsic resources to the 
interaction, from negotiating category membership to recruiting other participants to talking 
about the dispute. I revealed that resistance occurs when a response is given which does not 
structurally align and/or relationally affiliate with the prior turn(s); moreover, the findings 
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indicate that the inference-rich nature of categories/devices are a feature of / offer resources 
in disputes. I also found that speakers strategically reconfigure their relationship with their 
co-disputants through category work in order to manufacture a logical, or moral incongruity 
with their behaviour. 
 
 As outlined in the literature review, there has been little attention paid to public 
disputes of this nature (strangers arguing in public spaces), and even less examining 
interactional features in these environments. As such, there is a need for more (interactional) 
research that is reflective of what actually happens in public disputes. More precisely, it 
contributes by examining and developing very specific and underexplored practices 
(partitioning, doing being reasonable, and resisting enticers) that have a limited literature and 
have not been examined extensively. I bring together conversation analytic work on disputes 
across contexts to demonstrate the patterns of behaviour which are endemic, not to those 
environments, but to the activity of disputing. Therefore, this thesis shows how categories, 
sequence and morality are related to update (and correct) prior research on disputes. In this 
chapter I summarise my findings so to provide a description of the sequential organisation of 
particular interactional features of public disputes. I will then discuss how these findings 
interconnect before considering the implications of my findings for work on morality, 
sequence, categories, accounting and disputes in the wider literature. I will then reflect on 
some limitations of this thesis, before finally exploring future avenues for research and 
dissemination. 
 
6.1 Summary of thesis 
 
 
The analytic chapters provide a sequential and categorial analysis of an array of public 
disputes. These disputes are characterised by some initial infringing behaviour/thought (and 
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possibly further infractions) and can be considered as ‘first encounters’ (Pillet-Shore, 2018), 
with participants having never spoken prior to this dispute. The research gave unique insights 
into a relatively under-researched area of public life. This is because it is only in recent years 
that such data has been accessible – one cannot set out to go and collect naturally-occurring 
public disputes without a raft of logistical and ethical issues to deal with. It has only been 
since the popularisation of internet videos (particularly on YouTube since 2005) and the 
prevalence of mobile recording devices that these moments of public life can be captured and 
publicised.  
 
 The phenomena identified (blocking access to a third turn, partitioning, and doing 
being reasonable) were investigated through how they are done in disputative talk. In each 
chapter, I showcased 10-11 extracts that detailed the sequential, categorial, moral, and 
relational features that achieve the outcomes of investigation (e.g. what steps are taken to 
block access to a third turn, or how do people divide the social world). Though every case is 
unique (in that, no interaction is ever the same), I demonstrated the systematic patterns of 
people’s conduct which lead to those outcomes. For instance, one outcome is that an 
ostensibly straightforward question in a disputative environment (irrespective of the local 
environment) will receive resistance, and that resistance can take two forms: weak, or strong. 
In that analysis, I highlighted how these different forms of resistance forestall progressivity in 
different ways, but they achieve the same outcome (that a third turn is blocked).  
 
 Most conversation analytic research on disputes largely considered them in particular 
environments (see Komter, 1991; Pillet-Shore, 2016; Pomerantz & Sanders, 2013; 
Vuchinich, 1990), as activities which help develop social skills (David, Rawls & Trainum, 
2017), as matters to be resolved (Greatbach & Dingwall, 1997), or as the interactional moves 
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through which disputes begin (Coulter, 1990; Maynard, 1985a) or end (Church, 2009). 
Consequently, as I outlined in the literature review, there is work which focuses on 
categories, relationships and social interaction but does not necessarily foreground ‘disputes’ 
(but perhaps discusses them) – indeed, this thesis adds to that work but foregrounds disputes 
as the focus of investigation and more generally, highlights that we need know more about 
the interactional practices within disputes and how these shape and are shaped by relational 
issues.  
 
6.1.1 Chapter 3: Resisting a normative challenge 
 
 
In the first analytic chapter, I offer a novel examination of how participants prevent their 
position being challenged and evade social control. I investigated the suppression of 
challenges during disputes in talk-in-interaction. The findings contribute to our understanding 
of resistance in disputes, and offer insights into the ways that people manufacture obstacles in 
response to challenges. This has potentially important implications for showing how people 
can demonstrably resist or challenge views (e.g. how to ‘just say no’, or how to confront 
prejudice). This chapter developed Reynolds’ (2011; 2015) and Reber’s (2019) work on 
enticers. I investigated resistance within challenge sequences, showing the forms that 
resistance to a person’s position/point/agenda may take. I showed the challenger’s 
perspective whereby the manufacturing of a challenge controls the direction of talk and thus 
constitutes a local victory by influencing the trajectory of the dispute. However, the findings 
revealed that the influence of the trajectory may be short lived as the target may contest or 
push back against the producibility of the challenge at points where some other response has 
been made relevant (which somewhat ratifies it as a challenge). At those early points the 
resistance can be active to straightforwardly and unambiguously reject the challenger’s 
trajectory to suspend the ongoing activity; resistance may also be passive where the target 
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aligns by answering, but exhibits some problem with the prior turn(s) through pushing back 
against the trajectory. What people do in disputes can be seen to be furthering their agenda or 
resisting the other speaker’s agenda. Indeed, Stivers and Hayashi (2010), discuss how 
questions can set the agenda and answers which transform that agenda are “the least 
cooperative form of transformation, since what question recipients provide as a response is 
furthest removed from the question posed to them” (p.21-22). As such, this chapter 
contributes to work on question-response systems (see Heritage & Raymond, 2012; Stivers & 
Hayashi, 2010) and goes some way to explore the terrain of question responses that fall 
between the prototypical (yes/no) and non-answers (“I don’t know”). 
 
 The three sections in this chapter correspond with the three ways that resistance can 
occur in response to a challenge. The first section demonstrated how a target aligns with the 
challenge yet treats the challenge as a trouble – in this case the resistance did not stall the 
challenge trajectory but did speak to how the target pushes back in their answer. The second 
section showed how resistance may be built throughout the sequence. In these extracts the 
findings illustrated the various forms of resistance and the outcomes of that resistance. I 
explored how participants may begin with passive forms of resistance which do not suspend 
the trajectory, allowing the challenger to pursue their challenge, but that the target may build 
on this earlier resistance to then outrightly resist against the challenge once that challenge has 
been availed in the talk. The final section displayed the most outright rejection of the 
challenge; the final extract in particular showed how a target may reverse the challenge at 
that earliest possible point to control the direction of talk and hold the challenger  accountable 
for asking the question in the first instance.  
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 The analysis contributes to existing research to show that resistance does not always 
disrupt the interactional trajectory of a speaker (see Muntigl et al., 2013; Stivers & Robinson, 
2006) and may indeed be passively produced, though not in Dooley et al.’s (2018) sense of 
minimal responses – rather as contestations against the challenge. Gibson’s (in prep) 
understanding of resistance as disobedience does not fully capture the range of forms and 
functions that resistance has. It may lead to non-compliance (see Kent, 2012), but at those 
early points, it is a display of unwillingness to cooperate with the challenge by highlighting a 
problem with that challenging turn which pushes back against the direction of the talk in 
those moments. Consequently, the challenger may abandon their challenge or pursue the 
challenge and deal with the contingencies that the resistance has crafted. In disputes, 
resistance offers a way of responding to a turn to display a participant’s adversarial stance 
toward the other without stalling the progress of dispute. 
 
6.1.2 Chapter 4: Partitioning: Exploiting Category Boundaries 
 
 
In the second analytic chapter, I produced a novel analysis of how divisions are cemented in 
and through talk-in-interaction through how members negotiate their relationship. I 
investigated how people introduce alternate understandings of themselves and the local 
environment in the service of producing an action. Specifically, I examined the relationship 
work which occurs in and through disputes, focusing on the participants’ relationship in 
terms of how the dispute and the actions being produced are organised. I employed a 
primarily membership categorisation analytic approach to reveal instances where partitioning 
occurs. I explained what partitioning is – a practice whereby the boundaries of categories are 
explored (Sacks, 1995) and thus who the incumbents of those categories are changes. I built 
on Butler’s (2008) work to focus on how “the application of different categories also shifts 
the kinds of relationships between members” (p.156) to reveal how categorial and relational 
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work is conducted in disputes. I demonstrated that, in the context of disputes, a 
reconfiguration of the participants’ relationship affords challenges to be brought off or 
suppressed. Moreover, I examined Poulios’ (2016) claims that partitioning ‘distances’ to 
further specify his findings and reveal the specific interactional outcomes of partitioning. 
   
The analysis offered insights into how speakers treat the boundedness of membership 
categorisation devices and how this boundedness offers a resource through which challenges 
can be brought off or suppressed. For instance, I presented examples where a family device 
replaced (and covered) the relevance of the institutional ‘radio’ device, and through this 
reconfiguration the speaker was able to, in the first instance, push back against the rights of 
the radio presenter and finally reject the premise for his challenge. In that example, the 
speaker was able to suspend the dispute and bring the talk to a close. In other examples, the 
cover category was produced to smuggle potentially-sanctionable actions under seemingly-
innocent moves or the cover category was invoked to sanction the target on the basis of some 
disjuncture between the currently operated category and their prior talk. Consequently, these 
cover categories operated with respect to some social norm, similar to the practice outlined in 
Chapter 3 whereby the social norm being produced is done so that the target can be seen as 
transgressing that norm. 
 
 This chapter showed members’ own demonstrable orientations to invoking alternate 
bodies of common-sense knowledge and their mundane sense-making practices through how 
alternate category devices organised the ongoing dispute. This chapter illustrated a particular 
practice pertinent in disputes (and in other talk) that is deployed so that members can manage 
the contingencies of bringing off particular actions. The analysis highlights how partitioning 
manages access to resources and participation in the dispute – specifically, the generation of 
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certain actions, who can and is participating in the dispute and on what grounds they are 
participating. Unlike previous studies where partitioning organises the overarching structure 
of who is participating in activity and on what grounds (Butler, 2016; Evans & Fitzgerald, 
2016), in these disputes it configures who these people are to each other. In that sense it is a 
powerful practice for the reconfiguration of relationships (see Butler, 2008) and for bringing 
off or suppressing challenges.  
 
6.1.3 Chapter 5: Doing being (un)reasonable 
 
 
The final analytic chapter contributes to our understanding of the normative practices of 
disputing – in this analysis, I show how participants explicitly attend to violative conduct as a 
way of being seen as reasonable. This builds on the prior chapters to detail how speakers do 
being reasonable in disputes, and to discuss how structural organisation of disputes can be 
used as a resource to that end. In this chapter I focused specifically on how members 
themselves treat the structure of disputes. This chapter addresses how speakers display an 
orientation toward the dispute and thus provides evidence for what actually constitutes a 
dispute. The analysis focused on two ways that speakers manage subjectivity and 
(un)reasonableness in and through disputes. These are: (1) presenting one’s own conduct as 
reasonable, and (2) presenting an other’s conduct as unreasonable. I situated these against 
explicit orientations to reasonable to show how the explicit usage and meta-talk described in 
the chapter are both backward-looking (in terms of recasting the prior talk) and are used in 
ways that concede. The findings show that being a reasonable person is invoked as a moral 
category through how participants (re)work witnessable conduct and produce a purportedly 
rational account for that conduct through metadiscursive moves. Producing rationality is 
rhetorical (see Billig, 1987) whereby rational is not logical, but rather the efforts to produce 
that rationality are seeable as grounded and reasonable (Simons, 2013). 
 239 
 
The analysis showed how people made use of the metadiscourse during disputes, by 
‘talking about the talk’ that comprised the interactions. Comments on the production of 
interaction included mentions of turn taking (e.g. “can I talk”), word choice, turn design, 
social actions and stance taking. I discussed how meta-talk was used in ways that (1) 
maintained the progressivity of the dispute, (2) resists reaching a point of closure (on the 
other speaker’s terms), and (3) restricts the grounds to argue back as the meta-talk does not 
directly address the other speaker but rather speaks to an audience other than that speaker.  
 
The chapter presented two ways that doing being (un)reasonable is accomplished. 
First, by presenting the other’s conduct as unreasonable, I revealed how speakers point to the 
other speaker’s transgression of the interactional order – this appeared to be exclusively used 
to challenge the other speaker in a way that does not attack their position but dismisses their 
turn. It highlights the failure of the other speaker to turn-take in a reasonable way and 
consequently disrupts the speaker’s ongoing action. Second, by presenting one’s own conduct 
as reasonable, in this section I demonstrated how speakers described their own conduct as 
according with social order and the local expectations. Although this highlighting points to 
the speaker’s own conduct, it achieves a similar outcome to the first way – it casts the other 
as transgressing that social order and promotes their own behaviour as successfully according 
with that social order. Indeed, speakers have the opportunity to disrupt the other speaker’s 
talk but also, rather than simply retaining speakership, speakers could launch a new sequence 
that is independent from the prior talk.   
 
This section has summarised the three analytic chapters. I have highlighted the core 
findings that speak to the structural organisation of disputes and how these interconnect with 
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turn design. These chapters are tied together through the close examination of public 
disputes, and the three themes which run throughout this thesis: morality and categories, 
sequence and accounting, and disputes. In the next section I will unpack each of these themes 
to discuss the contribution to each of them this thesis makes.  
 
6.2 Research contributions 
 
Overall, my thesis has contributed to the small body of empirically-grounded interactional 
research on public disputes. The spectrum of public disputes analysed serves to showcase 
three regularly occurring interactional features as occurring across contexts but tied to the 
activity of disputing. These features can occur in mundane or institutional talk as discussed in 
the analytic chapters, and show how people display adversarial stances against a prior topic, 
turn or person. Findings from the analysis have illuminated some ways in which speakers 
challenge and resist challenges in disputes – from the sequential organisation of these actions, 
to the moral implicativeness of their conduct, to the design of their turns. I have extended our 
understanding of what actually happens in disputes by examining how members complain, 
account, accuse, reject, rebuke, and admonish one another in and through talk-in-interaction.  
Significantly, my thesis has deployed a methodological framework for using three 
EM approaches for undertaking interactional research into these relatively under-researched 
areas. The combination of MCA/DP/CA to approach interaction highlights the 
interwovenness of sequence, turn design and morality as they are done on a turn-by-turn 
basis. Indeed, this thesis moves beyond methodological differences to focus squarely on the 
phenomenon to provide the fullest picture of what that practice/operation/action 
accomplishes sequentially and rhetorically and how it may be consequential for who the 
people are, and what they are doing. For these reasons, I would advocate for working trans-
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approach within EM so as to not be restricted by the small methodological differences and 
also that the focus on methodology does not detract from the focus on the phenomenon. I 
have engaged with new and ethically uncertain issues of data collection whereby the ‘ethical 
guidelines’ are still being written with some guidelines (see BPS, 2018) characterising this as 
‘public data’ which does not adequately capture the specific characteristics or deal with 
vulnerable participants (for a more extended discussion on ethics and transcription see 
Chapter 2). This thesis, in particular Chapter 2, offers an instructive framework and 
advocates for future research into and using online video sources – it’s a bounteous area of 
data that showcases a variety of hitherto un(der)researched places of everyday life.   
6.2.1 Morality and Categories 
 
 
In the following section I will report the contribution that this research makes to work on 
morality and categories in talk-in-interaction. The findings from the analysis demonstrated 
different features of talk which constitute to and are constituted by the moral and sequential 
order of interaction. My analysis corresponds with Bergmann’s (1998) ‘lived morality’ as 
morality is something which is constructed in and through interaction (see also: Edwards, 
1991; Jayyusi, 1984; 1991; Silverman, 1997). However, I argued that seemingly disordered 
talk is purposeful, and a useful tool for participants, rather than an orientation to an alternate 
‘order’. It is things like disruption that create, or make the activity identifiable as disordered. 
In this sense, matters of disputing are talked into being by the disputers themselves, as 
Bergman (1992, p.154) explains: 
“there is not first an embarrassing, delicate, morally dubious event… instead, the 
delicate characteristic of an event is constituted by the very act of talking about it 
cautiously and discreetly”.  
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One of the approaches employed in this thesis was membership categorisation 
analysis and as such, a central focus was on members’ use and uptake of categories in and 
through disputes. This work contributes by examining disputative episodes of interaction 
using MCA, to explore how categories are displayed in and through extended sequences of 
hostility and why those categories are mobilised. This builds on work by Eglin and Hester 
(2003); Housley and Fitzgerald (2001); Leudar and Nekvapil (1998) who all show similar 
themes with how conflict constitutes and is constituted by dispute. In general, these studies 
illuminate the link between micro-category usage and the macro-level social order of 
hostility. I too illuminate this link through the findings, showing categories as inference rich 
cultural devices, though my findings demonstrate a particular practice through which this 
occurs. Participants typically invoke other categories (over the omnipresent and relatively 
anonymous category of ‘member of the public’) which cut across that general co-
membership, such as ‘employed’, ‘father’, or ‘service provider’ as resources that warrant 
challenges or resistance. Consequently, these other categories are produced to make visible 
certain associations (Sacks, 1979), become a resource for action (Stokoe, 2012a), are 
constituted by those actions, and position participants relative to one another. Categories and 
devices are situated in disputes and serve as resources for doing morality; that is, they 
produce a framework of appropriateness and the local moral order of who the participants are 
to each other (Nikander, 2000).  
 
 Who the participants are to each other speaks to the relationship work which 
participants do in and through disputes. In the analytic chapters I considered the relationship 
between the disputants as ‘new’ and thus without the ‘baggage’ of pre-existing rules and 
rituals of how these people act with one another. People in disputes occupy categories which 
configure their relationship to one another in certain ways – for instance, claiming 
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incumbency of ‘train guard’ positions them in a hierarchical relationship with ‘passenger’; 
conversely, claiming incumbency of ‘nice guy’ reconfigures the relationship to be 
symmetrical with the passenger i.e. through use of a ‘human’ device in which they are co-
members (Chapter 4, extract 3). Configuring the relationship is a resource for participants in 
these disputes – the making relevant, and consequential of ‘who they are to one another’ 
influences the distribution of rights and responsibilities according to their local interactional 
context.  
 
The analysis reveals the implications of this relationship work on how participants 
deal with challenges and resistance (and whether they are ratified as successful). I argue, 
along the lines of Leudar et al.’s (2004) finding, that in public dispute, it is not a case of ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ (or aggressor versus victim) as independent category pairs, but as coordinated 
by the very actions that are being performed in those moments. Indeed, participants dispute 
on the basis of who-they-are to the other speaker(s) and the who-they-are is fluid is 
renegotiated in and through the talk. This is developed by Tileagă (2005; 2010) who notes 
that the us and the them are representations of the extreme differences between participants. 
Specifically, in these public disputes, speakers work to be seen as the ‘us’, as the ordinary, 
reasonable member of society in this local environment and cast the other(s) as beyond 
comparison and outside of their moral order. As shown in Chapter 5, speakers must walk the 
interactional tightrope of espousing their view/opinion/belief whilst not being treated as the 
perpetrator, aggressor or cause of the dispute. 
 
Speakers, through categorisation work, position themselves against certain 
interactional trajectories insofar as the predicates and attributes of their category preclude 
them from the accusation, challenge, or some otherwise problematic action. This is one way 
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that resistance can be brought off by participants, given that categories are easily invokable in 
‘first encounters’ and are not easily refutable (on an evidential basis at least). Indeed, 
categories as cultural devices, and their associated rights, responsibilities and obligations, can 
be mobilised to align with their own position to reinforce that position and manage resistance 
against other (incongruent) positions.  
 
Participants treat one another on the basis of one another’s talk as being a local 
problem that ought to be dealt with. Speakers can claim incumbency of categories which 
have the rights and responsibilities to challenge, accuse and call-out problematic conduct in 
that environment. For example, being seen and heard as employed (and a contributing 
member of society) provides the rights and responsibilities to call-out problematic conduct on 
the basis of employment status.  
 
In this section, I discussed morality as a feature of disputes and how disruptions, 
transgressions and otherwise violative behaviour represents the moral order in disputes. 
Morality is an ongoing members’ concern that is made evident in recognition of social norms, 
in a transgression to those norms and in the consequences of a possible transgression. Indeed, 
members reify their positions as correct, or in some way legitimate, on the basis of who-they-
are and who the other speaker is. For instance, they can highlight the other’s conduct as a 
transgression in order to cast them as the disruptor and themselves as the victim. More 
specifically, it is not the content of the dispute (e.g. different opinions, views, positions) 
which are inherently adversarial or disputative, but rather it is how participants exhibit these 
opinions, views and positions as oppositional and how they deal with transgressions to social 
norms that speaks to what a dispute is. To this end, I outlined the importance of paying close 
attention to members’ category usage as constituted by and for actions. Categories are 
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implicative to the action which is being brought off and the relationship which is being 
configured between the participants during a dispute. Consequently, members’ category 
usage informs us about their sense-making processes and the local reasoning through which 
opinions and views are espoused in disputes. The following section builds on category work 
to discuss the relevance of sequence, resistance and challenges in disputes.   
 
6.2.2 Sequence, Resistance, and Challenges 
 
 
I began this thesis by outlining the basic structural organisation of a dispute from how 
disputes begin (for example, see Coulter’s (1990) dispute-initiation sequence) to how 
disputes end (see Church, 2009; Dersley & Wootton, 2001; Vuchinich, 1990). I also outlined 
some sequential features of disputes, noting that challenges may push forward some (new) 
trajectory and in response, resistance is a relevant next turn to occupy that space. The 
primary interactional features that characterise disputes are disagreement, disalignment, 
dispreference and disaffiliation. The findings show these occurring throughout the public 
disputes, which is not unexpected i.e. they are the very features that constitute a dispute and 
make it a candidate for inclusion in a collection of disputes. For instance, alignment is 
achieved by participants as they go along with the disputative project (Schegloff, 2007a), 
though the dispute is marked by disalignment at points where alignment is clearly prompted 
i.e. speakers align at the level of the activity (disputing) but disalign at the level of the project 
(e.g. an unfitted turn to resist a challenge). For instance, in Chapter 3, I explored how 
resistance may be conceptualised in terms of its outcome i.e. that it may align with the prior 
turn yet avail a disaffiliative stance. Indeed, disaligning and/or disaffiliating within a turn 
constitutes alignment at the activity level as disputes are constituted by not-going-along with 
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the other speaker.  
 
 Speakers in a dispute may design their turns as aligning or affiliative and thus 
cooperative with the other speaker(s), but remain in a dispute. In these instances, the speakers 
are ostensibly cooperating, but these turns are marked insofar as they are produced in the 
service of some upcoming challenge, otherwise the dispute would have ended. For example, 
an enticer which ‘suspends’ the dispute by asking a straightforward question in the service of 
crafting an incongruity between that position and their previously espoused position. In 
Chapter 4, I showed how participants may endorse their co-participant’s position to affiliate 
at certain moments (and become co-members within a category device), but in the service of 
pursuing their own agenda to seek compliance, produce a logical incongruity or otherwise 
end up as taking different positions. Given these sequential features of disputes, partitioning 
configures how speakers may be sanctioned for their behaviour. Speakers’ sanctions are 
disaffiliative in nature as they regulate the other’s behaviour in some way – though this is a 
careful tightrope that must be walked as the sanctioner treats themselves as having the rights 
to sanction, which is a sanctionable position as they themselves may be sanctioned on that 
basis (see Chapter 3, extract 5).  
 
 This thesis also contributes to the literature on resistance. In the literature review I 
outlined how resistance has been conceptualised and highlight some of the forms resistance 
can take in and through talk. Moreover, I identified the gap for examining resistance in non-
institutional settings where there is not a goal or activity to be pushed back against. With this 
in mind, the first analytic chapter specifically examined the forms and sequential placement 
of resistance in response to a challenge. I identified different forms of resistance as weak or 
strong, drawing on Dooley et al.’s (2019) study on active/passive resistance – I observed how 
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the outcomes of that resistance allow it to be characterised in those terms. Specifically, I 
showed how resistance which pushes back against the prior turn but aligns and thus does not 
outrightly disrupt the trajectory can be considered ‘weak’, whereas resistance that outrightly 
rejects or disaligns from the prior turn and thus disrupts the interactional trajectory can be 
considered ‘strong’. These terms are analysts’ categories but are grounded in those particular 
interactional outcomes. This research highlights the need for more EMCA research into 
resistance and its conceptualisation as something people do in talk. Specifically, this research 
builds on existing studies on resistance (e.g. Hepburn & Potter, 2011; Humă, Stokoe & 
Sikveland, 2019; Muntigl et al., 2013 etc.) to show how resistance actually manifests in and 
through interactions across various contests in order to precisely identify those social actions 
which constitute resistance (e.g. rejection, refusal, non-responses, transformative answers 
etc.). 
 
 The findings also present an understanding of challenges. In the literature review I 
discussed challenges as a fuzzy category which do not have the quality of a technical term, 
but are nonetheless observable in disputes and can be pinned down. I described literature that 
details phases of a challenge (Reynolds, 2015), or how leveraging epistemic status produces a 
challenge (Heritage, 2013), or how disputants produce themselves as challenger and target 
(Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987). Thus, I investigated challenges not as individual social actions 
but in Koshik’s (2003) terms as actions which convey a negative assertion toward another 
speaker, and are marked by the challenger as having control over the direction of talk. 
Moreover, in the extracts presented, there are very few challenges that may be considered 
‘successful’; however, the terms of ‘success’ do not precisely describe challenges as an 
operation that do achieve a momentary win as the producer is able to control the direction of 
the talk.  
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This thesis has shown the importance of paying close attention to the sequential 
organisation of disputes and the precise operations by which resistance and challenges occur. 
This tells us about the dynamic nature of social interaction and how the fabric of social life is 
not static, but ever changing, and is produced in social interaction. The findings of this thesis 
highlight how participants do being disputative by disalinging with a straightforward 
question, by claiming incumbency of an alternate category in order to alienate or suppress the 
other speaker(s) rights and responsibilities, or by being (un)reasonable. I suggest that this 
(dis)order is a feature of the first encounter (not having pre-established rituals, but instead 
relying on rituals for interacting with strangers) and that for speakers, to be ratified as a 
disputer, have to be seen to be invested in doing disputing or else be accountable for their 
inattention toward the disputative matters.  
 
6.2.3 Disputes 
 
This thesis contributes to the empirically-grounded literature on disputes, providing an up-to-
date look at the very specific things which people do in disputes. More specifically, it 
contributes to the small body of literature on public disputes. This has been done by 
examining those very specific things which people do in disputes from a CA perspective; 
additionally, it provides a look into what disputes ontologically are in the emic sense, and 
how participants themselves systematically produce disputes as an ongoing activity. As 
described in the literature review, previous work has debated what makes a dispute with 
authors such as Goodwin (1982) and Schmitt and Márquez-Reiter (2019) viewing 
disagreement as not constitutive of a dispute (though a part of one) – my findings support 
their view. The analysis shows that participants can work to be seen as not-disagreeing, 
usually toward some adversarial ends – for instance, in Chapter 3, being momentarily in 
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agreement in order to point to some hypocrisy in a co-interlocutor’s argument. Moreover, 
throughout this thesis I demonstrated that, for both analysts and members, the content of a 
dispute does not necessarily constitute a dispute but rather, it is the structural organisation of 
the dispute which informs analysts (and participants to some extent) that they are doing 
disputing. Indeed, members and analysts purport concern with what disputes are about 
(Allen, 1995; Carnevale & Pegnetter, 1985; Terry, 1987), yet in the majority of the data 
analysed, this appears to be secondary to the overall structure of what’s happening on a turn-
by-turn basis.  
 
I would suggest that this attendance to structure over content is specific to this type of 
dispute where participants are engaged in activities at the intersection of ‘first encounters’ 
and ‘disputes’. Comparatively, in family disputes where the participants are known to one 
another, and in formal debates, then the matters at hand (the content) may take more 
precedence in being dealt with as doing disputing may not necessarily be useful for what the 
participants are seeking to accomplish (such as: getting a child to do homework (Flint, pers. 
comm.), doing participatory democracy (Mondada, 2013b), or mediating messages (Hutchby, 
1997)) and so the content is more important than the structure (and as being seen to be doing 
disputing). In spite of this, content and structure are interrelated and not independent from 
one another. Across the analytic chapters I showed how participants formulate sequences in 
ways which are systematically related to the content of the dispute. For example, in Chapter 5 
I discuss the grounds (content) of a dispute (factual versus theoretical matters) being 
mobilised in ways that counter-challenge and/or undermine the other speaker’s position. In 
that instance the content of the dispute was exploited within and across sequences so as to 
craft incongruities with the others position, or to render them as an incumbent of a 
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problematic category (such as aggressor).  
 
The contribution to understanding disputes then is grounded in the ritual behaviours 
which occur in and through disputative talk – a dispute is characterised by the ‘normal’ rules 
and rituals of everyday life ceasing to operate and being replaced by an alternate set of 
rituals. The dynamic ordering of talk is a members’ resource allowing them to negotiate what 
the rules and rituals are (i.e. how people do being in a dispute) and what may be rendered as 
accountable or as a violation to this order. Consequently, social order gets manipulated, 
reworked and exploited in and through talk-in-interaction. The order of a dispute is disorder: 
sequential and moral norms of everyday life serve as a key resource in doing disputes – an 
orientation to both offer mechanisms for holding people to account for their behaviour within 
the dispute and more generally, it’s made visible in ways that it hardly ever is in other 
contexts. Speakers rhetorically deploy their recognisance of their sense-making practices and 
mundane reasoning through their own careful manipulation of talk. 
 
The interactional features identified and analysed throughout this thesis are drawn 
from a variety of interactional contexts (public, radio, and protest), and in a variety of 
interactional environments (e.g. on public transport, in police encounters, on political talk 
shows). This limits the claims which can be made about those specific environments, and 
moreover, each environment influences who the participants are to each other and how they 
act (Butler & Fitzgerald, 2010). The variety of contexts and environments within which these 
phenomenon occur serves to showcase that the interactional features identified are not tied to 
specific contexts, nor do they occur because of some institutional business (i.e. radio talk, or 
police business). The features analysed occur across contexts. This means, as Rawls (2008) 
also describes, that there are a features of how people do disputing which are the ‘constitutive 
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rules’ – meaning that, although the way in which turns and actions are designed is sensitive to 
those local environments, they have the same outcomes (e.g. blocking access to a third turn) 
which marks the participants as being engaged in disputing. 
 
Disputes as examined empirically using interactional approaches can be considered as 
‘difficult’ data – the recordings are usually unclear, there is an abundance of overlap and 
shouting, the opinions being espoused can often be discriminatory and offensive and the 
interactions can seemingly have no purpose other than to do disputing. This thesis builds on 
conversation analytic work on disputes (e.g. Church, 2009; Coulter, 1990; Goodwin & 
Goodwin, 1987; Reynolds, 2015 etc.) to put forward a case for more cross-context 
investigations of disputes. The interactional features discussed in the literature review are 
context-specific (e.g. children’s disputes (Church, 2009); police disputes (Kidwell, 2018); 
neighbour disputes (Stokoe & Edwards, 2007) etc.), and as such the claims that they make 
are restricted to those environments. This thesis brings together that research to show how it 
is applicable (but sensitive to) other interactional environments. Indeed, the analysis in 
Chapter 5 supports David, Rawls and Trainum’s (2017) work on how disputes are rule-
governed. It shows that although there are certain ‘special arenas’ of everyday life where 
doubt and dispute is endemic (Edwards, 2007), disputes are organised with respect to how 
people treat the interaction (i.e. we should take one turn at a time).  
 
This notwithstanding, disputes offer a site of interaction where complex practices 
occur over extended sequences, and they reveal members’ mundane sense-making practices 
over who-they-are and what-they’re-doing and how they talk the who-they-are into being. 
These reasons were showcased throughout this thesis – contributing a starting point for future 
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research and to demonstrate the fruitfulness of disputes as an area of empirically-grounded 
research that we should not be apprehensive about.  
 
This section outlined some of the core research contributions which this thesis makes. 
I reported on the findings which speak to morality and sequence, categories, accounting and 
more generally on disputes. These four contributions demonstrate the gap in the literature and 
provide a springboard for future research. In the following section I will discuss some of the 
limitations of the present study and how they may be rectified. I will then explore some 
possible avenues for future research which build on my findings.  
 
6.3 Limitations and Future directions 
 
 
In this section I outline some limitations with the thesis. These limitations do not detract from 
the research presented in this thesis, rather they reflect on possible problems with the data 
collection and methodological approach which could be rectified in future work. I will also 
discuss possible future avenues for research which build on the thesis, identify further gaps in 
interactional literature on disputes and explore possibilities for public engagement in 
translating the findings beyond the intended scholarly audience.  
 
6.3.1 Limitations  
 
It can be argued that the thesis is limited methodologically over the claims it is able to make, 
and also limited in this regard by the varied nature of the data used. The former is a limitation 
to what the research can offer in terms of ‘answering’ problems using EMCA approaches. 
The approach taken is described concisely by Sacks (1984, p.413) 
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“the idea is to take singular sequences of conversation and tear them apart in such a 
way as to find rules, techniques, procedures, methods, maxims […] that can be used 
to generate the orderly features we find in the conversations we examine”  
The close examination of talk then does not seek to provide solutions to problems, but 
rather understand members’ own solutions and work out what those problems are (Maynard, 
pers. comm.). In this regard, this thesis does not attempt to solve, mediate or otherwise 
provide a solution to public disputes. This could be argued as a limitation to the scope and 
purpose of the research; however, unpicking those interactional features offers insights into 
the ‘technology of disputes’ and goes some distance to develop the taxonomy of disputative 
talk outlined in Chapter 1, insofar as understanding how a dispute is actually structured rather 
than relying on its content allows us to see those differences. Therefore, this research is 
limited in its ability to provide some solution to the ‘problem’ of public disputes, but it can 
show those structures that constitute a dispute, how they unfold and how they are successful 
or not (to the participants) which allows for the accurate identification of disputes. 
A further limitation to the study regards how the disputes were recorded and 
subsequently collected. The video/audio recordings were largely taken and uploaded for two 
purposes (though not mutually exclusive): for entertainment whereby the dispute is recorded 
by a member of the public and then produced for the enjoyment of others – this concerns the 
radio disputes and the public disputes which are regularly uploaded to YouTube with 
captions that point to them as humorous. The second purpose is for evidential and/or 
noteworthiness – these are the police encounters and the public disputes. The police 
encounters are filmed by the police, and often by the public and often get uploaded by News 
channels as newsworthy; similarly the public disputes are recorded by bystanders because (1) 
they are breaches of everyday expectations of how people ought to act in public, and/or (2) 
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they are evidencing what actually happened in case of future police involvement. As such, 
these reasons preclude recording moments where disputes are not escalated or made 
‘noteworthy’ in some way and so the disputes collect tend to be on the ‘extreme’ end; they 
also mean that the beginnings of disputes are rarely captured – only when the dispute has 
become noteworthy and the recorder has a chance to begin filming. Indeed, because of this I 
miss an important component of disputes (with the exception of radio disputes) – how they 
start. Missing this and other information about the context or actions can limit access to 
members’ understandings and make it difficult to follow the course of events. There are also 
issues with the recording itself – poor camera angles, poor sound quality, poor video quality – 
the recordings are only a partial record of what has transpired – however, that is always the 
case (as we can never be ‘in’ the participants’ experiences) but it is particularly salient here.  
An additional limitation tied to the prior is that of data selection and the possibility 
that data may have been edited. As I outlined in Chapter 2, I used a number of inductive 
search terms and relied on YouTube’s algorithm to recommend similar videos. The data 
collection then was formed around those specific terms – possibly excluding other types of 
disputes which may be described using other members terms unknown to me. Furthermore, 
though I made every effort to exclude those data that appeared edited in any way, it can 
sometimes be very difficult to tell if editing has occurred and to a certain extent, all of these 
videos are produced for YouTube. This limitation is partially remedied by using the next-turn 
proof procedure to see how it is responsive to the prior turn and if it sequentially makes sense 
(in an analyst as member sense) but this is not infallible. 
 On this, Laurier (2013) and Strangelove (2010) both note that the recording and video 
publisher are also members and analysable as such. This raises a limitation (or at least an 
important question); these recordings offer a single and privileged perspective of these 
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interactions and analysis may only have access to that perspective (e.g. people who (a) have 
access to a recording device, and (b) are comfortable recording in public). ‘Exposing’ these 
perspectives is not a concern as the original videos often garner thousands and millions of 
views; however, a concern is how this perspective shapes what the research can look like. It 
relies on analysts to judge whether a perspective is being privileged and whether or not to 
include someone in the analysis. There are some guidelines (see BPS, 2018) around 
vulnerable people – but what this means in practice is fuzzy as we are unlikely to have access 
to how these people would report themselves (e.g. vulnerable, a child, non-consenting). 
These are not new concerns for researchers, however and there are not straightforward 
answers.  
6.3.2 Future directions 
 
This thesis builds on previous research but also provides a starting point for future research. 
There are four major directions for future research identified through the analytic chapters. 
First, there is a need for expanding the empirical exploration of ‘ordinariness’. I built on 
Sacks’ (1995) ‘doing being ordinary’ to uncover what ‘reasonable’ means for members; 
however, I only scratched the surface and future research should consider explicit 
orientations to doing being reasonable and also unpack members sense-making practices for 
‘being reasonable’ in and through talk. Second, partitioning has been scarcely researched and 
as such further research ought to be considered to explore how the social world is divided and 
put-together as a moment-by-moment accomplishment. A possible venture is to consider 
embodied features of interaction regarding how categories are deployed and understood; this 
will not only build on partitioning research (see Butler, 2008; Evans & Fitzgerald, 2016; 
Poulios, 2016; Stokoe, 2012a) but also provide insights into how embodied practices shape 
and are shaped by culture-in-action. Third, a future line of research ought to specify the 
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interactional particulars of resistance. There is a small body of literature on resistance-in-
interaction, and it can be understood as an obstacle to overcome (Humă, 2019) – however, 
there are questions over what can be said to be resistance and how resistance may be a useful 
(and perhaps trainable) resource for people.  Though I broadly conceptualised turns in 
disputes as challenging or resistance, drawing on extent bodies of literature which describe 
actions in those terms – there is very little research which pulls together turn design, 
sequence organisation and the moral order under the more general understanding of 
resistance. Finally, this thesis utilises a fairly underexplored corpus of data – a possible 
direction for future research is to expand upon this thesis’ use of data to explore the lesser 
researched or even known environments of everyday life, this includes (but is not limited to): 
self-recorded videos of activism, protestor confrontations, and other areas where disorder is 
the purpose.  
6.3.2.1 Theoretical Implications 
 
 
This thesis offers empirical insights into the interactional machinery of disputes. As discussed 
in the literature review, empirical interactional research answers questions grounded in what 
actually happens rather than relying on an ascription of motivation or reason. I discussed how 
answering why people argue is not a fruitful avenue for EMCA research as it unnecessarily 
ascribes motivations for the participants’ behaviour. Thus, this research contributes two key 
implications for theoretically-driven research into disputes: first, that an interactional 
investigation of disputes yields findings which can have concrete practical implications for 
those involved in disputes (see following section); second, that disputes are highly ordered, 
ritualised and rule-governed, but that orderliness is a particular frame inside of the 
overarching dispute frame. 
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 Goffman (1959; 1974) describes frames as interpretations of events which manage 
the impression others will have on those events and help people navigate those events. The 
analysis showed how people actually negotiate frames i.e. how the dispute frame is 
(re)produced. In Chapter 3 the findings reveal that through manufacturing a challenge on the 
basis of some social norms that participants craft a structure for the other participant to 
navigate (see Streek, 1986). Chapter 4 shows how participants manage who-they-are and thus 
the interpretation that the other speaker is availed of them – (re)configuring the frame so that 
the action they are producing can be made sense of by the other participants (see Goffman, 
1955). Similarly, Chapter 5 shows how participants explicitly manage two frames – the 
dispute and ‘normal’ everyday talk. Participants neatly transpose the latter frame in ways that 
then cast the prior talk as belonging to the dispute frame i.e. highlighting the other’s conduct 
as disputative for the ‘normal’ frame of society. In these senses, participants are not 
negotiating the frame of the dispute (see Nielsen et al., 2012), but rather are guiding and 
navigating the dispute through frames of social norms and who-they-are.  
 
6.3.2.2 Practical Implications 
 
EMCA in fairly recent times has seen the fruits of its analysts’ work translated into 
communication training for practitioners in across different fields (see: medical interactions 
(Heritage et al., 2007; Pino et al., 2016), police interviews (Stokoe, 2013), phone helplines 
(Hepburn & Potter, 2007), mediation services (Stokoe & Sikveland, 2016), and crisis 
negotiations (Stokoe & Sikveland, 2019)). The insights generated by paying close attention to 
the interactional particulars in these environments has provided an empirical basis to create or 
improve training. These studies have examined particular institutional environments where 
there is some institutionally desired outcome. This is unlike my data where the strangers 
appear not to have some predetermined goal to accomplish. However, this research 
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empirically unpicks how disputes unfold which is extremely useful for people who (1) are 
involved in doing disputing (e.g. crisis negotiators), (2) want to avoid disputing (e.g. police 
officers) or (3) want to prevent disputes from occurring (e.g. mediation). Similarly, 
examining the structures of talk through which participants can successfully bring off 
challenges is supremely useful as it provides a framework through which we may challenge 
the difficult to challenge moments of everyday life, such as discriminatory or offensive talk 
i.e. the research speakers to fundamental aspects of human interaction that may not be unique 
to disputes.   
Challenging others is one side of the coin, the other is resistance and how we can 
successfully resist against another’s course of action. Resistance is a cornerstone social 
scientific topic and one which is regularly used in tandem with persuasion. There is ample 
literature on how to do persuasion and the best ways to convince people, yet there is a 
relative scarcity of research that consolidates resistance. Resistance is a useful skill for 
everyone from an early age (Kent, 2012), for instance: how to reasonably resist in ways 
which are not sanctionable (see Kitzinger & Frith, 1999). This is a fruitful avenue for future 
research and has practical implications across environments and disciplines.  
This section has discussed some of the limitations of this thesis. I explained possible 
problems with the claims being made, the data and the data collection procedure. In each of 
these instances, I provided an explanation as to why they should be considered as limitations 
but do not detract from the research findings. I then discussed some ways that future research 
could build upon and improve the work carried out here. I specifically mentioned research on 
doing being reasonable, on partitioning and on the use of this type of data. This was a non-
exhaustive list of possible directions. This thesis, epistemologically, provides some starting 
points for future researchers who may otherwise be put off by difficult data/phenomenon to 
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show that they need not be nervous about analysing complex practices and that this thesis 
highlights some specific features of talk to start the analysis with.  
6.4 Concluding comments 
 
 
This chapter summarised the thesis and discussed the analytic findings as the product of this 
thesis. Moreover, I outlined the four primary research contributions: (1) morality and 
sequence, (2) categories, (3) accounting, and (4) disputes. I explored some limitations of the 
thesis before speculating how these limitations may be rectified in future studies as well as 
possible avenues of research which arise out of this thesis.  
Parties to a dispute effectively do two things: challenge and resist; and in doing so 
they achieve control over the interactional trajectory. People can claim a ‘win’ of the dispute 
by getting the other to concede to a challenge – however, when there are virtually no stakes 
for the future relationship then concessions rarely occur. This notwithstanding, participants 
may realise momentary ‘wins’ by taking a turn. Every opportunity to espouse a view, to 
challenge the other speaker(s), or to resist against a challenge means an opportunity to (1) 
control the direction of talk, (2) ‘prevent’ other speakers, and (3) configure the moral order of 
the dispute. Consequently, these three products of turn taking move the dispute in a direction 
favourable to the current speaker. 
Ethnomethodological approaches offer insights into the fabric of social life and 
reveals the mundane sense-making that participants are engaged with in and through all talk-
in-interaction. For instance, categories and relationship work which are seemingly 
unwarranted in disputative first encounters are highly consequential for the talk; similarly, 
disputes are windows into how participants negotiate the moral order and do work to be seen 
as incumbents of certain categories thus examining these practices through methods grounded 
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in what actually happens affords us with these clear insights and understandings of the social 
world.  
Public disputes are peculiar. They feature countless transgressions and violative 
behaviour against a presupposed normative understanding of how people should act in public. 
Such features include, but are not limited to: overlapping talk, enticing challenges, resistive 
moves against prior turns, disaffiliative stances against the other speaker, and disalignment. 
In many ways, responding to these features with similar features (X begets X) ratifies the 
activity of disputing. I would like to conclude by admiring the delicate co-ordination that 
occurs in disputes. Though disputes are ostensibly breaching expectations of social order, 
they shine a light on members’ constitution of social and moral (dis)order.   
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Appendix A: Jefferson Transcription Symbols 
Taken from Hepburn & Bolden (2017) and adapted from Jefferson (2004).   
 
Symbol Name Use 
[ text ] Brackets Indicates the start and end points of overlapping 
speech. 
= Equal Sign Indicates the break and subsequent continuation of a 
single interrupted utterance. 
(# of 
seconds) 
Timed Pause A number in parentheses indicates the time, in 
seconds, of a pause in speech. 
(.) Micropause A brief pause, usually less than 0.2 seconds. 
. or p Period or Down 
Arrow 
Indicates falling pitch. 
? or n Question Mark 
or Up Arrow 
Indicates rising pitch. 
, Comma Indicates a temporary rise or fall in intonation. 
- Hyphen Indicates an abrupt halt or interruption in utterance. 
>text< Greater than / 
Less than 
symbols 
Indicates that the enclosed speech was delivered more 
rapidly than usual for the speaker. 
<text> Less than / 
Greater than 
symbols 
Indicates that the enclosed speech was delivered more 
slowly than usual for the speaker. 
° Degree symbol Indicates whisper or reduced volume speech. 
ALL CAPS Capitalized text Indicates shouted or increased volume speech. 
underline Underlined text Indicates the speaker is emphasizing or stressing the 
speech. 
::: Colon(s) Indicates prolongation of an utterance. 
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(hhh)  Audible exhalation 
? or 
(.hhh)  
High Dot Audible inhalation 
( text ) Parentheses Speech which is unclear or in doubt in the transcript. 
(( italic 
text )) 
Double 
Parentheses 
Annotation of non-verbal activity. 
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Appendix B: Mondadian Transcription Symbols 
Taken from Mondada (2016). Available at: 
https://franzoesistik.philhist.unibas.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/franzoesistik/mondada_multim
odal_conventions.pdf 
 
Symbol Use 
** 
++ 
∆∆   
Gestures and descriptions of embodied actions are delimited between  
two identical symbols (one symbol per participant 
and are synchronized with corresponding stretches of talk 
 
*--->  The action described continues across subsequent lines  
 
---->* until the same symbol is reached 
 
>>  The action described begins before the excerpt’s beginning. 
 
--->>  The action described continues after the excerpt’s end. 
 
.....  Action’s preparation 
 
----  Action’s apex is reached and maintained 
 
,,,,,  Action’s retraction 
 
ric  Participant doing the embodied action is identified when (s)he is not 
the speaker  
 
fig 
# 
The exact moment at which a screen shot has been taken is indicated 
with a specific symbol showing its position within the turn at talk 
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Appendix C: Practicalities 
Data Storage: 
 
Loughborough’s Policy 3 – Information categories and controls: 
https://www.lboro.ac.uk/services/registry/information-governance/policy3/ 
 
Loughborough’s Office 365 - https://www.lboro.ac.uk/services/it/staff/storage/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Example of an Office 365 group folder.  
 
 
Data Capture:  
 
Data for this thesis was captured using VLC Player, a freely available piece of software. The 
below guide details each step for downloading a video from online sources (YouTube etc.). 
 
VLC Video downloader -- https://www.videolan.org/ 
 
Step 1. Download VLC Player for OSX or Windows (comes as standard on most Windows 
machines). 
 
Step 2. Open VLC Player and navigate to ‘Open Network’ (see figure 5). 
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Figure 5. VLC Player interface on OSX and file system.  
 
 
Step 3. Input video URL and select ‘Open’ (see figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Opening the video source in VLC Player. 
 
 
Step 4. Navigate to ‘Media Information’ and copy the location URL (Cmd + C on OSX), 
(Ctrl + C on Windows) (see figure 7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Selecting Media Information and Location.  
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Step 5. Paste URL into browser (Cmd + V in OSX), (Ctrl + V in Windows).  
 
Step 6. Right-click on the video and select “Save Video As…” (see figure 8). Select the file 
location and a title.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Saving the video. 
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Appendix D: Data 
 
 
Extract # 
 
Extract Name 
 
URL 
 
Time 
Chapter 3: Resisting a normative challenge 
Extract 1 I think you’re racist 
 
https://youtu.be/HPfN_CVLnk
I  
[07:46-09:27] 
Extract 2.1 Bikinis 
 
https://youtu.be/y5AM_ckVRr
s  
[03:01-03:49] 
Extract 2.2 Bikinis 
 
https://youtu.be/y5AM_ckVRr
s  
[03:01-03:49] 
Extract 2.3 Bikinis 
 
https://youtu.be/y5AM_ckVRr
s  
[03:01-03:49] 
Extract 3 you’re 
unemployable’ 
 
https://youtu.be/XFIwMTRj6J
0 
[02:46-03:18] 
Extract 4.1  giving them truth’ https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=sMLQoBLo8xo  
 
[15:26-16:01] 
Extract 4.2 I have a hat on my 
head’  
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=sMLQoBLo8xo 
[16:01-16:24] 
Extract 5 Americans will pick 
strawberries 
 
https://youtu.be/xPOxX_8H2s4 [12:41-12:56] 
Extract 6 no black faces 
 
https://youtu.be/jzPBn5SLcxE [00:35-00:47] 
Chapter 4: Partitioning: Exploiting category boundaries 
Extract 1 Bikinis 
 
https://youtu.be/y5AM_ckVRr
s 
[03:01-03:49] 
Extract 2 saying something 
that’s obviously true  
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=t6pNxshjQMQ 
[03:40-04:37] 
Extract 3 actually a nice guy 
 
https://youtu.be/onKFay453U
w 
[12:54-14:37] 
Extract 4.1 do you know who I 
am 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=Y5zx1xzzi7k 
[01:10-01:45] 
Extract 4.2 do you know who I 
am 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=Y5zx1xzzi7k 
[01:10-01:45] 
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Extract 4.3 do you know who I 
am 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=Y5zx1xzzi7k 
[01:45-02:30] 
Extract 4.4 do you know who I 
am 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=Y5zx1xzzi7k 
[11:44-12:40] 
Extract 4.5 do you know who I 
am 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=Y5zx1xzzi7k 
[12:40-13:25] 
Extract 5 you’re leaving a 
drug house 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=8BVT6Lzebxg  
[01:20-01:50] 
Extract 6 DON’T 
INTERRUPT ME!  
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=piyrtI43sK4&t 
[13:40-14:44] 
Chapter 5: Doing being (un)reasonable 
Extract 1.1 trying to be 
reasonable 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=3fDF1lN-LPc&t=59s 
[05:20-05:39] 
Extract 1.2 deeply unreasonable 
person 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=3fDF1lN-LPc&t=59s 
[05:55-06:05] 
Extract 1.3 being very 
reasonable 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=4rRrwMV8Has&t=129s 
[06:33-06:53] 
Extract 2 can I talk 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=oJ0HsV0Jcvs&t=535s 
[08:30-08:53] 
Extract 3 do not interrupt me 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=piyrtI43sK4&t 
[14:20-14:44] 
Extract 4 don’t speak to me 
like that 
 
No longer available.  
Extract 5 why are you 
shouting 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=uxTkhG3K99k&t=2s 
[00:20-00:37] 
Extract 6 who ask you politely 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=uxTkhG3K99k&t=2s 
[00:40-00:58] 
Extract 7 you’ve misanswered 
it twice 
 
No longer available.   
Extract 8 shut up before I hit 
you 
 
No longer available.  
Extract 9 Nazis that were 
shooting people 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=oJ0HsV0Jcvs&t=535s 
[07:30-08:05] 
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Extract 10 moral decline in 
Britain 
 
https://youtu.be/y5AM_ckVRr
s 
[03:01-03:49] 
Extract 11 vacuous ambiguous 
term called religion 
 
https://youtu.be/y5AM_ckVRr
s 
[03:01-03:49] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
